

GENERAL MOHAMMAD ZIA-UL-HAQ AFGHAN POLICY 1977-1988

Dr. Naseem Ahmed

*Research Fellow, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research
Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad*

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to give a brief history of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq Afghan policy during the period of 1977-1988 and the relations between two countries. Initially, General Zia continued the policy of previous government of Z. A. Bhutto, the spirit of this policy was to reduce the tension and normalize the relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided an opportunity to General Zia to get international support for his regime. Thus, he introduced the Jihad policy by giving the reason of security threat to the sovereignty of Pakistan. Finally, CIA and ISI sponsored Jihad started in Afghanistan against Soviet Union. It resulted in the nexus between Pakistan military and Islamists groups of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It led Pakistan to play the role of a 'frontline state' in Afghan resistance movement against Soviet occupation. However, this period is significant in three ways: Pakistan's role as frontline state, the role and position of Pakistan during the Geneva negotiations and the signing of the Accords. Most significantly, the paper evaluates Pakistan's Jihad policy against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. The paper discusses these three aspects of Pakistan Afghan Policy during General Zia regime.

General Zia's Initial Afghan Policy

General Zia-ul-Haq the new head of government inherited the Afghan policy of the previous government of Z. A. Bhutto. Zia continued the policy of improving the relations with Afghanistan. The basis of this policy had already been set during the Bhutto's rule. Initially, the Martial Law regime continued the 'Spirit of Kabul' and further promoted and strengthened it (Ghaus: 1988: 140). However, the military once again emerged as the key actor in the decision-making process of the state especially in foreign policy-making, by displacing the civilian political institution and its leader.

Moreover, at domestic front General Zia-ul-Haq took a conciliatory stance towards the Pakhtun and Baloch nationalist leaders imprisoned under the Bhutto regime for allegedly inciting secessionist movements. The release of Baloch nationalist politicians like Sardar Khair Bux Marri, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Ghus Bux Bizenjo and the veteran Pakhtun leader, Abdul Wali Khan, was seen as a positive step by Afghanistan. These steps were taken as positive development and welcomed by Afghanistan government.

General Zia himself visited Afghanistan in October, 1977, Zia and Daud developed a good understanding between each other and agreed that President Daud would visit Pakistan (Ibid: 1988: 141). Daud arrived in Islamabad on March 5, 1978, and commenced negotiations with General Zia, regarding further improvement of bilateral relations. Daud declared in Lahore on March 8 that Pakistan and Afghanistan will now: 'walk hand in hand in the warm glow of brotherhood...the era when both of us were subject to the old classic imperialistic technique of "divide and rule" is over' (Speech of President Mohammad Daud at Lahore, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. VI, Issue 3, March, 1978).

The internal situation in Afghanistan was moving towards a big change, since, Daud's turn towards the West and the conservative Muslim states had increased Soviet apprehensions about the future of Soviet-Afghan ties. Daud's new policy did not please Moscow or the PDPA (Sattar: 2007: 155). Daud's increasingly anti-leftist stance motivated the persistently squabbling Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA to unite in 1977. Finally, the advent of 1978 saw a decline in Daud's popularity owing to his regime's increasingly dictatorial turn exacerbated by a declining economy. His repressive measures against the left provided the spark for, *coup d'état* by the pro-Soviet PDPA against his regime on April 27, 1978. This coup was glorified by the PDPA as the Great Saur (April) Revolution. The Parcham-Khalq coalition gained power with the assistance of Soviet-trained officers of the Afghan army and the air force who in 1973 had also been instrumental in installing Daud (Bradsher: 1999).

The Khalq faction of the PDPA had a sizeable cadre from rural Pakhtun background who had affiliation with their Pakhtun ethnic cousins east of the Durand Line. General Zia regime's fears about

the revival of the 'Pakhtunistan' issue was realized when on May 9, the Afghan President, Nur Mohammad Taraki, referred to the 'border dispute with Pakistan' after meeting the ageing Pakhtun leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Kabul (*Dawn*, Karachi, May 10, 1978). Hafizullah Amin, Afghan Foreign Minister, indicated to his Pakistani counterpart in a meeting at the United Nations that the PDPA regime was not bound by any agreements that were made by Pakistan with President Daud (*The Pakistan Times*, June 7, 1978). Pakistani military's apprehensions about the nature of the new government in Afghanistan prompted reactivation of the secretive Afghan Cell in the foreign Ministry on May 2, 1978. Earlier the Afghan Cell had been created by the Bhutto regime in 1973 to formulate and coordinate Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis Sardar Daud's government.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

On December 26, 1979, the Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan, eliminated Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, leader of Parcham faction, as president in his place. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created a reaction that was swift and strong. It put the Soviet Union on the defensive before the outraged opinions of many countries. Surprised at the strength of denunciation, Soviet leaders reacted with tough defiance. Without yielding in their determination to hold Afghanistan within the Soviet sphere of direct and dominating influence, they launched a campaign to try to shift the blame to outsiders accused of supporting the Afghan resistance. The campaign met with little success, and the Soviet Union found itself unable to justify or explain away the cause of its widespread criticism. Not only the Western world but also the Third World condemned the invasion and the subsequent Soviet military occupation (Bradsher: 1985: 189).

Islamic countries also strongly condemned the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. As a result, particularly there was a wave of protests in the Islamic world against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. Islamic reaction focused quickly on an extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers on January 27 to 29, 1980, in Islamabad, Pakistan, to consider the invasion. Thirty-five nations strongly condemned "the Soviet military aggression

against the Afghan people," called for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops...[who] should refrain from acts of oppression and tyranny against the Afghan people," and said Muslim countries should not recognize the Karmal government. They set up a three-man committee headed by Pakistan's Agha Shahi to seek a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem (*Reuter*, Islamabad: January 29, 1980, in FBIS/ME, 30 January 1980: A.3-5). Generally speaking, Western countries also criticized the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

United States's Reaction

Realistically speaking, United States reaction was prompt and critical, she strongly condemned the Soviet aggression. "We are the other superpower on earth," President Carter said, "and it became my responsibility...to take action that would prevent the Soviets from [accomplishing] this invasion with impunity" (*Presidential Documents* 16, January 14, 1980: 41). Within a week Carter was calling it "an extremely serious threat to peace," explaining that this was "because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world" (*Ibid*: 1980: 25). And by January 23, Carter was telling American Congress "the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War" (*Ibid*: 28 January 1980: 196). Further Carter said, 'the Soviet claim, falsely, that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But, the president, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion was assassinated—along with several members of his family' (*Ibid*: 16, January 14, 1980: 25) The Soviet pretext of an invitation by the Afghan government for intervention by its forces was obviously false, as its target was none other than the head of that government (*Sattar*: 2007: 155).

The United States foreign policy elite visualized the Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan as a part of a Soviet grand strategy to expand its influence south towards the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. This theme of Soviet 'expansionism' towards the South derived from British security

paranoia in Asia dating back to the late eighteenth century that saw any Russian move in the direction of the Indian subcontinent as a threat to British interests in the region. The Pakistani military elite reinforced this perception with the Reagan administration.

Subsequently, Zia skillfully manipulated the U.S. fears of the alleged Soviet schemes to push southward in his so-called 'red template' briefings to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) in 1981. A key goal of exaggerating the Soviet danger was to persuade the Americans to boost their aid to Pakistan and the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency (Kux: 2001: 262).

However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced Washington's attention back on Pakistan. President Carter hated General Zia and his 'religious reforms', but was forced under the Carter Doctrine to shell out money to him for making Pakistan the frontline state and keeping the Afghan Mujahideen leaders in Peshawar and receiving the refugees (Ahmed: 2002: 208-09). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed both challenges and opportunities for Pakistan, an endemically unstable country situated uncomfortably at the juncture of South, West, and Central Asia. Within a matter of days the Soviet divisions pouring down the Termez-Kabul highway underscored Pakistan's strategic importance as never before, belatedly validating the logic that had lain behind its adherence to the US-led CENTO alliance system twenty years earlier (Richard P. Cronin in Eliot, Theodore L. and Robert (eds.) 1986: 19). The Soviet action also helped Zia to rebuild his external ties, which had been in disarray.

General Zia was able to transform his image in the West from a 'bad guy' to a 'good guy,' since Pakistan was a vital bulwark against Soviet expansionism. The Afghan War also enabled Zia to continue martial law and legitimize his military rule because the United States turned a Nelson's eye to human rights violations, allowing the dictatorship to trample the democratic aspirations of the people. Zia was able to suppress opposition parties and postpone elections indefinitely. There were reports that strong contingents of CIA agents were stationed in Pakistan to frustrate the activities of Zia's political opponents (Woodward: 1987: 310-311). Zia used various methods to attain legitimacy domestically. His regime, through the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), encouraged the rise of ethnic groups and religious parties on

sectarian lines and, ultimately, many Sunni and Shia groups emerged that divided society and undermined the *raison d'être* of Pakistan. Zia started an Islamisation campaign to legitimize and prolong his own rule. He also used religion as one of the main weapons to pressurize the opposition and to justify the holding of non-party-based elections (Hilali, *Contemporary South Asia*, 2002: 3). However, Pakistan expressed serious apprehension regarding the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan at domestic, regional and international level.

Pakistan's Reaction

The Soviet invasion increased Pakistan's insecurity and many Pakistanis recognized it. The nature of that threat perceived differently by different Pakistanis. Few apparently anticipated an immediate Soviet thrust into Pakistan, or subscribed to the "warm waters." The military did, however, perceive an immediate and drastic shift in the regional balance of military power and the emergence of a two-front threat environment (Richard P. Cronin in Eliot, Theodore L. and Robert (eds.) 1986: 21). The Zia Government immediately moved to repair its strained ties with Washington and acted with dispatch to orchestrate a strong United Nations and Islamic Conference position against the Soviet Union.

There were two groups in Pakistan on the question of how to respond to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan? The first group, notably including Pakistan's the then Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, was wary of adopting a confrontational posture towards the Soviet Union and opposed entering into an overly close security relationship with the United States. The Soviet action had grave implications for the security of Pakistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf region. The Soviet move into Afghanistan showed that superpower rivalry and the possibility of confrontation was not confined to Europe but extended to other parts of the world, including the Persian Gulf region. Pakistan came to describe as the 'center of gravity' of the world, and the 'third central strategic zone' in a potential armed confrontation between the superpowers (Shahi, *The Concept*, Islamabad: July 1982: 13). Agha Shahi believed, Soviet Union had no any intention to move southward.

Diego Cordovez writes in his book "*Out of Afghanistan the Inside story of the Soviet withdrawal*" about his conversation with

Agha Shahi 'Shahi also made several pointed comments about Afghanistan that did not seem as significant to me at the time as they did in the context of his later policy struggle with Zia and his fellow generals. He considered a Soviet invasion of Pakistan "very, very unlikely." He had to believe on the basis of diplomatic soundings that some "very powerful people" in Moscow regarded the invasion as a mistake and favored a Soviet withdrawal if a nonaligned coalition government could be established in Kabul' (Condoez and Harrison: 1995: 58). Later on in early 2005, this was conformed by Agha Shahi in personal communication with the author. He was of the opinion that 'we had talked with very powerful circle in Soviet Union and they assured us that Soviet Union had no any intention to move southward or to attack on Pakistan' (Author's personal communication with Agha Shahi, Islamabad: 2005). Therefore, this group was resolute to develop diplomatic pressure on Russians to withdraw from Afghanistan.

From this group's perspective, the main danger from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan lay in the potential for Indian-Soviet collaboration against Pakistan. To Agha Shahi and other civilians, as well as some military officers, Pakistan's security would be served best by leaving Moscow with the belief that Pakistan options remained open, while generating external diplomatic support from sources that both mattered to Moscow yet did not threaten it—the United Nations and the Islamic states (Richard P. Cronin in Eliot, Theodore L. and Robert (eds.) 1986: 22).

The results of Agha Shahi's diplomacy were impressive. Even before the temporary shelving of a revitalized U.S.—Pakistani security relationship, Pakistan had succeeded in orchestrating a UN resolution condemning the violation of Afghanistan's independence and calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Although it did not specifically name the Soviet Union, the January 14, 1980, resolution, which had been drafted by Pakistan, passed by a margin of 104 in favour, 18 against, and 18 abstaining. It was one of the most serious UN defeats for the USSR in the history of that body (Ibid: 26).

Both at an extraordinary session in January and at the Islamic foreign ministers conference in May, 1980, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) also went on record with a strong statement calling for a Soviet withdrawal and a negotiated

settlement of the conflict. The Pakistan government then proceeded to make four demands:

1. The immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet forces;
2. The restoration of independent and non-aligned status for Afghanistan;
3. Respect for the right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny and to choose their desired form of government in accordance with their own wishes, free from external interference; and
4. The creation of conditions which would permit Afghan refugees to return to their homes in dignity, safety, and honor.

Since the direct channel established between the military regime and Washington (after securing the \$3.2 billion aid package), there was no need for intermediaries like Agha Shahi. A more trusted man who shared the Military's perception and objectives was required and Sahibzada Yaqub was appointed as Foreign Minister in 1982. Sahibzada was a former general who became the second only civilian member of the 'club' and with him in control of the Foreign Office there was complete military control over Foreign Policy-making (Hussain: 1990:128-129). Finally, the Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, who wanted to limit the U.S. role in Afghanistan and to promote a settlement, lost his job in this struggle (Cordovez and Harrison: 1995: 53).

The second group saw direct threat to Pakistan's security from Afghanistan and looking for support from United States. According to General K. M. Arif, 'the new threat posed to Pakistan's national security was too serious to ignore and the choices available were uneasy' (Arif, *Dawn*, Karachi: May 19, 1992). Therefore, there was strong perception among the Pakistanis that after Afghanistan Pakistan would be the next target of Soviet Union.

At the time of, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan United States had a Democratic President, Jimmy Carter, who was never very friendly towards Pakistan. Finding Zia steadfast in his support of the Mujahideen, he offered \$400 million as aid to Pakistan an amount had declined by Zia, who described it as 'peanuts.' Zia justified his rejection on grounds that the \$400 million offered by the United States would not purchase security, but rather would

"buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much more influential in this region than the United States is (Borders, *Washington Post*, January 19, 1980: 8).

Whereas Republican President, Ronald Reagan, came into power the situation changed dramatically. In order to wage a proxy war via Pakistan the United States propagated Pakistan as a front line state. Reagan administration and its Arab allies showered aid on Pakistan and legitimized the dictatorship of Zia, whom at that time the international community regarded as a pariah for having executed Zulifkar Ali Bhutto. As one newspaper put it, 'it was Afghanistan which brought Zia from a doghouse to the White House' (*Guardian Weekly*, January 12, 1986:10). The Afghan crisis dramatically transformed Pakistan's geo-strategic environment and it emerged as a 'frontline' state. (Hilali: 2005: 51). Therefore, the supporters of second view started to propagate that Pakistan is facing serious threat from Afghanistan due to Soviets presence. As result the government of Pakistan struggled to get diplomatic support from the world community. For the first time in years, Pakistan found a favorable international climate for modernizing its military forces on concessional terms. Despite some differences born of a desire to maximize Pakistan's bargaining position and maintain its nonaligned credentials, Zia and the military readily accepted the notion of Pakistan as a "front line state."

President Zia in a statement had said "the Afghanistan situation has generated new dangers to our national security. We have apprised the whole world in clear and unequivocal words about the dangers that have arisen out of foreign military intervention in Afghanistan...it is a matter of regret for us that our stand has not had much acceptance in our neighboring country, the Soviet Union, although we understand that there is no enmity between us and Russia" (Alvi: 1980: 148). Addressing the UN General Assembly on October 1, 1980, President Zia strongly condemned the Soviet aggression and voiced his support for the Afghan resistance. He said, "...we earnestly hope that indirect talks through intermediaries of the UN Secretary General would lead to a viable solution of the problem" (Ibid: 1980: 135). Resultantly, Pakistan adopted new policy regarding Soviet occupied Afghanistan and it is known as Jihad Policy.

Pakistan's Jihad Policy in Afghanistan

General Zia made excellent use of the opportunities arising from changes in the geopolitical environment, as a result of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, to legitimize his regime, make personal gains, and obtain a renewed U.S. commitment to Pakistan's security, funds from Islamic countries and a continuing supply of weapons from the U.S. and China (Hilali: 2005: 188).

More importantly, the Afghanistan crisis motivated Washington to practically ignore Islamabad's clandestine nuclear weapons program in view of the Pakistani role as a 'frontline' state deterring Soviet expansionism. The importance of the Afghanistan crisis for the military elite can be judged by General Zia's remarks that the: 'Afghans are fighting the war for Pakistan. We must support them. American interest has been regenerated because of Afghanistan. Let us cash in on this' (Matinuddin: 1992:127). Thus, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the policy objective of U.S. strategists had once again become the destabilization of the Soviet Union via Pakistan and Afghanistan (Shah: 1997:34).

However, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided an opportunity for Pakistan to wage a more offensive policy. The great success of General Zia was to make Washington endorse, in the name of the 'roll-back' policy against the Soviet Union, his own decision of playing the Islamic tool in the region (Olivier Roy in Jaffrelot (ed.) 2002: 151).

According to Riaz Mohammad Khan, the then Foreign Ministry's Director of Afghan Affairs, Pakistan-U.S. relationship based on three areas. First and for-most was the U.S. commitment of economic and military assistance to Pakistan, epitomized in the five-years, \$ 3.2 billion package of economic assistance and military sales credits. This represented a top priority for the United States also, because Pakistan was now treated as a "frontline" state that needed to be strengthened. Second was the interest shared by the United States and Pakistan in bolstering the Afghan Resistance to keep military pressure on the Soviet Union? In this area, cooperation between the two countries grew in dimension with time as the resistance showed staying power and gained the backing of conservative lobbies in the United States. The third area

of cooperation related to diplomatic activity centered on Afghanistan, including the negotiations, which identified the United States as one of the guarantor states (Khan: 1993: 169-170).

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan realized the Pakistan military's objective of rejuvenating U.S. interest in the region. In 1981, the U.S. and Pakistan initialed US\$3.2 billion worth of economic and military assistance spread over six years, followed by US\$4 billion over the next six. The U.S. supplied Pakistan with sophisticated military hardware and provided for the training and education of the Pakistani army officer corps. From 1980 to 1990, approximately 200 officers were sent for training abroad and the majority went to the U.S. (Shafqat: 1997: 225).

The Afghan conflict led the Zia regime, in collaboration with the CIA, to allow thousands of Arab volunteers to enter Pakistan and join the anti-soviet struggle. Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf Sheikdoms and Egypt participated in this venture with enthusiasm. The seven Afghan parties based in Peshawar were presented to the world by the Pakistani establishment as the main Mujahideen groupings waging the jihad for the liberation of Afghanistan. The ISI's head of the Afghan Bureau, Brigadier Muhammad Yousaf, rightly observes that the 'leaders were well aware that without Pakistan's and that meant Zia's, backing everything was finished (Yousaf & Adkin: 1992: 40). Yousaf emphasized that it was a principle of Pakistani policy that 'every commander must belong to one of the seven parties; otherwise he got nothing from us at ISI-no arms, no ammunition and no training. Without these he could not exist, so he joined a party, provided he could find one to accept him (Ibid: 1992: 40). The Pakistani elite believed that its security was 'best assured by keeping the Soviets tied down in Afghanistan' (Kux: 2001: 266). The ISI's Afghan Bureau charged with the responsibility of managing the Afghan Jihad was directly responsible for:

- Training the Afghan Mujahideen.
- Policy, planning and organization.
- Provision of equipment, weapons and funds supplied by different nations.

Besides giving assistance in the form of military hardware and instructors, hundreds of Pakistani regular servicemen were

providing tactical advice to Afghan resistance against Soviet army. Brigadier Yousaf, who was directly responsible for operations and Mujahideen attacks inside Afghanistan, also supports this view. He pointed out as Director of the Afghan Bureau of the ISI, "I was tasked not only with training and arming the Mujahideen (Soldiers of God), but planning their operations inside Afghanistan" (Yousaf: 1992: 2). Further he revealed that the assistance given by Pakistan to the Mujahideen in training, logistics and on operations is well known. During my four years some 80,000 Mujahideen were trained; hundreds of thousands of tones of arms and ammunition were distributed, several billion dollars were spent on this immense logistic exercise and ISI teams regularly entered Afghanistan alongside the Mujahideen (Ibid: 1992: 4).

Thus, General Zia and his fellow generals in Pakistan were quick to recognize that the Soviet invasion could be utilized to get military aid from the United States. Playing the role of a "front line state" enabled them to strengthen the domestic power position of their military regime and to improve Pakistan's balance of power with India. Islamabad hargained skillfully, periodically demanding upgraded military aid as the price for its cooperation with CIA in Afghanistan. The Pakistan-sponsored factions of the Afghan resistance were also pursuing their own objectives, stockpiling vast quantities of armament during the war years for use in postwar Afghan power struggles (Cordovez and Harrison: 1995: 10).

General Zia basically initiated this jihad policy for his personal political gains because of two main reasons: firstly, he was facing domestic resistance due to the over thrown of the Bhutto's government and later on the execution of former prime minister. Zia wanted to reduce the Bhutto's popularity at any cost. Secondly, he was interested to get international support (particularly from United States) for the legitimacy of his rule. Zia cleverly used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for his own political interests.

Thus, general Zia succeeded in his both objectives because at domestic front he used the card of Islamisation or ethnic (the rise of MQM in Sind is best example) and at the international front he had succeeded to convince the United States to destabilize the Soviet Union in Afghanistan through Pakistan. Zia got U.S. support to legitimize his rule and also Pakistan got huge military and economic aid throughout that period. Charles H. Kennedy

analyzed this situation and argued that Zia successfully exploited the political utility of Islam and promised to implement Nizam-i-Mustapha (Islamic reforms) just to gain popularity among the common people. His major concern was his own survival and the stability of his government, not the propagation of Islam. He only paid lip service to Islam as far as it could legitimize his rule. Thus, he used religion as one of the main weapons to pressurize the opposition and to justify the holding of non-party based elections (Kennedy, *Pacific Affairs* No. 63, Spring 1990: 62-77).

Subsequently, to strengthen his power and position in the new civilian set-up, Zia secured his political future before the 1985 elections. Zia announced his plan for civilianization of the military rule on August 12, 1983. It envisaged holding of elections and transfer of power to the civilian government by March 23, 1985 (Rizvi: 2000: 184). Thus, Zia took the decision of holding national elections because of pressure from the national press and political leaders and its expression through the 1983 MRD agitation. They demanded withdrawal of martial law at the earliest.

Thus, we can argue that Zia succeeded in establishing a carefully tailored participatory system through constitutional and political engineering and cooption. This official media termed the change as the heralding of a democratic era (Rizvi: 2000: 188). Therefore, Zia had allowed a nominal restoration of civilian rule, staging 'non-party based elections' but he reserved the authority to dissolve the parliament and call new elections whenever deemed necessary. In this regard, Ziring correctly notes that: 'no significant restrictions had been imposed on the President who was also the head of the military establishment and in Zia, Pakistan had come very close to experiencing absolute rule' (Ziring: 1999: 475). Initially, no changes occurred in the Foreign policy of the country under the new government. Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan popularly known as army's man, continued to be the foreign minister of Pakistan.

On the Afghanistan front the Junejo government initially followed the policies of the Martial Law Government since it had to co-exist with General Zia as the President/COAS. Despite the diarchy in which a weak Prime Minister shared power with a strong President (due to the 8th Amendment), the Junejo government was able to change the emphasis of the Afghan policy

notwithstanding its dependence on military props. The stress was on the repatriation of Afghan Refugees (ARs) and negotiating with the Soviet rather than standing up to Moscow and aiming for a Mujahideen victory. Junejo began asserting his constitutional role and showed independence in a quite but preserving manner to conduct the business of the state (Mahmud, *The Nation*, November 12, 1987). Junejo did not want his administration merely to become a showpiece of the military. Furthermore, Junejo's independence of action can be seen in administrative matters. Junejo took various operational powers in his own hands. The extent of Junejo's independence of action in administrative matters and of the concomitant power struggle was evident in the top army and civil appointments.

In March, 1987, Junejo had appointed General Mirza Aslam Beg to replace the retiring deputy chief of army staff (COAS), General K. M. Arif, apparently ignoring Zia ul Haq's preference for another general to fill this sensitive post. The most significant aspect of Junejo's performance was his attitude towards the political opposition. It was a break with the past tradition. The government was tolerant about the activities of political parties. There was no restriction on their political activities.

On foreign policy front Junejo was also facing challenges, Zia had already got support and recognition of world because of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and Pakistan's role as 'frontline state.' He wanted to project Pakistan's good image in the world, Junejo visited so many countries like Turkey, Germany, France and USA. Junejo's visit to U.S. was very important. President Reagan welcomed Junejo and his entourage at the White House and appreciated Pakistan's transition towards democracy. Both leaders held talks, the focused areas were Afghanistan, nuclear issue, relations with India and narcotics. Reagan supported Pakistan for its opposition to the Soviet incursion and pledged his support for the Afghan refugees (*The News*, July 19, 1986). Pakistan and the U.S. also signed a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU), for the transfer and protection of strategic advanced technology, which was described as a "crowning success" of Junejo's visit (*Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi: Vol. 40, Third Quarterly, 1986: 7). U.S. President and other leaders welcomed the revival of Democracy in Pakistan.

In the case of Afghanistan, Prime Minister Junejo asserted his control over the Afghan policy by removing Sahibzada Yaqub in November, 1987, and appointing Mr. Zain Noorani as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. After the exit of Sahibzada Yaqub as Foreign Minister, who was seen as the President's man, General Zia felt excluded from foreign policy matters and it increased the confrontation between powerful President and weak Prime Minister, which was basically started since very beginning. After the lifting of martial law in the beginning of 1986, there was growing dissension over matters ranging from minor points of protocol to major policy issues like the Geneva Accords covering the Afghan conflict (Khan: 1999: 178).

In Afghan policy the civilian prime Minister wanted political solution of the problem and he was in the favour of Geneva Talks while Zia and his team were supporting the military option. Junejo believed that peace in Afghanistan is in the long-term interest of Pakistan's security. That's why Junejo was interested in an immediate political settlement of Afghan crisis, because Afghan crisis had direct negative implications on Pakistan.

The Public, media and political forces resentment against the Zia's Afghan policy increased pressure on Junejo's government in favour of an early settlement. Junejo argued that 'the Afghan issue is a political issue. Therefore, it demanded a political solution. The Soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan had presented with an opportunity that would be imprudent to lose (*The Nation*, 5 February 1987). Thus, Junejo seriously started the diplomatic efforts in early 1987 to settle the Afghanistan problem through Geneva talks. Here we are giving brief over view of Geneva negotiations, which would be helpful in understanding the position and stand of Pakistan and also the role of Prime Minister Junejo in the signing of Geneva Accords.

Geneva Accords 1988

The Geneva Accords represented the political settlement of Afghanistan problem. These negotiations had several rounds. The first round started on June 16, 1982, and the final round was concluded on April 17, 1988. The contracting parties of the Accords were the U.S., Soviet Union (who acted as guarantors), Pakistan and Afghanistan.

UN efforts to promote a political solution began in earnest with the appointment of Diego Cordovez, a senior UN official from Ecuador, as the personal representative of the Secretary General in 1981. He found the situation rather bizarre. Before he could convene the first Geneva meeting, Iran declined to participate arguing that the Soviet withdrawal should be unconditional, and Pakistan was unwilling to meet with the Afghan regime which it did not recognize. Cordovez had to persuade Kabul to agree to indirect talks. The Soviet Union refused to join talks taking the position that its forces entered Afghanistan at Kabul's invitation and would be withdrawn when Kabul no longer wanted their presence, but it sent high-level officials to Geneva to be available for consultation (Khan: 2007: 161).

The Geneva peace process was the result of the efforts of the UN Secretary General and his representative Diego Cordovez. It was only after shuttling from capital to capital for several years that Cordovez succeeded in bringing the representatives of Kabul and Islamabad to Geneva in June, 1982.

After this initiative, there were many other rounds of talks for seeking a peaceful settlement of the Afghan issue. The first round of indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan in June, 1982 through the United Nations intermediary could not accomplish more than a sketchy annotated agenda, and for the most part grappled with complicated issues of legitimacy, recognition, and *locus standi* (legal standing) (Khan: 1993: 92).

The Afghan focused on direct talks, a bilateral agreement with Pakistan on noninterference, and international guarantees limited to noninterference. For them, withdrawal was outside the purview of the UN negotiations. For the Pakistani negotiators, their non-recognition of the Kabul government—formally tied to the OIC position—ruled out the signing of a bilateral agreement. Pakistan desired a balanced, comprehensive settlement that provided for irreversible withdrawal within a short time frame and guarantees to cover the entire settlement. It insisted on UN consultations with "Afghan refugees"—a euphemism for the Peshawar based Afghan groups—and remained preoccupied with internal aspect of the Afghan conflict (Ibid). Cordovez successfully pressed the two sides in the 1983 April and June rounds of Geneva talks to agree on the components of a comprehensive settlement. These included

an agreement on non-interference and non-intervention, guarantees by third states, and arrangements for the voluntary return of refugees.

Signals of Soviet interest in withdrawal began appearing in 1985, and became clearer in their direction with the passage of time. Each time, however, they served to emphasize intent and left vital questions of detail unaddressed. They gave the impression of movement in the Soviet position, but stopped short of revealing the extent to which the Soviets were willing to compromise on either time frame or the issue of future government in Kabul. The most authoritative signals came from Gorbachev himself. In addition, the Soviet media, as well as official and nonofficial comments, indicated changes in Soviet outlook and policy (Ibid: 177-178).

Gorbachev's coming to power had brought about a change in Soviet policy as Moscow gradually pulled back from its previously 'hard-line' position on Afghanistan from late 1986. By late 1986, the text of the agreements having been all but finalized, Cordovez remarked: 'it (is) now true for the first time that the only issue remaining (is) the question of the timeframe (for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan) (Rubin: 1995: 77). Throughout 1987, the focus of negotiations kept moving between efforts to finalize the Geneva settlement with an agreed time frame. Soviets wanted 18 months for withdrawal. Gorbachev announced, at a press conference in Washington on December 10, 1987, that the Soviet forces would withdraw from Afghanistan within twelve months of the conclusion of Geneva Accords, and further, that during that period the forces would not engage in combat.

Gorbachev also delinked the question of withdrawal from an internal settlement in Afghanistan. Though he reaffirmed support for 'a coalition on the basis of national reconciliation and the realities of the situation,' (Khan: 1993: 234).

The approaching end to the Geneva negotiating process generated intense controversy over the issues of a pre-settlement interim government and the cutoff supplies to the Mujahideen implied in the negotiated text. Zia ul Haq felt outmaneuvered by the Washington summit and pursued with determination the objective of an interim government (Ibid: 1993: 242). Zia ul Haq had complained that the United States and the Soviet Union had arrived at an agreement on Afghan issue and "Pakistan [had] had

its reputation smeared in the bargain" (*The Nation*, Lahore, 21 February 1988).

According to Cordovez 'the Pakistani leaders were not unanimous during 1987, with respect to the type of postwar Afghan government that would best serve Pakistani interests. The ISI was more determined than ever to install a fundamentalist-dominated regime that it assumed would be closely linked to Islamabad. General Akhtar Rehman Khan, the ISI Director, argued that talk of political compromise would dampen the fighting spirit of the resistance groups. Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, on the other hand, maintained that a stable transition without bloodshed could be achieved only through a coalition that gave a key role to moderate resistance elements and included PDPA participation. Najibullah, in this scenario, would be replaced by a neutral personality (Cordovez and Harrison: 1995: 256).

The U.S. differed from Pakistan on this issue and showed no interest in promoting an idea of formation of an interim government in Afghanistan. To align himself with view of the two super powers, Junejo wanted to sign the Geneva Accords without introducing any new element at this final stage. On the other hand, President Zia wanted to put in the clause of an interim government before withdrawal.

Thus, disagreement arose between Zia and Junejo on their approaches to the Afghan crisis. Nevertheless, Junejo urged both the super powers to use their good offices to induct a government in Kabul acceptable to Afghan people before the Soviet withdrawal. He instructed Zain Noorani, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, not to sign the agreement just yet (Matinuddin: 1991: 320).

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister convened a meeting of prominent leaders of the opposition in Islamabad, and discussed the Afghan situation prior to signing the Geneva Accords (Burki: 1991: 84). Nineteen leaders from all major political parties attended the conference. The main issue was whether Pakistan should insist on the formation of an interim government before the withdrawal of the Soviet troops or not. The majority of speakers thought that the stipulation of formation of an interim government would just delay the departure of the Soviet forces (*The Nation*, March 7, 1988). Thus, Zain Noorani said in a press conference in

Geneva on March 16, that the issue of formation of interim government and the signature on the Geneva Accords were not linked (Choudhry, *Pakistan Horizon Quarterly*, Vol. XLI, April 1988: 1). The history of the complex negotiations culminated in the Geneva Accords of April, 1988.

Finally on April 14, 1988, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, and the US Secretary of State signed the Geneva accords on Afghanistan. The United States and the Soviet Union signed as co-guarantors of the main agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan (representing the Mujahideen).

The stage was thus set for the signing of the Geneva Accords. In a press conference on April 8, Cordovez promptly scheduled the ceremony for April 14. The signing ceremony was a grand occasion for the United Nations. Perez de Cuellar and Shevardnadze arrived a day earlier, while Shultz reached Geneva on the morning of April 14. The arrangements for the signing ceremony were meticulous, timed to the minute, with a brief welcome by the secretary general and equally brief concluding remarks. Acclaiming the diplomatic effort, the secretary general lauded the agreements, stating that they "lay the basis for the exercise by all Afghan of the right to self-determination" and represented "a major stride in the effort to bring peace to Afghanistan."

The Geneva Accords were signed which consisted of following four instruments: Instrument 1, It was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan pertained to the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention in each other internal affairs. Instrument 2, It was signed between the USSR and USA which concurred giving of guarantees by both the superpowers that there would be no intervention or interference in the internal affairs of the high contracting parties. Instrument 3, It was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan on voluntary return of refugees, which was vitally important for Pakistan. Instrument 4, It was signed between USSR and Afghanistan specifying the time frame for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The de-induction was to commence on May 15, and the Soviet military contingents was to be totally pulled out within 9 months with one half leaving Afghanistan by August 15, 1988.

The agreement provided for the withdrawal of the estimated 115000 soviet troops from Afghanistan beginning May 15,1988, and ending nine months later; the voluntary and safe return of some five million refugees and a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan pledging non-intervention and non-interference in each others' affairs. The obligations undertaken by the guarantors were 'symmetrical' allowing the United States to aid the Mujahideen if the Soviet Union continued to aid the Kabul regime (Ali: 2001:384).

The Geneva Accords were widely criticized by its text and regarded it not satisfactory. The U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz did not view the Geneva Accords to be perfect. However, he thought that it could 'achieve important ends' (*Khaleej Times*, April 15, 1988). He stated that the U.S. did not recognize the Kabul regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and reserved for itself the right to support Afghan parties it had supported. Nevertheless, he called for 'balance restraint' by all parties (Ibid).

Junejo addressing a joint sitting of parliament said that he was agreed that the present accord signed by Pakistan could not be termed as comprehensive or excellent document. But, keeping in view the given situation, there could have been no better option (*Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1988). While Zia in his address to the parliament said that all doubts has been removed. He called the Geneva Accord a 'historic event' (*Dawn*, April 21, 1988).

However, the issue of 'Pakhtunistan' and that of 'Durand Line' had been central objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy since 1947, and were second only to the task of coping with the Indian threat. The Geneva Accords did not address these issues; therefore, some people in Pakistan believe that Pakistan lost a golden opportunity in achieving the recognition of the Durand Line as the internal border between the two countries through the accord.

A rift was created between Zia and Junejo when the Prime Minister ordered an inquiry into an explosion at a military ammunition depot at Ojhri near Rawalpindi in April, 1988, in which hundreds of innocent people died. There was also civil-military disagreement on the Afghan policy (Siddiq: 2007: 87). However, Zia was already not satisfied with Prime Minister, but, the Geneva accords paid way to General Zia, to dismiss his own

nominated Prime Minister. Consequently, on May 28, 1988, President Zia dismissed the Junejo government and dissolved the National Assembly.

Junejo was punished for trying out his position as an elected chief executive of the country. He did not make allowances for a President who had been the military ruler of the country for eleven years, and who had got him elected as the Prime Minister based on the assumption that he (Junejo) would seek the President's blessing on all major issues. Zia later on announced November 16, 1988, as the date for fresh national elections, much beyond the mandatory period of ninety days (Khan: 1999: 179). Between May, 1988, and August, 1988, General Zia and his 'club' were again at center stage in calling the shots in the Pak-Afghan drama. Additionally, Zia's Afghan policy had long-term negative implications. The support lent by Zia to the Afghan resistance movement produced a parallel arms and drug economy with serious implications for the fragile weave of Pakistan's social fabric (Kukhureja: 2003:101).

Subsequently, Zia regime bore a number of serious domestic repercussions for Pakistan. Firstly, the foreign assistance strengthened the military regime in the internal context, allowing Zia to stay in power. Secondly, Zia's close ties with the religious forces became the cause of fundamentalism, radicalism and extremism in Pakistan. Thirdly, the Afghan refugees created demographic imbalance in NWFP and Balochistan. The basic goal of the Zia regime in the late 1980s continued to revolve around the need to install a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. Zia clearly outlined this stance to a U.S. journalist: "We have earned right to have a friendly government in Kabul. We won't permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims to our territory. It will be a real Islamic State, part of a pan-Islamic revival, that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see."

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was killed along with 37 high ranking Pakistani military officials including the architect of the jihad, the ISI Chief, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, in a plane crash on August 17, 1988. The plane, which also carried the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan and a senior U.S. military adviser, was allegedly sabotaged.

However, Zia left behind a legacy that included the creation of Jihadi organizations, which would be the cause of greater instability not only for the South and Southwestern Asian region but also for the world as a whole for years to come. At home, the Zia regime propelled religion into politics, facilitating divisiveness and sectarianism in Pakistan's fissiparous body politic. More importantly, the Zia era saw the culmination of the military's hegemonic control over the Pakistani state that had begun in the mid-1950s.

The decade long struggle against the Soviet army beginning in 1979, promoted pervasive militarization, what some call a Kalashnikov culture, throughout Pakistan, and especially in the provinces bordering Afghanistan. The Madrassas did not escape this, many of them took Afghan refugees as students. Additionally, the Pakistani and U.S. governments used the Madrassas and influenced their curriculum to intentionally encouraged students to engage in sectarian militancy.

As a result of these various forces, jihad [struggle] is understood by much of a generation of Madrasa students not as a personal struggle against the forces that prevent one from living faithfully, but as a violent struggle for the imposition of an Islamic state upon society (Christopher Candland in Charles H. Kennedy (ed.) 2006: 232).

The full impact of Pakistani sponsorship of radical Islamism would come to realization in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal when Afghanistan became a battleground of various regional powers vying for influence in this strategically located country. In this context, Pakistan's policy of supporting Pakhtun Islamists contributed in accentuating inter-ethnic conflict in Afghanistan that resulted in fostering violent internal warfare in this country in the post-Soviet era.

The Afghan War had grave implications for the internal and external security of Pakistan because of the huge influx of Afghan refugees who not only created political, economic, social environmental and ecological problems, but also posed an alarming threat to Pakistan's security.

In many areas of the country, the refugees have destroyed the ecological balance, causing desertification and consequent soil erosion, and promoted drug trafficking, a Kalashnikov culture,

sectarianism, and endless law and order problems. This large number of Afghans, not all of whom were genuine refugees, had a very adverse effect on the socio-economic conditions and law and order situation in the country. This impact is still being faced (Khan: 1999: 168).

Conclusion

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have been strained since the Partition of the India. The bone of contention was the border separating the two countries the Durand Line and the Pakhtunistan issue. Therefore, initially, there were two main objectives of Pakistan's Afghan policy: settlement of dispute on Durand Line as an international boundary and reconciliation over the Pakhtunistan issue. Thus, the two countries relationship has gone through many ups and downs from 1947 to 1977. Military junta in Pakistan believed, as a result of Soviet intervention into Afghanistan, Pakistan became sandwiched between Soviet ally India and Soviet controlled Afghanistan, hereby creating an extreme sense of insecurity in Islamabad. General Zia cleverly exploited this situation by giving the reason of Soviet 'expansionism' towards the South. Pakistan demanded for the safeguarding of its territorial integrity and security from posed threat of Soviet Afghanistan, and to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. General Zia decided for Pakistan to play the role of a 'frontline state' against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Subsequently, General Zia introduced Jihad policy. ISI took the sole responsibility of Jihad operation under the patronage of CIA. The ISI was responsible of managing the Afghan Jihad in many ways like training, policy planning, organization of fighting groups, weapons and funds etc.

In February, 1989, Soviet troops, defeated and frustrated, withdrew from Afghanistan and Soviet Union went into sullen isolation. The goal of securing a withdrawal of Soviet forces was achieved in February, 1989, through Geneva Accords but the goals of the return of refugees, cessation of hostilities and formation of friendly and pro-Pakistani government in Kabul were not attained. Zia's Afghan policy had long-term negative implications on Pakistani state and society like arms proliferation, drug economy, sectarianism, corruption, ISI and Military involvement in policy

making and politics of the country. Finally, general Zia's jihad policy resulted in civil war and Talibanization of Afghanistan and also the Talibanization of some parts of Pakistan. Therefore, further, it needs to investigate the implications of General Zia's jihad policy on Pakistani state and society.

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