

## MARITIME SILK ROAD AND CHINA'S EVOLVING GRAND STRATEGY FOR ASIA-PACIFIC

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### Abstract

*This article specifically explains China's Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific. Firstly, it explains the importance of Asia-Pacific and then explains China's Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific in detail. This paper summing up the findings of PhD thesis 'China's Grand Strategy and Reshaping the Regional Order: A Case Study of Asia-Pacific' argues that China has a clear and coherent Grand Strategy for the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to that, it analyses the basic components of Chinese Grand Strategy and identifies the way China is utilizing its economic, political, diplomatic, and security means to secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific region and to maintain the regional order.*

**Keywords:** *Grand Strategy, Asia-Pacific, Asian Infrastructure Bank, Maritime Silk Road, ASEAN*

### CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY AND ASIA-PACIFIC

In 1960s and 1970s, a new term 'Asia-Pacific' was established for the first time (McDougall, 2006). This term is used for the regions, which links the Pacific region to the East Asia. Many countries like Japan, Australia, and US supported this term as it legitimises the US presence in the region otherwise the US can be a Pacific but not the Asian power. Other countries like Canada, New Zealand and Australia also had the similar reasons to support this term. Asia-Pacific covers Southeast Asia (Brunei, Burma, East Timor, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand), Northeast Asia (Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia) and countries like US, Australia,

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Canada, Mexico, New-Zealand, India, Chilli and Peru can also be called as the Pacific countries in different perspectives (McDougall, 2006).

Currently, Asia-Pacific is one of the world's most stable parts of the global landscape. It is stable as a whole and has a strong momentum for peace and development. Not only major countries but also the weak states are fully convinced of promoting the peace and stability and to cooperate with one another. States are also resolving their mutual disputes through consultation and negotiation. Despite the existence of disputes, this region is developing and having relatively fast growth as compare to the other regions of the world. Despite the regional integration, cooperation etc. this region is still facing multiple threats to the security of the region such as nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and disputes between the regional states on the territorial sovereignty and maritime rights etc.

China is one of the great powers of Asia-Pacific region and very well aware of the reality that maintaining the order and stability in the region is closely linked with the Chinese interests and for regional peace Chinese peaceful policies play an important role. That is why China has taken the responsibility to maintain the regional order and they have adopted the policies of cooperation and mutual benefits for all. In 2013, Chinese president for the first time announced the Chinese intentions towards the regional politics. In his speech, he emphasised on the 'friendly neighbour policy' but he also added that friendly neighbours does not mean that China will compromise on its interests but will cooperate with the regional states for peace and stability.

### **Geo Economics of China's Grand Strategy**

Geo-economics of China's Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific region revolves around the Maritime Silk Road initiative and energy security.

### *Maritime Silk Road (MSR)*

In October 2013, Chinese president proposed MSR during his speech in Indonesian Parliament (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). This MSR relates with the ancient Chinese Silk Route (Schinas & Westarp, 2017). Ancient Chinese Silk Route stretched from Fuzhou to the Southeast Asia through Chinese Sea and via Strait of Malacca, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, Europe (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). The purpose of the ancient and current MRS is to connect Chinese people across the waters like South China Sea, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. The purpose is not only to connect the people but the trade and commerce as well, like China export its silk, tea and ceramics through the same route (Blanchard & Flint, 2017).

Figure 1: China's contemporary Maritime Silk Road.




Source: Xinhua.  
 Source: The Geopolitics of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Retrieved from tandfonline.com

Maritime Silk Road has become one of the most important tools of establishing Chinese foreign relation. Chinese media claim Maritime Silk Road as the “geo-economics plan” of China (Zongyi, 2014). Now the MSR will also connect with the different transportation corridors like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, UN Economics and Social

Commission, Trans-Asia Railway, which connects Kunming to Thailand, China-Bangkok-Laos and Kunming-Vietnam-Cambodia, the Mekong River Development initiative, the China-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the multilateral Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Programme (Blanchard & Flint, 2017).

Figure 2: Reviving the Silk Road



Source: Belt and Road New, August 2020

Chinese scholars argue that China's MSR initiative shows its intention of peaceful rise and its effort to create a harmonious environment for cooperation with the regional states. Naval craft of Chinese together with the legal status under international law can be used for diplomatic purpose and through this; they can promote the Maritime Silk Road (Yen-Chiang, 2018). However, this is only Chinese intention or perception but world looks it from the different perspective and it generates worldwide apprehension. Chinese claim over most of the South China Sea and other dependency issues in the infrastructure of MSR also have not helped in China's image across the region. Maritime Silk Road in the region serves to pacify the tensions over Chinese claim in the South China Sea as MSR initiative was extended from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and the other parts have

been extended into the Southern Pacific. It promotes the cooperation rather than unsettle naval expansionism. Chinese Ambassador Xiaondong explained the Maritime Silk Road as “MSR will help China and the regional states to solve the differences caused by the South China Sea disputes” (Xinhua, 2015).

On the basis of above mentioned statements, China established the MSR not only for securing its economic and security interests but also want to counterbalance the negative image of Chinese policies or action in the Asia-Pacific region as China’s official slogan is “Deepening trust and enhancing connectivity” (Jiechi, 2015). In 2014, a report was given by Xinhua, in which he explains Maritime Silk Road would involve the infrastructure construction and development in the states along the road and this project include the ports of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. China would coordinate, supervise and facilitate the project, which is also likely to contain attempt to build free trade zone (Xinhua, 2014).

For the purpose of MSR construction and other infrastructure developments China has created the fund of US \$40 billion (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). China also has established the US \$50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, one of the purposes of establishing this bank is also to fund MSR projects. Other funding sources like China Development Bank made plan to invest about US \$890 billion and China Administrative of Foreign Exchange injected US \$90 billion into China Development Bank and Export- Import Bank of China to support the MSR projects (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). China’s white paper of 2017 emphasized on the win-win situation, talked about the pragmatic cooperation involves solving the differences and building consensus (Xinhua, 2017). In 2017, Xi Jinping announced that China would put additional RMB 100 billion into the Silk Road Fund.

Most of the countries in Asia-Pacific took this initiative as a positive step towards the regional integration and development despite the fact China has to deal with the rivals of this project too. In July 2018, Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State announced the infrastructure

initiative and China considers it as a counter to the Belt Road Initiative (investment, 2018). Another counter to Chinese project was Australian announcement in November 2018, when they announced “The Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific” mechanism. India on the other hand did not attend both China’s Belt and Road Forum in 2017 and 2019 respectively. India boycotted it because of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which like the Eurasian Belt route and the Indian Ocean Silk Route crossed the Kashmir, which is a disputed area between India and Pakistan. India is anti of MSR because it considers it as a threat to Indian interests in the region.

### *Energy security*

Before 1995, China was exporting oil, but after the modernization and industrialisation, it has become one of the biggest importers of oil and gas (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). Middle East is the biggest market of energy for China; China uses the route through the Strait of Malacca to the South China Sea and up to China. This route plays an important role in resolving China’s energy security issue. In 2004, a Pentagon’s study on the future of energy security in Asia, in which the author argued that China is establishing good strategic relations along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea not only to secure China’s energy interests but others broader security objectives as well (MacDonald & Hamilton, 2004).

Threat to Energy security: China is facing various traditional and non-traditional threats to its energy security across the region especially the fight for the maritime route is posing serious challenges to China’s energy security. China considers the US, India and Japan as a threat to her interests, and claims that US and India look envious to Chinese projects in the Persian Gulf. As Middle East supplies almost half of the Chinese oil imports via Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, to South China Sea and then up to China so dangers does exist there (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). India, Japan and especially US tried to control some important straits by using all political,

diplomatic and economic means (Wang, 2015). The US aimed at controlling the 16 straits in 1986 when they declared war; these 16 straits included the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca (Wang, 2015). For the US, there are three ways to control the important maritime transportation routes. First to make its naval presence strong there and establish some overseas military basis, the second way is to put weight on the strategic islands and disturb/destroy the other countries development in the particular area and last but not least is to establish the maritime and security cooperation with relevant countries (Wang, 2015). Because of the piracy threats, China has started anti-piracy developments and enhanced ability of its navy (Yuandan, 2019).

The other country, which is posing threat to China's energy security in the Asia-Pacific region, is Japan. Japan considers Strait of Malacca as the "Lifeline" to Japan that is why they give priority to the Maritime Self Defense and Maritime Lane Security (Wang, 2015). Japan officially authorized Self Defense Force after 9/11 and now Japanese military presence in the Indian Ocean is posing threats to other regional states (Wang, 2015). Third country, which is posing serious threats to Chinese energy interests, is India. India wants the control of Ocean not only to deprive its rivals to use it but to secure Indian interests as well and even to achieve their target since 1990s they have intensified the Oriental Maritime and Indian Ocean Control Strategy (Wang, 2015).

Besides these three states, there are other factors too in the Asia-Pacific region to pose threat to the Chinese development and its energy security, like political deterioration, disputes between the states and regional turmoil. For instance, if the conflict escalates between China and the ASEAN countries in South China Sea and in response, ASEAN countries may use the Strait of Malacca as a threat or China take any step, which can trigger the Malaysia and Indonesia to block the Straits (Wang, 2015). Secondly, any escalation of conflict in Indian Ocean can disturb the stability of the region and as far as

the Middle Eastern region is concerned, Strait of Hormuz lies there and social situation in region and terrorist activities may have negative impact on the maritime lane security as well.

Non-traditional security challenges such as piracy and maritime terrorism pose serious threats to Chinese energy security. World witnessed a rapid growth of piracy incidents after Cold war and new developments and trends in the maritime terrorism are challenging the world shipping and trade. Because of such developments, China considers piracy and maritime terrorism as the biggest non-traditional threat to their energy security (Wang, 2015). Experts also argue that in the contemporary period, West African Coast, Somalian Peninsula, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bay of Bengal and the South Asia are mainly under the concentration of the pirates (Wang, 2015). These areas are important for China and even in recent years, China is encountering the pirates and suffered a lot in returns. Such type of pirates and maritime terrorist activities are posing threats to Chinese energy security.

Counter-Measures: China wants to avoid the “Malacca Dilemma” and this desire of Chinese led them to construct the alternative ways. China’s diversions are China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China-Myanmar Energy Corridor (CMEC). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor connects Xinjiang and Gwadar; it also links the Maritime Silk Road to Eurasian Belt (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). On the other hand, in 2017, they opened China-Myanmar Energy Corridor, it is basically a gas and oil pipelines project which connects Deep Water Port of Kyaukpyu and Kunming in South-western China. However, it is yet to be seen that how much these projects would secure and help China in fulfilling their energy needs. China’s claim in the East and South China Sea is linked to her energy potential. In the nutshell, China’s energy security is the driver behind the China’s Grand strategy for Asia-Pacific.



### ***Geopolitics of China's Grand Strategy***

After the announcement of Chinese Grand Strategy, the geopolitics of Asia-Pacific is changing rapidly. China's Asia-Pacific geopolitical policies revolve around the South China Sea and the Pacific Oceans. China is one of important actors in the Asia-Pacific region and wants to secure its interests and regional order without the escalation of conflict. In order to achieve its goals, China has adopted the strategies for South China Sea and Pacific Ocean to secure its objectives.

**Pacific Ocean:** Pacific Ocean plays the crucial role in securing Chinese interests, even under Grand strategy China has adopted the strategies for Pacific Basin too (Yang, 2011). China's policies for Pacific Ocean reflect different intentions of Chinese. First, it seems that China wants to push past, and second view could be, China is adopting these policies for "Island Chains". Third, People's Republic of China wants recognition as a legitimate government that is why they are pushing. On the other hand, Taiwan claims that China wants the access and control the resources of deep water along with the seabeds, which are rich in mineral resources. Last but not the least perception about Chinese policies is, as a part of increasing geopolitical rivalry with US (Scott, 2019).

China is taking diplomatic steps to engage with the regional states. China is enjoying formal diplomatic relations with only eight regional/Pacific Island states out of sixteen. In recent years, they have taken measures to establish good relations with the regional states and it reportedly deploys more diplomats than any other country in the region. Apart from it, they are also paying the senior level visits as in 2006 Wen Jiabao visited Fiji and announced the establishment of Chinese-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (CPICEDCF) (Yang, 2011). China is also an active member of different regional institutions to maintain the bilateral relations. Since 1989, China is a dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum but in recent years, it is paying more attention as they are sending their officials to attend the meetings (Scott, 2019). In 2000,


China not only set up China-PIF cooperation fund but in 2002, they also sponsored PIF trade office in Beijing (Yang, 2011).

China did not only join PIF but they have developed good relations with the other sub-regional groups as their close ties with the Melanesia Spearhead Groups (MSG). Even China funded the establishment of Melanesia Spearhead Groups' headquarter in Vanuatu (Yang, 2011). Chinese establishment of good relations and involvement in the various infrastructure projects under OBOR is increasing concerns in US and Australia. Especially China's ties with Fiji and their participation in various OBOR infrastructure projects in Papua New Guinea as a memorandum of understanding created a lot of suspicion in US and Australia. In response, they both announced plans to develop the naval base facilities at Lombrum to counter Chinese presence there (Scott, 2019).

China is not only developing and maintaining good bilateral and multilateral relations on diplomatic basis but it also has been concerned about the maritime security. Since 1988, China has been a member of Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). In 2018, China withdrew from the RIMPAC, world's largest international maritime warfare exercise hosted by US. US did not approve Chinese actions in the South China Sea and this reason lead towards the China withdrawal from RIMPAC in which Chinese had participated in 2014 and 2016 (Scott, 2019).

**South China Sea:** China's claim over the South China Sea is increasingly treated as its "core interest". Even China's U shape line claims that the Pratas Island, Paracel Island, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Island are a part of China's territory in the Sea (Miyoshi, 2012). China does not accept other states like Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippine, Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia's rights over the South China Sea. Chinese claim that these Islands had been stolen from China during different conflicts by the great powers. So they claim that China would get back stolen parts of China at any cost.

Figure 3: South China Sea



Source: <https://undertheangsanatree.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-nine-dash-line.html>

Hainan Island is one of the most important islands as it provides China with geopolitical and power projection advantages at the top of the South China Sea. Submarine base at Yulin enables Chinese development into the South China Sea and West Pacific (Scott, 2019). Hainan department of commerce announced to set a new port facility at Sanya for the purpose of deep-sea research vessel in 2018. This starting point of this project is linked with the Maritime Silk Road and this set would be a free trade zone by 2025 (Tang & Zheng, 2018). Woody Island was captured by the China in 1974 from Vietnam. Now Taiwan and Vietnam claim over the chain of Woody Island, which is one of the hot issue in South China Sea between China and these countries. China also announced to spend 10 billion Yuan for the

purpose of military and infrastructure development and this development would further enhance the Chinese control (Chan, 2012).

China claims that Spratly Island has remained a part of China for centuries. Spratly Island is rich in natural resources and fishing area. They believe that not only the Spratly Island but also almost the entire South China Sea including the other Islands come under its territory (Pletcher, n.d.). China's claims on Sea indirectly directed towards the control of estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil plus natural gas resources (CFRC, 2019). Countries, especially Vietnam and the Philippines are having dispute with China over this claim. In 1988, China first time established its presence in Spratly Island by removing Vietnam's garrison from Johnson South Reef. In 2014, China started building artificial land on certain reef (Pletcher, n.d.). Additionally, China has constructed airstrips, ports and military installations in Spratly and Parcel Islands (CFRC, 2019).

As for as foreign intervention in South China Sea is concerned, China avoids the talks at any regional or international forum as they don't want to make it as an international issue rather are keen to localize it that's why discourage the foreign intervention (Scott, 2019). China argues that under the international law, foreign countries are not allowed to conduct the intelligence-gathering activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Disputes, 2020). But the US on the other hand, have a different perspective, they claim that under the UN Convention on the Law of Seas (UNCLOS) all the claimant countries should have the navigation freedom through the EEZs (CFRC, 2019). In 2016, the Philippines brought claim against China before the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the decision came in favour of the Philippines but China refused to accept the Court's decision (CFRC, 2019). Even after the decision of Permanent Court of Arbitration, the new administration of the Philippines is enjoying good economic relations with China.

### ***China's Maritime Grand Strategy:***

This section examines how the maritime strategy of China is securing Chinese interests and affecting the overall regional order. China has shifted the world's attention towards Asia-Pacific. After the end of the Cold war, China transformed its strategic policies and since then maritime security has become the important element to influence its policies. Now, China's quest for sea power has become its main issue on which China claims that, they are shifting their policies because of the changing regional security environment, which is driving them to shift from the land power to the control of the territorial waters and strategic resources. Consequently, most of the nations are shifting their focus towards the maritime economic competition so China too.

Because of the above-mentioned Chinese perspective, China has changed its policy from Maoist maritime strategic approach "coastal defence" to "offshore and far sea defence" (Table 1). Even though China was not having an impressive maritime strategy in history but they always remained an important maritime country in the Asia-Pacific region, which possessed 18,000km mainland coastal, plus 14,000km island coastline (Chandramohan, 2014). In 2015, Chinese official defence strategy stressed upon the adoption of the "open-seas protection" strategy. Under this strategy, they claimed that protection of "offshore defence" and "open seas defence" is and will remain at the top of the Chinese maritime strategy (Saito, 2017). China stresses that their maritime strategy only focuses on the enhancement of the Chinese Sea capabilities, their naval presence will not disturb the existing order rather would lead towards the "harmonious ocean" (Xiaoyan, 2014). In 2017, Xi announced that for becoming to be a great maritime power, China adopted the pivot policy of "strong navy" (Xinhuanet, 2017).

Table 1: Changes in PLAN Strategy

1950s to 1970s	Coastal defence/ Inshore defence	Main area of operations: Coastal and Inshore areas not far from the mainland. Main Objectives: Supporting Land engagements, preventing enemy infiltration from sea etc.
1980s to the beginning of 2000s	Offshore defence	Main area of opportunities: Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea. Main Objectives: Prevention of enemy invasion, national unification, safeguarding of territory, protection of sea lines of communication, protection of maritime rights and interests.
Beginning of 2000s	Offshore defence/ Open seas defence	Main area of opportunity: open seas in addition to offshore waters. Main Objectives: While maintaining and strengthening offshore defence strategies, safeguarding China's interests overseas and being ready to counterattack with nuclear weapon, participating in international security cooperation etc.

Source: NIDS China Security Report 2016

Hugo Grotius changed the world perception about the sea power. In 1609, he wrote *Mare Liberum* he convinced the policy makers that Oceans can be used as a channel of communication between states. After this development, world leaders started to think on different lines and made rule and law for the peaceful use of the sea. China since its foundation not only recognized UN but also participated in United Nations Conventions on the Law Seas (UNCLOS). China made a rule and requests other countries to inform China before passing its territorial water but China itself did not follow it when in 2014 People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) passed the US

territorial water. After this incident, US scholars argue that the US should withdraw the Chinese rights of moving freely in the South China Sea and this status must remain until the Chinese do not accept their mistake and follow the international law (Saito, 2017).


**Classical Approach of China's Maritime Strategy:** China adopted the "String Policy" under this strategy. They attempted to increase their access to different ports and develop good diplomatic relations with the regional states to fulfil the China's energy needs. Even though US was busy in two other conflicts in Afghanistan and Middle East but despite this fact and opportunity, China did not adopt the offensive policy rather it was a defence move by China. Even today, it seems that China is almost adopting the same strategy as they are utilizing diplomatic and economic means to develop good bilateral and multilateral relations with the regional states under its Grand Strategy. In 2003, China started to talk about the Malacca Dilemma, as it is just 2.7 km wide at its narrowest point and China had to pass through its oil from Strait of Malacca. Therefore, they feared that it could be blocked any time by a terrorist attack or natural disaster etc.

**Current Approach of China's Maritime Strategy:** After adopting the GS, China has divided its People's Liberation Army into five different branches: 1) The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force) and The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) (Koda, 2017). China's ground force and air force both are tasked to conduct defensive operations along with the offensive as well when needed. They both not only focus on Taiwan but on the other regional states as well like India, North Korea, Vietnam and many others.

With the rise of China as a regional state, PLAAF has also expanded the area of its operation. They started to operate over the extended waters too. This gave the clear message of expansionist policy of China to the world. Secondly, it clarified that PLAAF is not only

operating in the air rather it is helping PLAGF operations. Not only this PLAAF's fighter and bomber force are also tasked now to attack on the enemy naval in the distinct sea areas. In addition to the other developments. China has also built artificial island in the Spratly and Parcel Islands. Since 2015, China has started to reclaim the 3200 acres, China is not only reclaiming but satellite images of Subi Reef and Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Island are showing unusual activities of China over there, as a possible construction of airstrips, helipads, piers etc. (Figure: 4 and 5). This development will help PLAAF to fly over the South China Sea for conducting defence exercises and attack on the other states if they attack on China or create hurdle in Chinese interests (Koda, 2017).

Figure 4: Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Island



Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35216579>

At the moment, China can only have robust operation only in and around the Chinese territory, they are not able to compete the US forces yet as the US used to carry operation worldwide and support its allied around the world. However, if China plans to militarise the Spratly and Parcel Islands gets fruits for China it can disturb the regional order and would be a threat for US interests as well. People's



Liberation Army Navy became a major player after the Chinese rise in the mid of the 1990s even it played important role and supported the Chinese A2/AD strategy (Koda, 2017). Chinese PLAN also has planned to turn from “brown water” to blue water” navy, with the extraordinary abilities to operate in the high seas in the Asia-Pacific region (Koda, 2017). Since last few years, China is spending more on the development and strengthening the PLAN than any other force. This Chinese priority is showing that they are serious to make it the “blue-water” navy. However, the biggest hurdle in this regard is China relations with the other states, as it does not have strong alliance, which can provide functional military bases and full support to PLAN. This is the biggest difference between the US navy operation and PLAN and China knows it too that is why they have started to build the base in Djibouti and their Grand strategy for maritime security (Koda, 2017).

Figure 5: Subi Reef in the Spratly Island



Source: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-17/south-china-sea-subi-reef-in-2012-compared-to-2016/8128816?nw=0>

## CONCLUSION

The above-mentioned discussion shows that China has a clear and coherent Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific region. It will be before time to predict Chinese behavior and the future regional order but it seems that China's approach towards the regional order is neither realist nor the idealist rather they are adopting a way between both to secure their interests and maintain the peace in Asia-Pacific. Under its new Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific, China is spending more on military modernization and maritime security to defend its security interest in the region. To achieve such goals, China is trying hard to maintain the peace and stability in the region by avoiding the escalation of military conflict. Diplomatically, China has successfully convinced the regional states that a powerful China would not harm their interests rather a strong China will play an important role for the regional peace and stability. China's One Belt One Road initiative is a part of Chinese Grand strategy. It not only strengthens Chinese economic and domestic progress but also helps China in bypassing the potential threats in Strait of Malacca and South China Sea and provides alternative routes to fulfil the Chinese energy needs.

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