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CIVIL SERVICE IN PAKISTAN AND ITALY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the various politico-bureaucratic aspects of the two divergent nation states viz. Pakistan and Italy. Despite the fact that the two nations have different historical, cultural and geographical dissimilarities there is deep observation that they have more common threads of unstable political system, corrupt regimes, and characterless leadership.

The historical evolution of Pakistan and post independence constitutional and administrative developments and that of Italy's post 1815 re-establishment as a unified state is analytical discussion which leads to the micro level analysis of the administrative and the political machineries of both the nations. The paper attempts to reveal the similarities and dissimilarities of historical, political, socio-cultural and constitutional framework of both countries in general, and that of civil service systems in particular. With such serious irregularities at the administrative and political systems, the research paper will endeavor to suggest the analytical preview of the facts and would than try to present remedies which may lead to the civil services and administrative reform in order to regain the essential viability of the both states namely, Pakistan and Italy.

INTRODUCTION

Apparently Pakistan and Italy are neither bound by any special bonds of friendship nor do they have any common historical background. Notwithstanding these, it is quite surprising and probably a mere coincidence that the people of both the countries have a lot in common--the omnipresent crisis situations in politics; too much involvement of the people with the political affairs of the countries; the general impression as if the countries are on the verge of dismemberment; paradoxical life styles; corrupt and inefficient bureaucracies; and weak political management of the economies leading to the conclusion that the two governments are not exactly on top of things.

The impact of religious tendencies in the early part of the existences of these states and its implications for the constitution making and the legislation aimed at the controlling of the civil service system is the heart of this research paper. The forceful impact of the papacy in Italy and the Islam in Pakistan are the central points of this research paper. At the political scene in Italy according to Ferrel Heady, 'A military-bureaucratic coalition emerged immediately after the independence in 1947 replacing the British colonial rulers, and has maintained its power position ever since without substantial interruption'. In a similar fashion in Italy, after the fall of Mussolini there was no obvious dominate party or social group, nor indeed was there any effective government or administration with half of the country in a state of war between Nazi-Fascist and partisans.

Such dismal of political start by the both countries have led them to the array of political mistakes, which ultimately shook the basic notions of statehood. So, they share more similarities than the dissimilarities and hence this comparative study. The paper will reveal the similarities and dissimilarities of historical, political, socio-cultural, and constitutional framework of both the countries in general, and that of the civil service systems in particular.

PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL SCENE

Pakistan became an independent nation in 1947 when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned upon withdrawal of British sovereignty. Faced from the very start with tremendous problems stemming from such circumstances as the dislocations of partition and the resulting two-way flow of refugees, the geographic and linguistic division of East and West Pakistan, and the lack of a unified leadership, Pakistan have gone through a series of political crises. The most traumatic episode was the relationship with India and the resulting dismemberment of the country leading to the emergence of former East Pakistan as the nation of Bangladesh. Chaotic conditions in Pakistan's internal politics have led to alternating periods of parliamentary or presidential and military

rule. As Heady (1984) pointed out that, "A military - bureaucratic coalition elite emerged immediately after independence in 1947, replacing the British colonial rulers, and has maintained its power position ever since without substantial interruption." Many foreign writers on the political situation of Pakistan have, however, underestimated the political awareness of the general public of Pakistan. They are certainly wrong in their perceptions and have failed to appreciate the high level of capacity of the population for political participation. The general elections during the 1970s and 1980s are clear indicators to that effect. The most recent general elections in the country have also confirmed the fact that the masses of Pakistan are now fed up with old generation of politicians and have given the mandate to rule to very young leadership. Pakistan, like many other democratic countries, has a number of pressure groups which include labor unions, media, theologians, traders and businessmen, agriculturists, students etc; who apply their ever-changing tactics to influence the political leaders as well as the civil servants for achieving the vested interests. The political leaders and the civil servants have to tackle the conflicting demands and interests very diplomatically within the limited and meager resources at their disposal. On the other hand the people at large want to see strong legislatures at federal and provincial levels versus the less prestigious bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are, in fact, scapegoats, like their counter parts in the United States of America, for the inefficiency of public representative.

ITALIAN POLITICAL SCENE

In Italy after the fall of Mussolini, there was no obviously dominant party or social group, nor indeed was there any effective government or administration with half the country in a state of civil war between Nazi-Fascist and partisans, and the other half under Allied occupation. Until 1947, all the anti-fascist forces worked together in government. From May 1947 onwards, the left (Partito Communista Italiano (PCI), and Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) was excluded and the Democrazia Cristiania (DC) ruled the country either by itself or in coalition with the Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats. In 1948 the DC won a majority of seats both in the Chamber and the Senate. From then on, the party's main concern was to maintain overall control over the levers of economic, administrative and political power. This was done in a variety of ways: by changing the electoral system; by producing a sound party organization; and most importantly, by increasing the party's hold over the economic life of the country. In the second part of the post-war period, other forces were drawn into the system in order to shore up DC control. The story of rise and fall of the DC can be divided into four phases: (1) The DC, or rather De Gasperi, was acting in communion with the church and industry while at the same time laying the foundations for its expansion into the economy with the foundation of the Southern Development Fund, National Hydrocarbons Agency (ENI) and the land reform agencies; (2) With the death of De Gasperi, the party was divided into factions; (3) This phase was marked by the absorption of the PSI into state client list system as well as a further expansion of the state sector of the economy; and (4) Then there has been the slow loss of power by the DC as its poll decreased and the party tried to find a new identity and has also compromised its position by ceding a degree of power to the PCR, by giving up the premiership first to the republicans and then to the socialists and devolving administrative control to the regions, some of whose governments do not include the DC. According to James Walston (1988) it is quite interesting to note that, "ministries can be considered by the influence and prestige they may give the minister or his party nationally or internationally, by their vote-gathering capabilities, by the amount of control they might be able to exert on the country and on occasions (as when there are controversial decisions to be taken) by their unpopularity." There is enough evidence to show that in certain spheres, state resources have been and were systematically used for party and private advantage and this use had been crucial both in the building of electoral support for the DC and its allies and for linking the center and the periphery. Pressure groups and lobbies are quite common in the political system of Italy. In this context a specific example can also be quoted: A Christian Democrat, Paolo Bonomi realized that there was political capital to be made in organizing small land-owning peasants. This he did by forming the Coltivatori Diretti, an organization closely linked to the DC which with preference votes it was able to command, could easily elect up to ninety deputies and this organization, therefore, became a major pressure group till it was integrated into the state. Any description of Italy will not be complete till the mention of the Church of Rome and the mafia. The relationship of the Catholic Church and the State is governed by article 7 of the Constitution that enshrines the Lateran Pacts and other treaties which include Concordat. Despite the obligation not to take part in national politics, the Church often did so and there are numerous examples of its intervention. Accordingly with the Church, it is not altogether clear whether mafia is part of civil society or the state itself. In this context Walston (1988) observes that, "Although mafia only affects portions of the south of Italy, as a system of social control, it is, if anything, more effective than the church because its sanctions are of this world and somewhat more direct. In these areas, it is a value system which is all-pervasive.....mafia is clientelism taken to its violent extreme." Mafia controls a large proportion of the local economy. Given the level of state intervention in the south, this means a close integration with the state. Many Christian Democrats in Sicily, including no Sicilians, have established close contact with mafia. That is why on the judicial side, the Mafioso is able to fight back through the deputies he controls.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The function of the executive, Weber said, is the imperative coordination of government activity. The Italian Constitution attempts to achieve this in two ways: On the one hand, it recognizes the commanding position of the head of the cabinet (President of the Council of Ministers or Prime Minister); and on the other, it seeks to give the cabinet strength as an institution of collective decision-making. It is the cabinet, and not the Prime Minister, which must present itself before both the Houses of Parliament to seek a vote of confidence within ten days of its formation. Similarly, it is the whole cabinet which must resign on the passing of a vote of no-confidence. In spite of ministerial stability, Italy still suffers from cabinet instability and this has consequences for the quality of the country's executive government. Incidentally, in Pakistan similar situation prevails, though in the different context, and the higher civil service of Pakistan, despite its somewhat diminished role, has had a remarkable part to play under all of the post-independence regimes. It is generally credited with having made government operation possible at the start. "The bureaucracy stood when other segments of society faltered and collapsed. It conducted the business of the government. It helped forge a new state" (Heady 1984). In short, the public services of both the countries have maintained continuity through the major political upheavals.

CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM

Pakistan: Pakistan emerged as an independent country in 1947 after a British colonial rule of about 200 years. The effects of the partition of the Indian sub-continent, the influx of Muslim refugees coming from India to Pakistan and other problems faced by a newly independent but under-developed country were immense and, therefore, for a long time more attention was paid to solving immediate socio-economic and political problems of the country, than to the reform of the administrative institutions which Pakistan inherited from the colonial rule. One of the most important and effective of these institutions was the Indian Civil Service (ICS). The British had established a strong and effective civil service in India which suited to a colonial administration and served its needs well. This civil service structure was created by the British in the undivided India in the middle of nineteenth century, and was initially manned by the ruling British race and was called Indian Civil Service. Subsequently numerous changes were affected in the system according to the needs and requirements of the changing times. A colonial system of administration places greater emphasis on the maintenance of law and order while the requirements of an independent and developing country attract more attention on socio-economic

development and the establishment of a modem democratic welfare state. Pakistan, therefore, after independence had the major task of reforming, inter alia, its administrative system. This was an evolutionary process which was developed and refined over the vears. Actually freedom from colonial rule did not usher in changes in the role or attitude of the bureaucracy. A pattern similar to the one that was obtained in British India characterized the political and administrative system in Pakistan. Weak political leadership, dominance of a small capitalist and feudal class, and inter-and interparty feuds on trivial sectarian issues leading to the making and breaking of coalitions thwarted political development. An ambitious military leadership in connivance with the elite civil service took advantage of the political mess and seized state power. A long period of military--bureaucratic dominance over the state apparatus followed and ultimately was instrumental in the political disintegration of Pakistan and emergence of its Eastern Wing as an independent nation-Bangladesh-in 1971. Within the administrative system, elite civil servants sought to protect themselves as an institution and frustrated major reforms that threatened to sever their ties with tradition and break their monopolistic hold over key positions involving policymaking functions. Politics has always enshrouded the bureaucracy in Pakistan ever since it emerged as an independent nation. It has had an adverse impact on bureaucratic performance and has affected credibility of civil servants in serving the public. Its impact has been administration-wide and, in some cases, transcended bureaucratic boundaries. Being elitist in character, bureaucrats, as a social group, were insulated from the rest of the society; and wide gulf existed between the bureaucracy and the people at large. The common man encountered difficulty in gaining access to public service. Indeed, there was little direct interaction between the bureaucracy and the public. As in the colonial days, the civil servant manifested a paternalistic attitude toward the people. In early fifties an attempt was made to reform the system and foreign experts were invited to report on the system of administration. In this context Egger and Glaideux (1953) are critical of the role of the civil servant: "officers tend to be obsessed with service

membership, title, class and rank and too little concerned with job responsibilities." They curtly remarked that, "regardless of their personal and professional qualifications no democracy can afford to entrust its administrative destiny to any single cadre, group, class or service. To do so is to run the risk of creating and maintaining a civil service oligarchy". They did not favor the idea of supremacy of the generalists over the specialists, but also recommended the unification of the entire group of employees into a single civil service of Pakistan with an internal grouping solely for administrative convenience. In the meantime the publication of the Report of the Fulton Committee in Britain worked as a catalyst for administrative reforms in Pakistan introduced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1973. The main features of the 1973 administrative reforms were (Kennedy 1985):

- 1. All the services and cadres will be merged into a unified graded structure with equality of opportunity for all who entered the service at any stage based on the required professional and specialized competence necessary for each job;
- 2. All "classes" among government servants will be abolished and similarly replaced by a unified graded structure, a peon or equivalent at the bottom, a Secretary or departmental head at the top. The existing classification of the services into Class I to Class IV will no longer operate. The road to the top will be open to all on merit.
- 3. The use of "service" labels will be discontinued forthwith.
- 4. The Unified Structure will enable promotions to the higher posts throughout the range of public service for horizontal movements from one cadre to another including the movement of technical personnel to the cadre of general management. There will also be scope for out of turn promotions to exceptionally able officers.
- 5. The correct grading of each post will be determined by job evaluation.
- 6. There will be provision for entry into government service for talented individuals from the private sector in fields such as banking, insurance, industry and trade. Prior to 1973 there were

about 600 grades of pay of government servants in the various ministries and departments. These grades have been reduced to 22 grades, which are applicable to all ministries and departments of the government. Each grade carries a scale of pay, allowances etc. The present position is that grade I is the lowest grade applicable to peons, messengers etc. and grade 22 is the highest for the post of permanent Secretary who normally heads a Ministry or Division while Additional Secretary is in grade 21, Joint Secretary in grade 20, Deputy Secretary in grade 19 etc.

In between these are grades for junior executives, stenographers, clerks, typists etc. These grades are applicable to all employees whether in the ministries or in other departments and offices, big and small, and all professional or technical posts have been integrated into this unified system. In order to emphasize professionalism in the field of administration, thirteen "Occupational Groups" have been constituted. The Secretariat Group is a considerably large group. Officers reaching the higher levels in the other occupational groups are also eligible for being inducted into the Secretariat Group. Most of the posts of Secretaries, Additional Secretaries, and Joint Secretaries in the Ministries are filled by officers belonging to this group. In order to provide better opportunities of promotion to professionals it has been ensured in the rules that there should be no barrier for promotion of a professional or a specialist to higher grades in the administration including senior appointments at the higher levels of decision-making. Hence provision has been made in the rules that all Government servants including the professionals and specialists could rise to the levels of the hierarchy in the Departments and in the Ministries including the levels of Joint Secretaries, Additional Secretaries and Secretaries subject, of course, to certain regulations regarding qualifications etc. The system of 'reservation' of some higher posts for any particular occupational group has been done away with. Similarly provision has been made for horizontal mobility of officers from one group to another group particularly in the higher grades of the civil

service. In order to facilitate promotion, government servants in lower grades who have reached the maximum of their scale of pay, can now move to the higher grades, automatically (subject, to good work, conduct etc.) irrespective of whether or not a vacancy exists in the higher grade. Such automatic movements to higher grade, however, can take place up to and including grade 20. In order to induct into service professionals and specialists available in the country, as well as provide better opportunities of promotion to those talented government servants who had not been provided opportunities for promotion due to the system of "reservation's" and other inhibiting rules, a new system called "lateral entry" was introduced. According to this system well qualified persons in service as well as outside government service were invited to apply for the posts of Deputy Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and Additional Secretaries in the Federal Ministries. Appointments to these posts were made direct through a competitive examination or by interview or both. This provision has been held in abeyance for the present. Prior to reforms, candidates were assigned to the various 'services' on the result of the competitive examination held by the Public Service Commission and were trained in separate academies for each 'service'. After the reforms all the candidates of the examination held by the Federal Public Service Commission are trained in a common institution called the Academy for Administrative Training (now called Civil Service Academy) and assigned to the various "Occupational Groups" after the training. Previously the Federal Public Service Commission (and the Provincial Public Service Commissions for the Provincial posts) was required to be consulted before any disciplinary action was taken against civil servants in the higher grades. After the reforms consultation with the FPSC was dispensed with. However, 'Service Tribunals' were created consisting of a Judge of the High Court as Chairman and two other members which were authorized to hear appeals by a civil servant, aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service. Civil service of Pakistan can broadly be divided into three groups: generalists/elite belonging to central superior services; professional services; and

miscellaneous services. As indicated earlier in this chapter that there are 13 service groups which are recruited through a nationwide competitive examination, traditionally called Central Superior Services (CSS) examination. This is considered very prestigious examination, conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) every year. Out of about 8000 confident and highly qualified young men between the ages of 21 to 28 years are selected through a lengthy written examination; viva voce; and a number of intelligence/psychological/medical tests. Then they get common training at Civil Service Academy for about one year (including military training and field study) followed by a comprehensive professional training of respective professional group to which they are allocated. They also get a number of opportunities for in-country and foreign training. Their promotion is much more rapid than the officers of two other groups. Professionals like doctors, engineers, agriculturists, educationists, are recruited by FPSC on the basis of an interview keeping in view their performance during their academic career. The interviewing boards for their recruitment also include senior professionals in the respective fields for facilitating the relevant board at the time of interview. These professional cadres have also enhanced their prestige considerably over a period of time and have also been successful in holding some top-level positions which were traditionally considered as the monopoly of the CSS cadre. Miscellaneous services include Assistant Directors, Deputy Directors, and Directors General in nonprofessional, non-CSS departments such as local bodies' directorate, fertilizers directorate, etc. They are also recruited in grade: 17 through FPSC losing their position gradually but thev are due to professionalization of so many positions, on one hand, and holding of senior positions such as Directors and Directors-General by the CSS officers, on the other. They have the lowest promotion prospects and enjoy the service benefits the least.

The Constitution of Pakistan lays down separate services for the central government and the provincial governments. Both types of the governments are required to regulate their civil services through Article 240 of Chapter 1 of Part XII. The civil service of the colonial period was transformed into 'Pakistan Civil Service' in 1947 and reorganized and re-established into its modern form in 1973. The Constitution of Pakistan describes the constitutional status as the appointments to and the conditions of service of persons in the service of Pakistan shall be determined:

- (a) in the case of the services of the Federation, posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation and All-Pakistan Services, by or under Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)]; and
- (b) in the case of the services of a Province and posts in connection with the affairs of a Province, by or under Act of the Provincial Assembly.

The Parliament in relation to the affairs of the Federation, and the Provincial Assemblies of the Provinces in relation to affairs of the Provinces, may, by law, provide for the establishment and constitution of a Public Service Commission under the Part XII, Chapter 1: Services and Miscellaneous [Article 240-242].

Italy: The public service has maintained continuity through the major political upheavals that Italy has suffered in the twentieth century without experiencing a major shakeup of its personnel. Fascism took over the pre-fascist bureaucracy and was able to use it without much difficulty. Few career civil servants resigned in protest; they in fact could not afford to. Mussolini was usually able to quiet resentment or objections to his domestic or foreign policies by giving increases in salaries. This did not generally have effect of making the civil service salaries really adequate, but it warded off any serious opposition. In order to buy support he greatly expanded the bureaucracy, filling it with Fascist party and nonparty appointees. This caused certain resentments among older career bureaucrats, who felt their positions or promotion possibilities threatened.

By expanding the public service, nevertheless, a place was found for many while the principles of the merit system were wrecked. In the 1930s all public employees were forced to take a personal oath of loyalty to Mussolini. Again a very few refused to do so and resigned their position since most employees were dependent on their salaries for supporting their families. Thus apparently entire public service at all levels of government from national to local became officially fascist. The collapse of Fascism then caused an emotional and intellectual crisis for some and majority were willing to serve Mussolini's successors for financial reasons. As luck would have it, the attempts by anti-Fascists to launch a purge of the bureaucracy failed and only some of the most exposed top-ranking civil servants either resigned or were dismissed.

In the early postwar period, parliament created a commission to study the reorganization of the public service with the aim of reducing its size and eliminating overlapping and duplication, but all that resulted was a new agency with its own swollen table of organization and consequently the overblown civil service of Fascist days was further expanded. The government in fact creates jobs for reducing the level of unemployment though most of these jobs are low-skilled and low-paid, with the employee obtaining whatever satisfaction can be derived from the dignity of the office. No government institution, no matter how useless, is ever abolished, because to lose job is a major catastrophe. Just like Pakistan, Italian government is very slow in introducing the modern labor-saving devices in the public offices and so the resultant paper work is always on the increase. The various ministries and agencies of the government have evolved over time, accumulating historic functions which sometimes lack logical coherence and rationality. A function, once located in a ministry, however, tends to become entrenched in a network of relationships which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in administrative reorganization. Ministries may be combinations of operative functions, information functions, and regulatory functions, often having little in common.

In other words, a ministry may be a collection of divisions having very little interrelationship. The Italian civil service, like that of most western European countries, is divided into four classes: (1) Administrative Class (2) Executive Class (3) Clerical Class (4) Messenger Class. The administrative class is responsible for the general supervision of the work of the entire ministry, for preparing and advising the Minister on major questions which require his decision, and for dealing with the whole field of government policy as it affects and is affected by the work of the ministry. The executive class comprises the staff responsible for the detailed management of routine business, for supervising the clerical class, for the day to day operation of the more complicated branches of administration, for taking decisions which do not involve questions of administrative principle or ministerial policy and for assisting and preparing the work of the administrative class. The clerical class comprises the typist, secretaries, mechanical and counter staff. The messenger class is made up of porters, messengers, chauffeurs, and other oddjobber, like the numerous ushers (bidelli) generally found in the ministries.

Besides that the Italian civil service recruits a number of specialists as well as general administrators: engineers. economists, and scientists, but like most European countries adequate number of technical experts are not readily willing to join the public sector except hydraulic, transport and civil engineers. Teachers and judges are permanent state employees. About 20 percent of the total civil servants make up the administrative class of higher civil servants. The higher civil servants are the key group in the public administration because it is they as a group who determine the nature of the administration as a corps i.e. its attitudes and activity. They are unevenly distributed throughout the administrative machine. The Ministries of Finance, Treasury, Interior and Agriculture have a large number of higher civil servants as compared to the ministries of Mercantile Marine, Tourism, the Cabinet Office, and the state Holdings who have very few.

Entry into the Italian civil service is by written examination. Candidates for the administrative class must have either obtained a university degree or reached the rank of assistant secretary in the executive class. Unlike Pakistan or Great Britain, Italy has no Public/Civil Service Commission; each ministry announces and holds its own examinations. An examination commission must formally be appointed for each examination, and the syllabuses

announced. Recruitment by written examination is intended as a means of selecting candidates on merit. This process presupposes that the examinations are held impartially, and are appropriate but the Italian people themselves have their reservations and doubts this presupposition. They suggest that political about recommendations and clientele connections play their role as they do in the appointment to special and temporary posts. In addition, the examinations have remained of a general type, being more of test of a generalist than specific culture, humanistic rather than technical, and hence unconsciously favor candidates cast in the social and intellectual mould of existing higher civil servants.

Specialized training in administration (post-entry service training) was started in the early 1960s and at present four schools (Scoula Superiore della Pubblic Amministrazione), set up in four different parts of the country are catering to the need for training of the higher civil servants. This training has shown a positive impact on civil service methods and thinking particularly on the young officers/civil servants. Entry into the higher civil service ensures the successful candidate of a life-time career. Initial eighteen months period is considered to be the probation. Poor performance leads to being overlooked in promotion though promotion is largely by seniority. Appointment to top posts such as Director--General of a ministry and Prefect in the provincial centers and specifically to the key top posts such as the Auditor--General, Director General of the Treasury, D-G of Civil Administration in the Ministry of Interior, Secretary General in both the Foreign Office and Defence Ministries etc; involves party politics. Generally such appointments become a test of power between the coalition partners (there has always been a coalition government in Italy) or between the Christian Democrat factions, that may even involve Ministers, the Cabinet, the President of the Republic and party executives. The failure of a party or faction to get their man appointed is evidence of its weakness; success becomes a symbol of strength. Reliable statistics on the social origins of civil servants are not available.

In general, one can accept Chapman's description of the origins of the Western European civil services as being generally

true of Italy: "Excluding the industrial workers the public service epitomizes the various levels of the middle class. The clerical staff represents the lower middle class, the executive official represents the middle middle-class, and the administrative official represents the upper middle class. Even when their salary scales do not fully correspond to their position in society, the different grades of the public service adopt the social customs and outlook of their appropriate social grading." Available data, however, comprises two major characteristics of the civil service: (i) that majority of the civil servants in Italy come from the middle class; and (ii) they come predominantly from the Southern part of the country. The most obvious reason for the predominance of southerners is the comparatively poor salary scale of civil servants. It is often half or even a third of the salaries that can be had for comparable positions in the private sector and the industry which is mostly in the north. Given the lack of alternative employment in the south and the limited opportunities of private law practice in its provincial centers, the civil service seems a more attractive proposition to southern graduates than to their northern counterparts. In this context it is important to point out that the universities of Rome and the South are responsible for two-thirds of the country's law graduates.

Besides, the civil servants receive important fringe benefits like pensions, paid leave, good numbers of holidays, excellent severance pay based on seniority, free health care, indemnities for loss of health due to the job, and a thirteenth-month's salary (tredicima) in addition to security of tenure. This situation has led to a striking phenomenon of the accumulation of jobs and posts. At the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy, civil servants often take a second job to make ends meet. They can do this because most of the ministries and government agencies work single session from 8.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. This leaves them free to devote their evenings to another job or form of employment. At the top of hierarchy, it takes the form of the appointment of many higher civil servants to lucrative directorships as state nominees on the Boards of Directors of state corporations, monopolies and companies. Certain officials of particular ministries, such as Treasury, Finance and the Interior, regard such appointments almost as a vested right, and the additional salaries, expense accounts etc; form an important part of their emoluments. Low salaries normally attract mediocre personnel and give no incentive to promote administrative efficiency and at time many posts in the ministries remain vacant. Civil service morale is consequently low thereby giving rise to clandestine means of enhancing the income.

PECULIARITIES OF CIVIL SERVICE IN ITALY & PAKISTAN

According to Cassese (1984), Professor of Administrative Law and a judge of the Constitutional Court of Italy sets forth the peculiarities of the 'Italian case' in the following logical sequence:

"Higher civil servants are not integrated in politico-economic leadership; Relations between higher civil servants and political leaders are based on a relationship of exchange in which the former have obtained a guarantee of their post and their career in exchange for a loss of prestige and power; in fact, the Italian civil servant, as compared with his European colleagues, is more certain of his post, but less influential; the higher civil servants, therefore, have accepted a lesser role, in order to have free hand as regards their own fate."

On the other hand the civilian bureaucracy of Pakistan particularly the higher civil servants enjoy significant security of service as well as are more influential in the policy making decisions. In the words of Kennedy (1985) that:

"The political leaders are episodically replaced, but the power of the administrative system and the authority of the bulk of its officers is impervious to change. It is in this context that the importance of the civil bureaucracy must be assessed. Patently, the bureaucracy of Pakistan not only serves as the primary executive branch of government, but in the absence of countervailing institutions, as the primary legislative branch as well. Further this power, except for temporary incursions by political leaders, is not directly subject to popular control."

In contrast, however, the Italian political leadership tempers the relative rigidity of the relationship that is established between the higher civil servants and the political leaders by increasing indirectly the remuneration of some higher civil servants by giving them external assignments; by having recourse to the promotion of heads of department, and by setting up administrative organisms outside the ministries. These correctives modify the situation as it exists at the outset and give rise to parallel administrations, which enable the political leaders to govern. Higher civil servants, though they are partly themselves the cause of this situation, realize that their behavior and the reactions that follow as a result put them on a dead-end track; hence their attitude of mistrust and sometimes of protest with regard to political leaders, an attitude unfavorable to innovation, and preference for the application of the laws. In order to be able to overcome this impasse and also under the thrust of other pressures, the government multiplies its activity of legislative proposal of the two instruments to guide the administration the law of Parliament and the command of the government--the former tends to be emphasized. More laws, however, mean, not only a more controlled higher civil service, but also more power of Parliament over the administration, at the expense of the government itself. The result, therefore, is a loss of influence, not only of the higher civil servants, but also of the ministers themselves and consequently the administration remains without guidance.

CONCLUSION

The continuation of complicated and out-dated procedures within the administrative machinery creates the conviction, which is widespread, that administration is corrupt; and that efficient service can only be obtained by greasing the palms of public officials in Italy. This impression is probably exaggerated. However, it is true that the complicated maze of administrative procedures places a premium on the person who knows his way around the administrative set up. In addition, the accumulation of posts--holding more than one post at a time whether inside or outside the administration--at all levels of the hierarchy militates against officials being efficient in their primary post. Besides, the lack of adequate technical staff implies a dangerous dependence on certain pressure groups for information and its evaluation. Due to the absence of an effective extra-bureaucratic power structure, bureaucratic domination has become so extensive that it pervades the entire social fabric. Bureaucrats and the higher civil servants have taken upon themselves the responsibility of public decision making and there is no efficacious means of holding them accountable for their actions. A highly centralized top-heavy bureaucratic structure has resulted in an authoritarian approach in dealing with administrative matters. There is recently a lot of emphasis on the idea of decentralization and on its corollary, popular participation in administration particularly at the subnational levels.

The dominance of generalist or so called elite class of civil servants in administrative affairs, particularly their occupying of important positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy, has been strongly resented by the professionals and other groups of civil servants. The non-generalist were sanguine that after the administrative reforms the erstwhile dominating tendency of the generalist cadre over other segments of the bureaucracy would end and that a system would emerge wherein equity for all civil servants in terms of their career advancement and prospects would be ensured.

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