

**QUAID-E-AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH'S ROLE  
IN HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY: A CASE OF UNITY OF TWO CLASSES**

*Nauman Reayat  
Dr.Manzoor Ali Veesrio  
Salma Baloch*

**ABSTRACT**

*This paper argues that Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a constitutionalist and great political leader who is known as founder of Pakistan and an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. This study analyses Jinnah's role in uniting two parties: All India National Congress and All India Muslim League is often times taken as his contribution in bringing two communities together. Unity between two political parties based on mutual interests and shared objectives determine the class politics of that time. Given the fact that political participation was limited only to privileged classes of society, it is worth probing that Jinnah played a major role in bringing two communities politically, socially on a large scale. It seems that same classes of two communities were brought together as the result of Jinnah efforts.*

---

**Keywords:** Hindu-Muslim Unity, Class politics, Political representation, Class interests.

**INTRODUCTION**

This paper mainly divided into two main parts. First part will explain the steps taken by Jinnah in 'Hindu-Muslim unity'. Second part of the paper deals with the criticism of role of Jinnah in Hindu Muslim Unity. It will explain the context in which Jinnah was considering suitable, purpose of such unity and benefits which had been obtained by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah while tending to unite Hindus and Muslims together. Failure of such unity in books of history has been attributed to religious differences and communal politics. But Jinnah being oblivious, religious prejudices always adopted constitutional ways to attain political objectives. All political objectives which were the demands of national environment in the eyes of Jinnah had been envisaged for collective wellbeing. Such collective benefits were not of Muslims only but of united India comprising both Hindus and Muslims. He always put both the communities on equal footing. A nationalist constitutionalist didn't prefer local issues over national issues and that was why he played his role at central legislative body. Local issues had been left to local players but to represent provinces at centre Jinnah was the most suitable person.

Jinnah's constitutionalist posture has always been confused with his loyalty to British Raj. Some of the historians didn't shirk of labelling Jinnah as agent of than British Government. But it would be unjust to accept such an argument without logical scrutiny.

#### **JINNAH'S ROLE IN UNITING HINDU AND MUSLIMS**

Jinnah's first step to evolve unity between two parties Congress and League was his homework done to arrange a unity conference in 1910 at Allahabad (Jawed 2009). In the conference, deliberating upon various national issues along with other leaders such as S.N.Banerjea, Ghokale etc., and his efforts brought the fruit in form of constitution of an executive committee for the promotion of peaceful co-existence between two communities. It seems that he even before joining Muslim League was sincere to cause of Congress-League unity. He was against grant of separate electorates to Muslims that time, because he considered such separation as an implicit acceptance of the fact that Hindus and Muslims are two different communities and are not Indians. He wanted to see both Hindus and Muslims as equal or in other words of democratic language majority and minority as equal. Rather it wouldn't be wrong to say he was not ready to assent the distinguished civilizational creed of two communities in any manner in his heydays of political life.

Jinnah went onwards to bring League and Congress in line to have a united front against British Government by first joining League and then started attending sessions of League consecutively in 1910, 1911 and 1912 (Ibid). He succeeded to convince members of League to revise League's constitution. As a result, in 1913 demand of self-government had been included in constitution of League. That was the major break-through in national politics of that time. Message of congruence between ideologies of two parties who had always been seen as communal rivals, was sent to British Government. But the context in which such development took place must also be taken into account. In 1911 annulment of Bengal was announced by the King at Delhi clandestinely. Annulment of partition of Bengal was an eye-opener for members of Muslim League. They realized that reliance on Britons wouldn't be reliable and hence mistrust had been created. Searching for an alternative Muslim League had to tilt towards Congress. Aware of this situation, Jinnah stressed on joint efforts and union of people along national lines and shared such feelings with the general public on platforms like Anjuman-e-Islam. It is surprising that even today such tilt can be found in Pakistan's posture in international politics. When Pak-US relations were strained couple of years ago Pakistan started mending her ways with India.

Above all, the game-changer in Congress League relations was Lucknow Pact. It was his most significant achievement that he, overcoming the difficulties and dissensions within the two parties convinced the leadership of the two and created an understanding between them. Before bringing them on the same page, Jinnah made hectic efforts to create a conducive and friendly environment between the two. He first worked on holding session of two parties together in same cities. In Dec 1915 when Jinnah was president of Muslim league vowed to hold the session of Muslim League at Bombay where Congress' session had also to be held. While achieving this he received stubborn opposition from his co-religionists. Even British officials appointed to maintain law and order didn't intervene to ward off the disruption created by dissenters in the session of Muslim League held in 1915. But, he, dedicated to his cause didn't care and managed to hold the meetings at Tajmahal hotel where Muslim League invited congressmen and then later on League leaders attended the Congress sessions. In League's session, a committee was constituted to correspond with other political organization. Hence sessions at Bombay were antecedents to Lucknow pact. Such homework of Jinnah brought the fruit when Jinnah succeeded to make understood hard-nut-to-crack leader of right faction of congress i.e. Tilak that need of the time is to present joint scheme before British Government. In December 1916, League and Congress came on common terms which were broadening and increasing of elected Indian members to legislative bodies. But the most important term was of grant of separate electorates to Muslims. That was the victory of Jinnah that he got Congress to recognize the separate socio-political nature of Muslims at the expense of conversion of representation of Muslim-majority provinces from majority into minority. But politics is a game of compromise; is a game of give and take. Congress succeeded to lessen the representation of Muslims in Muslim-Majority provinces such as Bengal and Punjab whereas League got recognition of Muslims as separate political entity by Congress. Here again the context in which Lucknow Pact took place must not be unnoticed. First World War started in 1914. Recruitment from British India was taking place on massive scale. Various acts such as Rowlatt Act were being enacted by British Government. Such measures which were violation of interests of both Muslims and Hindus gave no other option to two communities but to make a common front against British Raj which did take place in the form of Lucknow Pact.

After enactment of Rowlatt Act, Jinnah resigned from Imperial Legislative Council. Then due to the Treaty of Sevres between the allied Powers, question of Khilafath became a hot debate in Indian politics. Due to death of moderates like Naroji, Gokhale and Pheroze Shah Mehtha leaders like Gandhi got able to make their splashing entry in both Congress and

Indian political arena possible. Leading the Khilafath movement Gandhi mixed religion with politics which was contrary to Jinnah's Political ideology. Jinnah-the constitutionalist never enjoined Gandhi's launch of non-cooperation movement because such movement against the constitutional ways. Jinnah tried to convince his counterparts but to no avail. Hence, at last he had to part his ways. He resigned from Congress in 1920 (Woolpert 1999). Later on, plight of both Muslims-Hindus and extreme religious environment that sharpened the communal boundaries proved that Jinnah was right to condemn unconstitutional ways of getting demands accepted. After leaving Congress, his life till 1927 was politically less active. Even during that stage he at various places and junctures such as in 1919, 1923, 1924 and 1926 didn't stop his efforts to bridge the Congress-League gap (Jawed, 2009; Naik, 1978; Saiyyid, 1981; Woolpert, 1999).

In March 1927, at Delhi, adopting constitutional path and playing his old card of give and take Jinnah succeeded to get leaguers agreed on joint electorates and in exchange wanted Congress to agree on reforms in Baluchistan and NWFP; separation of Sindh from Bombay; representation by population in Punjab and Bengal and 33 % seat for Muslims in central legislature. His proposals had been disapproved by some of Muslims such as Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy and Sabaites (Woolpert, 1999). Proposals which are known as Delhi proposals alarmed Britons enough to respond by sending a commission known as Simon commission to take Indian leaders into confidence for future constitution of India. But both Congress and League boycotted it. Hindu Mahasba and Shafi League were again against the moves of Congress and Jinnah respectively. Executive committee of League and working committee of Congress met at All Parties Conference in May 1928 so that consensus might be hammered out regarding future constitution of India. A committee under the supervision of Nehru was constituted which came up with a report by the name: Nehru Report. Nehru report was clear contravention of Muslim's interests and showed that Congress stepped back from earlier concessions extended to Muslims. Jinnah proposed some amendments aimed at achieving unity between two parties but in vain. Jinnah was severely condemned by leaders of Hindu Mahasbas such as Moonje and Jayakar after which Jinnah got discourage. Jinnah's fourteen points were reaction to Nehru report. But his all efforts ranging from Delhi proposal to fourteen points aimed at trade-off between interests of Congress and League representatives proved to be abortive due to resistance from Hindu Mahasba and League-dissenters. Jinnah making relentless efforts convinced dissenters like Agha Khan over joint electorate and also made Sir Tej Bahadar Saprú, Sastri and Setavald to join his chorus of unity but Sabhaites didn't capitulate and remained stumbling block.

But the journey of Jinnah leading to 'Hindu-Muslim' unity didn't end there. He maintained his view on various instances in years: 1931, 1932, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939 (Ambedkar 1947; Bolitho, 2006; Philips & Wainwright, 1970; Rao, 1972). He was intrinsically dedicated to his cause, so much so, that even after the Lahore resolution he didn't switch over from his bandwagon of unity. At the arrival of Cabinet mission his wish was to remain in a loose unity with Hindus which without any shadow of doubt show Jinnah was not a communalist who draw the red line but actually that was sabahaites-dominated Congress who bracketed Indians in black and white and hence sharpened the religious fault line.

## CONCLUSION

The paper has analysed the contribution of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in bringing two communities Hindu and Muslim, closer to each other. In the beginning, he was life-long believer in democracy and he considered both communities equal in status. In 1912, he was able to convince Muslims leaders to change the objectives of All India Muslim League. Thus, the political party included one more objective in its manifesto that the party will work for self-government in India. Eventually, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah became successful in unity two communities through Lucknow Pact in 1916.

It was most significant achievement of Jinnah who came to be known as ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. It was clear from the speeches and statements of Jinnah that he was ambassador of Hindu-Muslim friendship. However, there is need to analyse the efforts of Jinnah in the different perception and not in communal perspective.

## REFERENCES

- Ahsan, Aitezaz, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*. (Oxford University Press, 1996).
- Ambedkar B.R., *Pakistan or Partition*. (Bombay: Thacker and Company, 1946).
- Bolitho, Hector. *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Broomfield, J.H., *Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth Century, Bengal*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
- Hardy, P.H., *The Muslims of British India*. (Karachi: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
- Hayat, Sikandar, *The Charismatic Leader: Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Jalal, Ayesha *et.al.*, 'Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the War', *Modern Asian Studies*, 1982.
- Jalal, Ayesha, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2010).

Jawed, Ajeet, *Secular and Nationalist Jinnah*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Nanda, B.R., *Gandhi Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Page, David, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-1932*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Philips, *et.al.*, (eds.). *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935-47*. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970).

Rao, Shiva, *India's Freedom Struggle*. (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972).

Saiyid, M.H., *The Sound of Fury: A Political Study of Mohammad Ali Jinnah*. (New Delhi: Document Press, 1981).

Sayeed, Khalid B., *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

Wolpert, Stanley, *Jinnah of Pakistan*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Yong Tai Tan, *The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947*. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005).

---