

STRATEGIC TRIANGLE: CHINA-INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Saadat Hassan*

Imran Ali Noonari†

Abstract

As we know that in the region of Asia there is an on-going structural change that is reshaping the countries that are China-India-Pakistan. The two economic giants India and China are expanding economically and diplomatically on the Asian stage creating ample of threats and opportunities for Pakistan as well. In all this Pakistan is the one that borders among the two giants and has to think more in strategic terms either should ally completely with India or completely with China or to ally with both of them. The two rising powers are reshaping the global system structure as well and will play an important roles on the stage of new world. Their gradual rise will also profoundly influence the global economy system.

Pakistan is facing stark reality standing at the face of globalization as well. In order to embrace the benefits or to alleviate the perils of globalization, Pakistan needs to take a strategic repositioning of in various fields. In these strategic options for Pakistan is an independent variable and rising powers India and China are dependent variable. It also highlights China's growing inter-dependence and likely future satisfaction.

After the analysis of data it is concluded that this rise sparks the reality, what will be the future intentions of rising powers India and China? What conditions will it create for Pakistan in the near future as both the rising giants are learning to work together so some of the precautions should be taken by Pakistan in order to have place along with these emerging Asian Powers. China and India are in a position that China have more chance to win over India as strategic partner as opposed to a strategic ally like

* Ph.D Scholar, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad

† Lecture, Department of Political Science, University of Sindh, Jamshoro

Pakistan. Some further recommendations are also jotted down at the end of the paper.

Introduction

The rising great Asian powers CHINA and INDIA due to their increased economy and relations with outside international community have created some sort of perils and opportunities for Pakistan. Among the world's major emerging economies it is the only one that borders the two that are the fastest growing. It has China and India as its immediate neighbours. What is important from Pakistan's perspective is that China and India are learning to work together. China and Pakistan have conventionally valued one another as a strategic hedge in opposition to India. "For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India, "China is a high-value guarantor of security against India and in pursuit of this Pakistan has to leave for better choices to be made for his future.

Structural change in Asia among India, China, and Pakistan has been intense and is directly associated with the instability that has resulted. As these governments move forward on their regional and global power cycles, what points of non-linearity(critical points) yet await the region and the larger system, and with what effect? The uncertain relationships between both of the three countries is not just due to the new overt nuclearization of this sensitive triangle, structured around the highly volatile Kashmir. The legacy of distrust and conflict, the unresolved border issues, and the plurality of perceptions and options considered by decision-makers in each country add to the complexity of the regional scenario. The asymmetry paradigm, which favours China over India and India over Pakistan, offers certainly a clue to the triangle configuration, particularly to its strategic dimension. On one side China and India redefine their foreign policy with more emphasis on real-politic than on ideology whereas Pakistan seems stuck in the old regional sticky situation. China and India have reformed themselves to the point,

while projecting strongly their national specificity and some similar thinking seems to emerge slowly in Pakistan.

Paper also discusses the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become the fastest growing economy in the 21st century. This article aims at analysing China's growing relations with Central Asian Republics (CARs), discussing Chinese energy needs and its interest in Central Asian hydrocarbons as well as Central Asia's geo-economic and geo-strategic significance with focus on the implications of this interaction for Pakistan.

Overview

Relations among the three



China has emerged as an important factor in India-Pakistan dialogue. Since Pakistan came into being as an independent state, was struggling for establishing diplomatic ties with its neighbouring countries. In case of China and Pakistan both have got pleasure from a slam and mutually beneficial relationship. Pakistan started to have

diplomatic ties with China since the beginning of period 1951 and was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1950. Both the countries share a common border with their hostile neighbour India. Pakistan stayed a unwavering ally during Beijing's period of international isolation in the 1960s and early 1970s. China is also a very good friend of Pakistan since she came in to being and has always provided Pakistan with key military, technical, and economic assistance, which includes the transmit of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment as well. According to some experts the increasing relations between the United States and adversary India will eventually prompt Pakistan to drive for even closer ties with its longtime strategic security partner, China. Others say China's increased unease about Pakistan-based insurgency groups may cause Beijing to proceed with the relationship in a more cautious approach. Both the states have traditionally valued one another as a strategic hedge against India. Soviet and American military assistance to India in 1960's was one of the cause for having stronger relation between China and Pakistan. Pakistan is also a low-cost secondary deterrent to India, in Chinese perspective. Former Pakistani ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani told CFR.org in 2006, when he was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.¹

"For Pakistan," he said, "China is a high-value guarantor of security against India."

The religio-culture rivalry of Indo-Pak dates back to hundreds of years. There have been recorded clashes between minority Muslims and majority Hindus. History of India and Pakistan is overshadowed by the conflicts. As a matter of fact India-Pakistan has a history of Confidence Building Measurements (CBMs). Agreement like Indus water treaty, Simla agreement and Lahore declaration are the few success stories in this realm. Since the inception of both the States, these states have clearly remained at logger heads. The relationships between the two states remained

predominantly conflicted. The chief problem between the two states is Kashmir. Kashmir issue is straining their relationship since independence, with periodic military posturing on both sides of the border. Their rivalry dates to their partition in August 1947, when Britain left its claim over the Indian subcontinent and from following that they divided their former colony into two states. India and Pakistan fought a couple of disastrous wars with each other and number of small scale wars. There is a overabundance of outstanding issues between the two states. These issues remained unresolved till today. The relation between India and Pakistan are carried out keeping these issues in view. These issues have involved the strategic environment of the region.

India policy headed for Pakistan remained aggressive from the very inception of both the states. India played a crucial role in dismembering Pakistan in 1971. It had distorted Pakistan by supporting and enhancing the defence capabilities of Bengali people. They gave the pretext that they infiltrate in the war taking in consideration the demands of the Bengali population. Moreover, they also planned military exercise dubbed as Brass-tacks crisis of 1986-87. Both the countries have undergone a limited warfare in Kargil theatre in 1999. Additionally, it cannot be neglected that India has mobilized its forces in Kashmir a plethora of periods. All these things explicitly suggest that Indian policy towards Pakistan is that of aggression. These policies have converted the Pakistani state into a suspicious state. When India conducted its peaceful nuclear explosions in 1974, Pakistan thought it to be designed against it. In response it Pakistan orchestrated an enthusiastic nuclear program. Up to the year of 1998 the nuclear program of both the states remained vague. Neither of them was ready to take lead. Both the states tried to avoid the open test conduction. However, with the rise of BJP in indigenous politics India tested its Nuclear weapons quickly. Surrounded with these circumstances Pakistan was entirely unable to eschew or halt or control its nuclear testing. Soon after India, Pakistan detonated its nuclear weapons. In this way the

region of South Asia became a volatile nuclear region. It is the only region of the world having two nuclear states.

Indo-Pak relations have three historic periods.

- From 1947 to 1971 (No nuclearization in the region)
- From 1971 to 1998 (Ambiguous nuclear strategy)
- From 1998 to onward (Active role of nuclear weapons)

In the first period both countries fought three wars, nuclear weapons played no role at that time. In the second period there was an ambiguous nuclear strategy since both countries obsessed ambiguous nuclear programs. They talked about their nuclear weapons program unequivocally. The third period depicts the nuclearization of both the states. Both of the states were called as “de-facto nuclear weapon states”. As the strategists are divided over the role of nuclear weapons that is whether they provide stability or brings instability, the testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan raised a debate regarding the role of nuclear weapons in this region. During the cold war, India and Pakistan came close to nuclear war twice, during the 1987 Brasstacks and later on in 1990 crisis over Kashmir. After these tests of nuclear devices, India and Pakistan fought a limited warfare in the Kargil theatre, but the threat of nuclear escalation prevented an all-out conventional war. Brasstacks, 1990 crisis, Kargil and Mumbai chapter are the finest example.

There is also a period of time when both the states have gone through a period of reconciliation among them. Whenever a war is fought, during that war it is very difficult to begin a peaceful dispute resolution method. But during a crisis which can escalate towards war, an agreement plays an important role. It builds a sense of confidence between the states. The concept of limited war also increases the chances of surgical strikes on other industrial and economic sectors such as oil reservoirs and economic properties. The Indian struggle to get hold on the major assets of its state was

fruitless. The role as a cooperative or uncooperative was played by the United States. To stabilize the relations in between both states the pressure was increased from the international community particularly from United State and President Reagan played a fundamental role. Regan played his role to stabilize the relations between both state the other USA's leaders also address this issue and give their views about Indian and Pakistan relations. It was said by them that there is no evidence that India will attack on Pakistani arsenals.

The period of reconciliation among the two consists of people-to-people diplomacy, the bus service, train service (samjhota express), "amankiaasha" etc. All these measurable steps were taken by both of the governments to normalize the relations along them to have prosperity in the region for peaceful co-existence. Engaged in the favour of people-to-people diplomacy both governments have to realise that it is really the people who have the power to induce changes and if they are kept at a distance the process will be defeated. Because peoples are the masters who can change the history and in pursuit of this we should remember the people revolution in France, China, Iran. The largest citizen peace dialogue between both is the Pakistan India's people forum for peace and democracy (PIPPFD)². India-Pakistan soldier initiatives (IPSI) in 2000³. The Pakistan peace coalition that was formed in 1999 engages in anti-nuclear activism in partnership with its sister country India i.e.; committee on nuclear disarmament and peace (CNDP) and many other steps like this was taken in order to normalise the relations⁴. In order to have friendly trade relation with each other a major step was taken by the government of Pakistan regarding India as labelling her the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) which means that imports from India would enjoy the same terms as those from other trade partners. Pakistan has lifted barriers to imports from India, reciprocating a similar move from New Delhi 15 years ago, giving a breath of fresh air to the relationship.

The circumstances, thinking, the perception and the mindset of the military leaders and the politicians of India and Pakistan have not changed even after the introduction of nuclear weapons into the deterrence equation. Both the sides hold that by attacking each other cities, refineries, population and other counter-value target is easy and that will not raise the issue into the general war. This thinking is frivolous, puerile and ludicrous. For this two reasons can be propounded. First, the difference between the nuclear warfare and conventional warfare must be maintained and explained. Because the nuclear weapon has brought many new faces to the modern warfare. However, it is said that some theatrical weapons are of the same destructing nature as the nuclear weapon. However, the nuclear weapons affect the victim states for a long time, by affecting the area radio logically. These are the strategies that both the countries have gone through in pursuit of each other's nuclear ambitions to have stronger command⁵.

It is hoped that growing networks of cooperation will only grow between the citizens of India and Pakistan and will eventually result in a prosperous conflict free and stable South-Asia.

China from the beginning urges to stand along with Pakistan in every stance because she believes that having strong relationship with Pakistan provide them to overcome the anti-Chinese feelings. Chinese government stands strongly in favour of Pakistan in many disputes as in the case of 1965 war of Indo-Pak. They also stand as a guarantor for Pakistan in East-Pakistan crisis in 1971. One should not forget the Chinese support for Pakistan that came in the form of a draft resolution by the Chinese representation at the UN, a plea to all nations for the international support of the Pakistanis and a mutual troop disengagement and withdrawal. Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1971 and by the Security Council on December 21, 1971 called for an immediate end to the war and troop withdrawals on both sides. Pakistan found all the verbal and moral support it needed from China and it is

needless to say that Peking was always forth-coming to have support for Pakistan, taking every opportunity to attack and criticize the Indians and the Soviets. PRC was the sole major source of military support for Pakistan from the period (1971-1975) because arms embargo was held on Pakistan. China supplies Pakistan some \$300,000,000 worth of military equipment. So the support for Government of Pakistan will no doubt continue for quite some time to come on behalf of PRC⁶.

Interests in the Region

Both China and India have clashing interests in the South Asian region and Pakistan is facing repercussion in realm of this. India is investing in the oil and gas sectors of central Asian economies particularly Kazakhstan. Energy cooperation is at the heart of India's engagement in the region. "Second only to food" which is the rising energy security needs of India second to their cooperation. India is interested in deepening defence cooperation, and has offered to train the military personnel in Tajikistan and other central Asian republics. Also Indian workers have long been active in the Gulf energy and construction markets⁷. China is also having its interests in the region as she is developing Gwadar port to enhance its trade via Pakistan to warm waters, boosting up its economy by dumping its product, building small Dams etc.

Central Asia with its significant hydrocarbons resources is also a major area of interest for PRC, all of these interests of the rising giants have their interests using this important geographical region which directly or indirectly creating deeper repercussions on Pakistan although disturbing the peace and security structure. The major threat comes from the interests of India which directly influence the security structure of Pakistan. So in pursuit of this Pakistan have to opt a better strategy which will keep its influence in the region along with these rising giants. The overall regional scenario underscores the geostrategic importance of Pakistan.



The fastest growing economic route is to welcome the foreign direct investment (FDI). China's recent boom in the economic sector, along with the success of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, demonstrates that Chinese culture is not inimical to economic progress. China's continuing growth in its fourth decade is a major event in world history that has delivered benefits to its citizens, and also to its trade and business partners. Chinese economic expansion also creates conflict in the economic sphere alone, China has become involved in disputes over cross-national shifts in production and employment, corporate takeovers, trade imbalances and protection, environmental hazards, currency valuation, intellectual property, internet censorship, labor standards, subsidies, and many other issues. Since the end of 1970s the surfacing of PRC has been worldwide hailed as one of the most important proceedings in modern world history. China has turned herself into the fastest growing economy in the world for three decades by well thought-out market reforms. China lifted 400 million people out of poverty, and has undergone "the fastest change in human history" and an achievement called by World Bank as an "unprecedented in human history." For the past 30 years economic growth has been impressive in PRC, averaging between eight to ten per cent real growth per year. In 2009, China has overtaken Germany to become the world's third-largest economy earlier than expected. China has been able to show a strong capacity of responding to external and internal challenges and constraints while retaining its essential features of socio-political organization and mode of functioning. This gradual rise of China has vividly enabled Beijing to readjust its course of international relations and diplomacy. China's membership in the World Trade Organization along with other international involvements; such as contributing troops to the United Nations peacekeeping operations, supporting nonproliferation issues, hosting the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear issue, settling defensive disputes with its neighbors, and participating in a variety of regional and global organizations; have confirmed Beijing's new



style of soft diplomacy. China intends to couple the new diplomacy with its official slogan of “peaceful rise” and “harmonious world” and to alleviate fears and likelihood of other countries allying to balance its rising power. As a matter of fact China has the largest foreign currency reserve in the world, larger than the combined reserve of the G7. Because of its rise as an economic power the West is also eager to talk with China on issues such as trade balance, exchange rate, energy price, commodity price, environmental protection, unemployment, food security, etc. so in pursuit of its rise the West is becoming addicted of Chinese market⁸.

The India China economic syndrome is poised to change the global economic landscape. Along with China, India is the second important Asian country that runs along in economic competition with China. Though India cannot run along in economy with China but its economy competes to some with of China. As announced by the world bank report that India’s GDP increases to 6.4% in 2009 far short of China that is 8.7% announced by Chinese government in January. The economic growth in India is more sustainable than China. Another World Bank reports says that India’s economy will surge to 7.6% in 2010 and 8% in 2011 not so far behind the China which it predicts to be 9% which shows that there is a slow and steady race going in economic sector between both the economic giants.

Competing Giants	Population (2002)	Population growth rate (2002)	Infant mortality (2002)	Annual average real GDP growth rate(1990-2000)	FDI(2001)
CHINA	1.28 billion	0.87 percent	27 (per 1000 live births)	9.6 percent	\$44.2billion
INDIA	1.05 billion	1.51 percent	61 (per 1000 live births)	5.5percent	\$3.4 billion

The above graph shows some of the statistical data of how the two giants are competing in the economic growth⁹.





China has on the other hand invested a lot in Pakistan region in order to expand its economic growth and to maintain its strong relation. On August 2011 China launched its communication satellite paksat-1R into which covers all of Pakistan, parts of South and Central Asia, the Far East, Eastern Europe and East Africa. Both the countries have also joined in combined military exercises in 2011

which is beneficial for both in security reforms and to enhance their security structures. China on the other hand agreed to have PAK-CHINA railway network which can establish a closer link between the two. China also helped Pakistan to build the nuclear reactor known as Chashma 1 and 2 on in response to the help of America to India in nuclear and arms deal. Further China helped Pakistan in building Chashma 3 and 4 and approved the reactors as a part of Bush strategy to strengthen India as a bulwark against China. Also along with all this a 40% of arms export goes to Pakistan from China. So both the countries are helping each other in strategic and security fields. The major step that was taken from china's end is to help Pakistan in building projects such as the Gwadar deep-sea port, coastal highway, up-gradation of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) and several other energy related projects. There is also high level consolidation in economic sectors between PAK-CHINA which can be seen in the past visits of diplomats to their respective regions but the most recent visits by Chinese minister is of more value in the year 2001, 2005 and 2010. Also the trade increases from \$1 billion to a level of about \$7 billion. So both the countries boosted their relationship to enhance their economic and strategic capabilities tourism cooperation, lease of Saindak copper-gold project, supply of locomotives, supply of passenger coaches to railways, white oil pipeline, and a MoU between ZTE and PTCL, agriculture, infrastructure, information technology and other fields under the principle of reciprocity and mutual benefit for achieving common prosperity. These all steps taken by the governments are of vital importance in their respective fields but the major step is that of construction of KKH and more consistently the building of Gwadar port from where large amount of export flows which directly enhance their economic activity.

India on the other hand is the importer of large amount of arms which include radar system, fighter planes, and the radar system for a strong partnership with out-side world and to have influence in the region. In pursuit of this India is also enhancing its trade relation

with western countries to boost its economy. India invested a lot in the central Asian region especially in Kazakhstan. It has lots of interests in the region to cope up with its energy needs and hydrocarbons. It has gone in sign with the civil nuclear deal with America. Also the recent visit of Obama's to India is of much importance which shows their mutual interests with each other in strategic field by signing the nuclear deal. This is also a signal that there exists a strong connection between the democracies and democracy stands of vital importance for United States. Including all of the above to counter Sino-Pak building of Gwadar port, India helped Iran in building of Chabahar port. This will also bring Afghanistan and Iran into economic alliance as well as strategic alliance. This port will help an accessible way for Indian imports and exports with road link to Afghanistan and Central Asian. Also a major step of building up of 200 km road that will create a link of Chabahar with Afghanistan¹¹. Also the presence of U.S in this South Asian region is of great importance in accordance with the relations among these three major countries. Especially U.S boot in Afghanistan region in the aftermath of 9/11 by declaring a step in countering the terrorist calling it to be "war on terrorism". Afghanistan due to its colliding boundaries with Pakistan created a lot of problems for Pakistan which diversified the U.S attention to Pakistan as well. Also U.S have its own interests in Pakistan region specially in countering terrorism as already they are facing a deep fall back in the economy because of their ongoing war in the Afghanistan region. In this concern U.S is giving a lot of AIDS to Pakistan in order to help them in their ongoing war. This all has created lots of worries in the Indian Diplomats because they think by doing so will directly affect their relation.

On the other hand China has emerged as an important factor in India-Pakistan crisis as well. China's growing relation with Pakistan is also becoming a source of concern for India. Pakistan's relationship with China grew especially after the border clash of China with India. This 1962 border clash deteriorated the two

against each other. China always stands forth in favour of Pakistan in 1965 war between Indo-Pak. In East Pakistan crisis the situation was somewhat different and also it was perceived that the war was of much concern for PRC for the formulation, operation, extent and nature of Chinese foreign policy in 1971 dispute. In the period of Ayub Khan's presidency he established close ties with PRC based on a strong friendship under the framework of third world solidarity. So the relation normalizes and much improved from (1959-1969) in which agreements like SEATO and CENTO were made between these Asian countries. Also both the countries feel that they are contiguous to each other and have a common hostile enemy that is India¹². Also if we examine we will find that the relations of China with Soviet and U.S are also not so good from the beginning so they tried to focus more on compiling strong relations with Pakistan because of their common hostile neighbour. China is also helping Pakistan in improving his economy by building small power projects and ports like GWADAR. So all of this from the beginning either it's the war of 1965, 1971, or the Kargil crisis China has always taken favour of Pakistan which threatens India and she feels insecure because of their improving relations in every field. So the major turn in relations of Pakistan with China was 1962 Indo-China animosity which created a positive alliance between Pak-China relations. The basic insecurity between the two regional hegemonic continues to thwart their relations more depending on the triad of China-Pakistan-India. It also concludes that the rivalry between both these economic giants CHINA and INDIA arose, due to their regional dominance paradigm and influence in the multi-polar world of 21st century.

Developments and Strategic Partnerships in the Region

The historical evolution of Pakistan-India-China relationships shows that the conflict between China and India and India and Pakistan was inevitable but the future wars are not inevitable. However, keeping in mind the historical grudges, establishing and

maintaining peaceful ties is harder as compared to fighting and mounting the historical hatred. The best ultimate option of a 'Peaceful coexistence' in the region between these three states is the 'survival of Pakistan under stable umbrella of India and China' and the treasons compelling Pakistan to follow these lines are as follows:

Although the asymmetry clearly exists regarding the economic and military powers of these three actors, still India does not have an upper hand over Pakistan in terms of power because of China's assistance and inclination towards Pakistan¹³. Pak-China friendship goes back to 1950's when Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize People's Republic of China. Since then, China has helped Pakistan develop its military and economy. The year 2011 marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan, and is designated as the 'Year of China-Pakistan Friendship'¹⁴. China's aid in military development to Pakistan is slightly higher as compared to the economic sector, mainly to counterbalance India. Apart from fighter jets and other modern military technology, Pakistan and China are also working on a Civilian nuclear programme. However, recent economic ventures like Gwadar and cooperation in communication sectors like Space Technology including Paksat-1R, a Pakistani geostationary and an advanced communication satellite in August, 2011 are skyrocketing the bilateral ties between the two¹⁵, whose friendship is regarded as "deeper than oceans and taller than mountains".

The year 2010 is described as the year of the 'Tiger' and the world wonders as who that Tiger is. Martin Jacques in his book, 'When China Rules the World' (2009) describes China at the apex of world power with its rising economy, remarkable technological development, Han unity and political determination. He says that America's economic weakness and the disunity of the Western world is fuelling the process of China's ascendancy¹⁶. However, Ashok Kapur describes both China and India as 'encaged tigers' in

terms of their interaction in the military and economic affairs. Talking independently, India after disappointing itself for decades, it is now on the verge of becoming a great power. The world started to take notice of India's rise when New Delhi signed a nuclear pact with President George W. Bush in July 2005, but that breakthrough is only one dimension of the dramatic transformation of Indian foreign policy that has taken place since the end of the Cold War. After more than a half century of false starts and unrealized potential, India is now emerging as the swing state in the global balance of power. In the coming years, it will have an opportunity to shape outcomes on the most critical issues of the twenty-first century: the construction of Asian stability, the political modernization of the greater Middle East, and the management of globalization¹⁷. India's strong position in the world scenario can be judged by the fact that it is also trying hard to become a permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC). New Delhi has made concerted efforts to reshape its immediate neighborhood, find a modus vivendi with China and Pakistan (its two regional rivals), and reclaim its standing in the "near abroad": parts of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, it has expanded relations with the existing great powers -- especially the United States¹⁸.

In the shadow of the above described world's two fastest growing economies (even though China is way ahead in the numbers game; India's GDP per capita of \$1016 pales before China's \$6,100)¹⁹, Pakistan is militarily and economically much backward. Politically, Pakistan has to maintain its friendship ties with China to counter the Indian military superiority and its growing strategic partnership with Afghanistan encircling Pakistan on the Western front too. Moreover, it is of utmost importance in keeping off the US and Russian influence in the region keeping in view the growing US-Indo strategic partnership. Economically, Pakistan needs Chinese support in trade and industry. Pakistan is taking the help of China in development projects in almost all sectors. China on the other

hand also deems Pakistan a beneficial partner with respect to the trade route through Gwadar Port, moreover it wants Pakistan as a partner to counter balance the US and Indian influence.

Pakistan and India both cannot afford a nuclear war in the region. So, Pakistan must develop a policy of peaceful coexistence with respect to India. Both should contemplate in order to improve their bilateralism through people to people diplomacy, free trade and other diplomatic measures. This is the only solution if both have to excel towards progress, particularly for Pakistan, as its economy and conventional military technology is lagging far behind India's.

Growing Indo-US Relations

The accelerating Indo-US relations pose a serious threat to Pakistan. The Indo-US Nuclear deal under the Bush administration has set a blow to the five decades old strategic partnership of Pakistan and US. Recently, after the interests of US in leaving the strategic leadership of Afghanistan after the US troops evacuate Afghanistan by 2014 has again raised the grave concerns of Pakistan. The United States is interested in India's emergence as a regional power, a senior defence policy official has said, describing India an increasingly important partner to the US.

India will emerge as an "unrivalled" regional power with large military capabilities in the next 15 years but its "rising ambition" would further strain its relations with China besides complicating ties with Russia and Japan, America's National Intelligence Council has said in a report.

"India will be the unrivalled regional power with a large military — including naval and nuclear capabilities — and a dynamic and growing economy," the NIC, which represents 15 spy agencies of the US including the CIA, has said in its global trends forecast for 15 years.

"The size of its population—1.2 billion by 2015—and its

technologically driven economic growth virtually dictate that India will be a rising regional power," it said.

"The Obama administration is committed to strengthening regional partnerships, to build an international system capable of addressing the challenges that have no respect for borders," Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defence for policy²⁰.

Indo-US nuclear deal:

US President G.W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced to forge a civilian nuclear deal on July 18, 2005. However, the text of '123 Agreement' was released by US Department of State on August 3, 2007²¹. This deal asserts the proclamation of India as a regional power and moving ahead in becoming a giant in the global politics. It severely affects the Balance of Power (BoP) and deterrence stability in the region particularly with respect to Pakistan. India argues that it needs energy for its growing economic sector, and it needs energy sources for that purpose. It is increasing its nuclear power in the disguise for the need of energy in the name of civilian nuclear programme²². It forces Pakistan to focus on countering the non-conventional military threats from India.

Obama's trip with more than 200 business executives to India in 2011, and his announcement,

"In the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member," in a speech to India's parliament on his first official visit to the world's largest democracy, underscored the growing importance of India economically, which by 2020 is expected to be one of the five largest economies in the world, along with Asian powers China and Japan²³.

This shows the future motives of Obama administration in boosting up India as a rising global power to curtail Chinese influence. After the suspicion regarding Pakistan's ISI with the terrorist and militant

groups, US does not rely on Pakistan particularly after the Afghan war. So, US also backs Indo-Afghan relations, both strategic and economic to side Pakistan.

Strategic Triangle among India, China and Pakistan

The three important and major players in the South Asian region are China, India and Pakistan and there exists a triangle among them, this exists among them since 1960's because of two bilateral conflicts between these three states amongst each other. The Indo-China war and Indo-Pak war of 1962 and 1965 respectively were the reasons of this triangle and its evolution. The relation among these states evolved from diplomatic rivalry to war and from war to strategic discourse and all these factors kept these states together. The relationship between China and Pakistan inspired India to form triangularity. Since the India has become the part of this triangle it has become difficult for these three states to disengage them from this game. The three powers are tied to each other and their actions reflect their view of strategic and cultural problems and geopolitics in a volatile area.

China saw India as its potential rival in the former British India, and the irony is that even as Nehru was promoting Chinese interests in the major world capitals and the UN, China was undermining India's and Nehru's interests and prestige in the third world and in international capitals. China's leaders calculated well and in unsentimental fashion. China chose Pakistan, India's regional and international rival as its strategic partner on the correct calculation that China's support of Pakistani power and interests would reinforce its desire to cancel or counterbalance Indian power and prestige. It played on Pakistan because it had the motive to work well as China's proxy against India; it was a country with a grievance against Hindu India; moreover, Pakistan posed no threat to Chinese interests because of its dependence on Beijing's support, and thus it made sense for China to intervene in sub continental

affairs by its support of Pakistani interests in opposition to Indian ones. The post-1947 (ex-British India empire) and post-1949 (the rise of a centrally controlled and unified communist China) situations, and the rise of two superpowers in a Cold War setting in Asia were new for Beijing's leaders, but the methods it applied to build its friendship with Pakistan and its enmity with India relied on the tried methods of Imperial China. They relied on a mix of diplomatic persuasion, economic inducement and military pressure. Pakistan did not require much diplomatic inducement to sign up with China when it realized that the US-Pakistan military pact of 1954 did not help it gain its objectives in Kashmir and it needed additional external support in its fight against India. China started this process in 1955 when a secret message from Beijing to Pakistan indicated that a conflict of interest did not exist between China and Pakistan but a conflict of interest with India was likely.

The timing is significant. The message was sent when Nehru was promoting China in Korean and UN affairs, and in the Bandung conference, and before the border issue with India flared up. Beijing's diplomatic move towards Pakistan showed its long-term strategy. Its economic and military inducement in the form of aid followed in the 1960s.

Another diplomatic action came in the form of Beijing's public support of Pakistan's position on Kashmir starting with the early 1960s when China's statements emphasized the justness of Pakistan's cause in Kashmir, the emphasis on Kashmiri self-determination and the problem of 'Indian aggression.'

The transfer of a portion of Kashmir in the Sino-Pakistani border agreement by Pakistan to China was a trade off between the two. The pattern of China's conduct was to apply military pressure against Indian interests in the Himalayan region. It came in the form of territorial claims against India (and in the disagreement relating to Indian claims), as a result of the military build-up of Chinese forces in Tibet, which gave China a military advantage in moving

from the Tibetan plateau downhill against Indian forces, and finally, Chinese support of insurgent groups in India's northeast had destructive consequences because the intervention was low risk and high value for China; it kept India on the defensive in a sensitive area, and it impeded India's development work within India and the growth of India as a political and peaceful model of a pluralistic and a modern society, which was widely seen as an alternative to harsh Chinese and Stalinist methods. China's intervention in the area raised the costs of Indian development and Indian defence because Beijing was aware that Nehru's Indians lacked the political will to call China's game. In other words, Beijing formed a two-front strategy against India early on—via the Himalayas and the Indian northeast in the 1950s and via Pakistan in the mid-1950s and the early 1960s. China's aim was to create hurtful stalemates for India and its constituents. The process of pressuring India in the Himalayan areas started in the 1950s, but the tilt towards Pakistan on the Kashmir question in the early 1960s was significant because it created a clear public identification against India on an international issue, which was also a core issue in Indian domestic politics, its foreign policy and its military position in the north. Moreover, China had maintained an ambivalent position on Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani relations during the 1950s; by the 1960s, it abandoned this position and shifted from this position to a hostile one.

China chose its partner(s)—Pakistan, and later Myanmar and Iran—based on their strategic location in relation to China's rivals, and it applied its diplomatic/military/economic tools in strategically located pressure points (the Himalayan region, Kashmir and the Indian northeast, and later in the Bay of Bengal, Gwador and the Indian Ocean). Geopolitics, not ideological affinity between partners was the driving element. The formation of strategic triangle(s) in the subcontinent was initiated by Pakistan. As early as May 1947, in a conversation with US embassy officers, M. A. Jinnah explicitly pointed to a conflict of interest between Pakistan and Russian and Indian expansionism and sought US aid in this struggle and offered

Pakistani facilities in exchange. The first strategic triangle involved US and Pakistan in the form of a military pact that was used against India. However, this triangle had a limited shelf life because it was cemented by US fear of Soviet expansionism towards the Gulf region, and despite the animosity of the likes of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger against Indian interests, US opposition to India had its limits. The US-UK military and diplomatic pact with Pakistan no doubt pressured India and damaged its external influence, but the driving element of this pact was the appeal of the subcontinent for Soviet and Chinese communists for several reasons, and the availability of Pakistan with its strategic location as a base on the southern underbelly of Soviet Russia. The US/UK-Pakistan-India strategic triangle lost its force by the early 1960s when US-UK came to India's aid after China's attack. This triangle lost its relevance for several reasons. The US-Soviet détente took shape in the late 1950s, and thereafter Washington had limited need of third-party interlocutors. As US modern arms came to Pakistan, India too started its process of arms acquisitions in the mid-1950s to match Pakistan's growing capability. Pakistan's use of US arms in the 1965 war with India embarrassed Washington as this was not the declared purpose of its arms supply. As Pakistan lost faith in US-UK support, it turned to China and this undermined the public rationale of US-Pakistan military ties. Out of these circumstances came the formation of the second major strategic triangle. This triangle has had a long shelf life.

Characteristics of the Triangle

The origin of this triangle was based on well-defined geographical boundaries or limits. It has three main members: China, Pakistan and India. It covers three major centres of gravity or frontier zones: the Himalayan area including Kashmir, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim; Pakistan's NWF area including the Gilgit/Hunza/Wakhan corridor to Afghanistan; and the northeastern frontier zone that includes Arunachal Pradesh and the Myanmar/Yunnan area. These

zones are defined by their military, demographic and economic geography rather than formal borders, and—given the presence of porous borders and long coastlines in western and southern India and given the existence of ethnic conflicts and availability of arms and supplies for insurgent groups—the situation on the ground rather than lines on official maps matters. All three frontier zones are centres of intense military, social and political-diplomatic conflict involving multiple state and non-state players. Porous borders and modern communications have facilitated transnational interventions on several fronts: from Pakistani Kashmir to Indian Kashmir and lately, to other parts of India; from China through Yunnan and Myanmar to India's northeastern areas; from Bangladesh to northeastern and central India; from Nepal to the eastern and southern Indian states; and so on. Geography not only favours Chinese military movement and reinforcements in the Tibetan area in a war but Indian topography favours military movement by those who have the initiative against Indian targets. The geographical connectivity between China and Pakistan and their allies has facilitated the flow of Chinese power from the north to the south—from China to Tibet, to Pakistan's northern areas and through the Karakoram highway to the Arabian Sea. Chinese power has also gone north to south from China through Yunnan and Myanmar to India's northeastern area and to the Bay of Bengal, and from Tibet through Nepal to the Terai region. The buildup of Chinese rail and road networks in the Himalayan region is a sign of the rise of a Chinese managed north-south axis in all frontier zones and on India's strategic flanks. Note that precisely when the US and USSR were preoccupied with the Cold War and built east-west links, China set out to develop its north-south links in the strategic South Asian zone. The end of the Cold War was not a defining moment for China because it continued to maintain its geopolitical focus on the subcontinent, and to expand it by seeking to extend its frontiers to the Gulf area through its missile and oil deals with Iran, by its investment in Gwadar as a commercial and a military port, which

requires it to consolidate its power projection naval capacity beyond the South China seas, and to modernize its missile and space capacities and to make space its new frontier as well.

Peaceful Coexistence

It is hardly likely that the Sino-Indian rivalry will end soon, or that the border issue will be resolved soon. The PRC has unfinished business in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area because its mental map indicates that China is a rising power, that US is a declining one and India is open to persuasion and confusion as long as its internal politics impede the development of an Indian capacity to neutralize Chinese influences in the region. This rivalry, however, has a positive side. It has forced Indian society and government to take on China's challenges and despite the slow pace of Indian economic reforms and the big difference between the scale of foreign investments into China as compared to India, the Indian economy has grown well. So, there is a possibility that Chinese practitioners are starting to take India seriously, but to encourage China to become a turnaround story will require Indian engagement of Chinese actions in the economic and the military spheres. Moreover, the international environment in Asia-Pacific does not help China in the long run. It recently showed its capacity to mess around with satellite communications—a clear sign to its rivals in US and Asia about a clear and present danger. With such actions, its claim of a peaceful rise rings hollow. Earlier, its action in giving nuclear test data to Pakistan and missiles to the volatile Gulf /Pakistan area shows the damage China did to the nonproliferation regime. It is likely that, for the foreseeable future, the Chinese leaders will continue to overlap two paths. The first one requires it to assert its military capacities and to ignore the law of unintended consequences, i.e. the negative effects in stimulating Japanese military and nuclear development in strengthening the ties between US and India and Japan and India—two new traditional partners—

and defence ties between India and Russia and India and the Europeans—traditional partners. The second one requires it to think outside the box of asserting its rights as a major power and think instead about its responsibilities and its methods in dealing with its rivals from a position of genuine equality. The second path has a potential in the rise of China as a responsible regional and international player because the communists in China have lost the Confucian base in its post-1949 society and politics; with its amazing economic growth, its internal social and economic tensions and gaps are growing, and a belief in the preeminence of China in its southern zone—from India to Vietnam—has no takers in Southeast Asia and East Asia. Will China adapt or truly re-learn? This is the China question for the 21st century.

As far as India Pakistan rivalry is concerned, there is very little hope of a peaceful coexistence among these states till the time Kashmir issue is not settled. The present government of Pakistan has shown willingness to settle all the bilateral issues between the old rivals and to promote bilateral trade but there are many forces undermining the efforts being made to look for future aspirations of peaceful coexistence. The religious fanatics from both sides pressurize their governments and weaken the bilateral talks and steps taken for confidence building measure. It has become very important for economical weaken Pakistan to promote trade not only with China but also with India to gain the pace. The only way out is to curb these fanatics and work for promotion of free trade and than settling of political issues existing between these two states.

Effects of nuclear war

Most of the radiation hazard from nuclear bursts comes from short-lived radionuclides external to the body; these are generally confined to the locality downwind of the weapon burst point. This radiation hazard comes from radioactive fission fragments with half-lives of seconds to a few months, and from soil and other

materials in the vicinity of the burst made radioactive by the intense neutron flux of the fission and fusion reactions.

It has been estimated that a weapon with a fission yield of 1 million tons TNT equivalent power (1 megaton) exploded at ground level in a 15 miles-per-hour wind would produce fallout in an ellipse extending hundreds of miles downwind from the burst point. At a distance of 20-25 miles downwind, a lethal radiation dose (600 rads) would be accumulated by a person who did not find shelter within 25 minutes after the time the fallout began. At a distance of 40-45 miles, a person would have at most 3 hours after the fallout began to find shelter. Considerably smaller radiation doses will make people seriously ill. Thus, the survival prospects of persons immediately downwind of the burst point would be slim unless they could be sheltered or evacuated.

It has been estimated that an attack on U.S. population centers by 100 weapons of one-megaton fission yield would kill up to 20 percent of the population immediately through blast, heat, ground shock and instant radiation effects (neutrons and gamma rays); an attack with 1,000 such weapons would destroy immediately almost half the U.S. population. These figures do not include additional deaths from fires, lack of medical attention, starvation, or the lethal fallout showering to the ground downwind of the burst points of the weapons.

Most of the bomb-produced radio nuclides decay rapidly. Even so, beyond the blast radius of the exploding weapons there would be areas ("hot spots") the survivors could not enter because of radioactive contamination from long-lived radioactive isotopes like strontium-90 or cesium-137, which can be concentrated through the food chain and incorporated into the body. The damage caused would be internal, with the injurious effects appearing over many years. For the survivors of a nuclear war, this lingering radiation hazard could represent a grave threat for as long as 1 to 5 years after the attack.

China as Mediator

After unsuccessful attempts to draw the United States and the European Union to play active roles in resolving the Kashmir issue, between India and Pakistan now the only option left is to China to play its role and mediate between two nuclear states. Also Pakistan reportedly wants China to play the role of a "silent" third party mediator as China and India move towards stronger bilateral ties and cooperation, Pakistan is keen to take advantage of the prevailing conducive atmosphere to find a durable settlement to the Kashmir issue.

First, that China and India both needed peaceful relations with each other as they both concentrated on developing their economies. Second, beyond peaceful relations, both states would benefit from actively cooperating with each other, economically and politically. Indeed, the economic payoff of the Sino-India relationship is already evident in their booming trade relationship (China is India's biggest trading partner, and trade between the two emerging giants is only likely to grow). Politically too, it appears that both China and India have some common interests when it comes to issues like climate change and multi-polarity in the international arena. Moreover, both China and India have other less obvious common ground – like finding solutions to the widening gap between the haves and have-nots in their respective societies and finding ways to cultivate and exploit the potential 'demographic dividend' that both countries still enjoy (China to a lesser degree given the 'one child policy' that has been in effect since 1978). Third, while the benefits of bilateral collaborations are evident to both China and India, the trust deficit between the two countries has thus far kept both countries from realizing the full potential of such cooperation.

This trust deficit stems from historical frictions between the two Asian states. Their border war in 1962 has resulted in a lingering ill-feeling vis-a-vis the Chinese in the Indian collective memory in

addition to a (still) disputed border. Intermingled with this issue is the question of the diasporic Tibetan community and the Dalai Lama, who found sanctuary in India after fleeing from Tibet. Then there are the strategic concerns surrounding China's close relationship with India's South Asian rival, Pakistan, and the recently deepening Indo-US ties. Both countries, rightly or wrongly, feel potentially boxed in by the other.

At the symposium, delegates emphasized the need for confidence building measures between the two states to try and bridge this gap. Certainly, the need for joint exercises, and military and bureaucratic exchanges cannot be overemphasized. Familiarity with how state organizations function and how what their objectives would help decrease suspicions. China and India have also worked towards establishing regular cultural exchanges. Indeed, in 1988, the two even signed a Cultural Cooperative Agreement. Since then, India and China have held large-scale art festivals in the other country and also increased the pace of smaller cultural exchanges.

But perhaps more needs to be done to familiarize the people of each country with the culture and people of the other. For one, as noted in the symposium, often the media in both countries take hawkish positions on bilateral issues. Emotions and opinions drummed up by such reports can make compromises difficult for both governments, each of whom has an increasingly nationalistic audience to play to. Thus, while the media, especially in India, cannot be controlled, it may be fruitful for both countries to establish regular media exchanges and meetings to foster their mutual understanding of policies, cultures and rhetoric. More importantly, to encourage people-to-people exchanges both student exchange programmes and tourism between the two countries should be developed. Certainly, over time, greater understanding amongst the people of China and India (and not just their political elites) would help reduce suspicions that linger in the Sino-Indian relations that often foil mutually beneficial cooperation.

Conclusion

The road of relation between the three India-Pakistan-China is always bumpy from the beginning. It has been marked with cooperation and collaboration with tilted interests. There exist a triangular relation between them since the period of 1960's because of bilateral conflicts of 1962 Indo-China war and 1965 Indo-Pak war. The Pak-China relation is one of another reason for this triangular relationship. These large Asian emerging powers will play important roles on the stage of the new world. In order to embrace the benefits or to alleviate the perils of globalization, Pakistan needs to take a strategic repositioning of in various fields. The two economic giants are expanding their muscles, and there are ample of threats and options for Pakistan to ally with either of them, and despite these threats and options what are the best for Pakistan to opt for her future.

Major obstacles in relation with respect to rising India is that of Kashmir dispute, Indian aggressive attitude and an element of mistrust, terrorism, the divisionary behaviour of Indian leadership and minor obstacles are Pak-China relations, lack of institutionalized management mechanism, no mediation from U.S and least people to people contact. The people of both countries should devote their energy and resources jointly towards building up an effective pressure on their respective government to open up the avenues for exchange of ideas. Also peace movement should be initiated between India and Pakistan and the best example can be seen as that of "Amankiasha" initiated by both countries. Although the trade between them is a win-win situation as India having middle class of about 300 million people with rising purchasing power that matches that of South Eastern Europe whereas Pakistan middle class is approximately 30 million. Trading with India can be used as a trade route to South East Asia. Challenges always remain there in international relations with a simple reality that states have a natural

tendency to maximize their vested interest and to dominate one another economically, Politically, militarily provided they have mean to do so. The question arises that why Pakistan and India cannot do something sensible that they can live together like good neighbours is still unthinkable.

On the other hand China is another rising economic power which has invested in south Asia's smaller economies like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the most important of them is Pakistan to gain a strategic foothold and a diplomatic profile in the region. Rising India makes Pakistan all the important in Chinese strategy for the subcontinent. Pakistan has overestimated the support it is getting from China although free trade is clearly hurting Pakistan because a large amount of revenue is flowing toward China making their economy strong. It is reasonable to assume the Chinese support for Pakistan in its confrontation with United States. Given the strategic and other beneficial options for Pakistan rising out of China, she helped Pakistan in strategic field specially in all the wars she fought with India and also helped Pakistan to enhance their military capability qualitatively and quantitatively by helping them in "military industrial complex". Latest example is the launch of JF-Thunder fighter jet. In the economic field China has helped Pakistan to boost its economy. Several joint ventures includes Karakoram highway, Pakistan aeronautical complex, Indus highway, Saindak metal, Chashma nuclear plant etc. also both have supported time to time on international forums. Being the permanent member of United Nation Security Council (UNSC), China is a very important player for Pakistan in the international politics. China has always advocated negotiations and talks between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. China's membership or the observer state status at the international economic and strategic forums like ASEAN, SCO, SAARC also pounds to Pakistan's interests because China is her strategic and economic friend.

Some Chinese strategists see in the current South Asian crisis an

opportunity to recover the lost ground and thwart India's ambitions to challenge China's future economic and military primacy in Asia. China's growth and opening up are more likely to benefit developing countries in the long run though it can hurt Pakistan in short run. Pakistan is seeking help from China to help it overcome its energy crisis through a long-term upgrade and diversification of the antiquated power sector. China's "no-strings attached" economic aid to Pakistan is appreciated more than the aid it receives from the US, which often comes with stringent conditions.

It is hardly likely that the Sino-Indian rivalry will end soon, or that the border issue will be resolved soon. So, there is a possibility that Chinese practitioners are starting to take India seriously, but to encourage China to become a turnaround story will require Indian engagement of Chinese actions in the economic and the military spheres. As far as India Pakistan rivalry is concerned, there is very little hope of a peaceful coexistence among these states till the time Kashmir issue is not settled. The present government of Pakistan has shown willingness to settle all the bilateral issues between the old rivals and to promote bilateral trade but there are many forces undermining the efforts being made to look for future aspirations of peaceful coexistence. Also a status of Most Favoured nation (MFN) was given by Pakistan to India in order to have a stronger bilateral trade among the two and also it is thought that it will help to solve the long term Kashmir issue which is far more to achieve in near future. But perhaps more needs to be done to familiarize the people of each country with the culture and people of another. Pakistan is the only country that bordered by these giants and has the inherent capability to maintain its independent status. Pakistan is also located in a region of volatile nature so a mix and comprehensive approach is needed for Pakistan.

Recommendations

After unsuccessful attempts to draw the United States and the

European Union to play active roles in resolving the Kashmir issue, between India and Pakistan now the only option left is to China to play its role and mediate between two nuclear states.

Positive measure's like "Amankiasha" should be taken in order to have people-to-people diplomacy.

There is a chance of peaceful co-existence but as far as India-Pakistan are concerned there is very little hope of a peaceful coexistence among these states till the time Kashmir issue is not settled. Also it is assumed that the border issue between India and China will end soon.

Pakistan should normalize its relations with India to have a bilateral trade because it will benefit Pakistan to stable its economic growth more than trade with China. Because India-Pakistan trade is a win-win situation

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