

THE POLITICS OF THE OPPOSITION IN PAKISTAN:
A CASE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE TEHRIK-I-ISTIQLAL
DURING THE BHUTTO ERA: (1971 - 73)

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When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power on December 20, 1971, as the President of Pakistan, all around him was defeat and despair. The country had been broken. Six thousand square miles of territory was under Indian occupation and nearly 90,000 Prisoners of War (POWs) were in the Indian gaols. Humiliated militarily, broken as a nation, it seemed that Pakistan could no longer challenge Indian hegemony in the subcontinent. (1) At this moment of national crisis, Bhutto, while admitting that country was facing the worst crisis in its life, promised to the nation that he would make a 'New Pakistan' as envisaged by the Quaid-i-Azam and assured his countrymen that they would emerge as a stronger and a greater nation. (2)

Although Asghar Khan, the Chairman of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, was a bitter critic of Bhutto's role during the East Pakistan crisis, however, he welcomed his assumption of power with caution and reluctance. Declaring it an event of great importance, he said that so long as Bhutto worked for the achievement of the national objectives, it was only proper that he should be supported by the people, regardless of party or political affiliation and assisted in every possible way. (3) Representing his party stand, Asghar Khan said that Bhutto would be judged by his ability to resolve the main problems facing the country, which according to him, were the preservation of the unity and the integrity of Pakistan; success of his government in negotiating a settlement with the elected representatives of East Pakistan; the speedy restoration of democratic institutions; the protection of the rights of citizens; the end of social and economic exploitation and the establishment of a just social order. (4)

From his first public reaction to Bhutto's assumption of power, it was clear that Asghar Khan and his party was in no mode to give him some long time to prove his abilities.

While Bhutto was busy in re-organising the administrative structure of the country, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal started mobilizing and educating the public opinion on various issues of national importance confronting the country. In a big public meeting held at Karachi, its leaders demanded the lifting of Martial Law, immediate release of Mujib-ur-Rahman and an open trial of Yahya Khan. (5) Asghar Khan made an interesting claim that if he would allow to go to East Pakistan, he could manage the re-unification of East and West Pakistan. (6) The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal stressed that before negotiating with India, Bhutto should consult the MNAs of all political parties. (7)

For achieving their objectives, the Tehrik leaders started meeting with like-minded politicians. They first met with Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, leader of the parliamentary party of the Jamiat-il-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP), in the National Assembly. After three-hour-discussion the leaders of both the parties expressed their unanimous view that the Martial Law should be lifted and democracy should be restored immediately. (8) They were of the opinion that the party in power should not take the cover of Martial Law to remain in power and that whatever reforms the present regime wanted, should be processed through the National and Provincial Assemblies.

It seemed that the demands of lifting of Martial Law and summoning of the National Assembly became the main policy of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal during the first half of 1972, as these were the only weak points on which they could press the Bhutto government without having a representation in the Assemblies. Eventually, the second-line of the party leadership started a campaign against the Bhutto government pursuing the thinking of its convenor. A.B.Awan, a prominent leader of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, called for acceptance of the hard reality and bitter truth that East Pakistan had separated from us and demanded summoning of the National Assembly comprising members of the remaining four provinces. (9) Accepting this reality, Awan stressed, that Bhutto should not waste any more time and should immediately convene the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and

lift the Martial Law thereby restoring true democracy in the country. (10) Musheer Ahmed Pesh Imam, General Secretary of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal said that convening of the National Assembly was essential to consider the question of recognition of Bangladesh and said that the National Assembly was the only proper forum for such important decisions. (11) Abu Saeed Enver, Organising Secretary of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, while demanding the withdrawal of the Martial Law and convening of the National Assembly, said that in the absence of democracy, the linguistic, cultural and regional influences were growing in the remaining Pakistan. (12)

This pattern of onslaught on the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) government became the corner stone of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's policies in the early days of Bhutto government. While talking to his partymen at Karachi, Asghar Khan said that the mainspring of the PPP's power at present was armed forces and not the people. (13) He accused that Bhutto was a party to the tragic dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 (14) and said that the Martial Law was being continued in the country as a mere to introduce one party rule and crush the opposition. (15)

These utterances were bound to produce the counter attack from the ruling party. In a press statement, Khurshid Hassan Mir, the person who defeated Asghar Khan from Rawalpindi in the General Election of 1970, said that Asghar Khan had already lost his credentials in politics, when in the General Elections of 1970, he was defeated by a PPP candidate by a margin of 40000 votes. (16) Ashiq Kaleem, the Vice Chairman of PPP (Punjab Zone) said that Asghar Khan had no right to make a demand for convening the National Assembly session, as his party had no representation in it. (17) Jam Sadiq Ali and Jamoot Ali Shah, members of Sindh Assembly in a joint press statement said that the demand for lifting the Martial Law could create a serious crisis in the remaining Pakistan and every sane Pakistani should refrain from making such demands. (18) The Central Information Minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, while criticising the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's policies, invited Asghar Khan to have a debate on television on the

different national issues.(19)

The PPP leaders were not satisfied with mere issuance of these statements but its emotional workers tried to disrupt the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal meetings at Karachi, Peshawar and several other places by changing slogans in favour of Bhutto and against the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal.(20)

The strong policy against the Bhutto government adopted by the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and unwanted severe response by the PPP leadership not only boosted the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's image in the national politics but also attracted a large number of people who were looking for a platform to oppose the Bhutto's regime.

To organize the party's activities throughout the country, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's leaders decided to hold a two-day national convention at Lahore on March 1-2, 1972. (21) During the convention, the draft manifesto of the party was discussed and to enhance the party's activities, it was decided to hold provincial conventions of the party in all the four provinces during April, 1974.(22) The Draft Programme of the party promised unrestricted democracy, federal parliamentary system, reduction of voting age to 17 years, equal and justiceable rights for all citizens, a free press, independent judiciary, thorough scrutiny of the assets of all the public servants, including ministers and the head of the state and bringing down the disparity between wages to the ratio of one to ten.(23)

It was further declared that the draft programme, which was prepared by the National Working Committee of the party, would be placed before a representative party conference of delegates from different districts and city organizations of the party, to be held in mid of April 1972.(24) Commenting on the land reforms introduced by the Bhutto government, (25) the convention expressed the view that the reforms would fail to bring about any marked change in the living standards of the farmers as the greatest problem of Pakistan's agricultural system was absentee landlordism and the present reforms had not dealt with this basic problem.(26) Several resolutions were also adopted in the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's convention calling for immediate session of the National Assembly, lifting of

Martial Law and emergency and condemning the ruthless killing of Pakistani POWs in India. (27)

The demand for lifting the Martial Law made by the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and some other opposition parties was weakened when the Bhutto government managed to arrange a tripartite accord between the PPP, National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat al-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) on March 6, 1972 (28) agreeing to continue Martial Law till August 14, 1972. While criticising the said accord, Asghar Khan urged the National Assembly to take a decision on the removal of Martial Law at its session which was scheduled to be held on April 14, 1972 and warned that a contrary decision would be a clear violation of the mandate of the 1970 elections.(29) Begum Tahira Masud, Chief Organiser of the Women Wing of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal alleged that by the said accord, it had been decided to form 1935 Indian Act as the basis of the future constitution of the country.(30)

Ignoring these lonely and feeble voices of the opposition, Bhutto presented a draft interim constitution on April 11, 1972 (31) which was approved by the National Assembly on April 17, 1972. (32) Criticising the interim constitution, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal held the view that it had given powers to Bhutto no less than a dictator and accused that "Awami Martial Law" had been replaced with "Constitutional Martial Law".(33) But this criticism became weaker when instead of August 14, 1972, Bhutto decided to lift Martial Law from April 21, 1972 and formulated a twenty five member committee, comprising of all political parties having representation in the National Assembly, to prepare an agreed draft of a permanent constitution.(34)

While the elected representatives of the nation were busy in drafting a permanent constitution for a country which had seen a lot of political set-backs mainly "due to the inability of its statement", (35) the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's leadership decided to organize their party on more democratic basis.

The first two-day annual conference of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal was held at Rawalpindi on April 22-23, 1972 in which

Asghar Khan was elected as President of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal for the next two years.⁽³⁶⁾ The other prominent office-bearers who were elected during the Tehrik's first ever elections were, Malik Ghulam Jilani as Secretary General, and Babu Ferzedin Ansari, Rahim Bux Soomro, and Karimullah Khan Durrani as Vice-Presidents of the party.⁽³⁷⁾

While addressing the conference, Asghar Khan mentioned his satisfaction that this party had been organized on democratic lines and repeated that his party would continue its struggle for a democratic and federal parliamentary system in the country ⁽³⁸⁾ and emphasised that he did not mind his party's absence in the National Assembly and his party would continue to strive for its goals outside the Assembly.⁽³⁹⁾ At the end of conference, the participants adopted a number of resolutions demanding for speedy repatriation of the POWs; to take effective steps for checking the rising cost of living and the shortage of essential commodities.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The conference also expressed its distrust over the 'so-called' reforms introduced by the PPP government and demanded to improve the deteriorating law and order situation in the country.⁽⁴¹⁾

The said conference was a land-mark event not only in the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's short history, but it was also a significant occasion in the sense that it was the first party in post-election 1970 era which dared to hold party elections and organized its structure on a sound democratic footings.

Sensing the changed political climate on the issue of framing of a federal constitution, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal decided to attack President Bhutto's reconciliatory stand towards India which he was bound to adopt to solve the Indo-Pak outstanding issues. It was an open secret that one of the main reasons of Bhutto's popularity in the Punjab, strong hold of the PPP, was his anti-India attitude. The Punjabis loved him not only due to his threats to disclose the secret clauses of the Taskent Declaration, but he was welcomed also due to his promise to "wage a war for a thousand years against India" a stand which he took during Indo-Pak war of 1965.⁽⁴²⁾ The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal decided to defame Bhutto on pretext of his passive attitude towards India, which he was adopting to nor-

malize the situation after assuming the power.

While addressing a public meeting held in the lawn of the Baluchistan Assembly, Queta, Asghar Khan alleged that Bhutto was thinking to form a confederation with India and declared that such a move would be opposed strongly by the people of Pakistan. (43) He said that no useful purpose would be served by the proposed summit with the Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi unless Bhutto would hold a meeting with the people of East Pakistan before going to India. (44) He advised Bhutto to take the people of East Pakistan into confidence and through them put pressure on Indra Gandhi to solve the post-war problems, otherwise the proposed summit would be meaningless. (45) He further charged that it was Bhutto who had advised Yahya Khan to use military force in the East Pakistan. (46) He said that Bhutto was mainly responsible in bringing about the present tragic situation in the country, and asserted that the Soviet-Polish resolution in the Security Council, which called for a ceasefire, in East Pakistan during the Indo-Pak War of 1974 might have saved Pakistan. But by tearing that document in the Security Council, he alleged, "Bhutto struck his first major blow to the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan". (47) The National Working Council of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, which met on June 9-11, 1972, also urged upon Bhutto to have full and meaningful discussions with national leaders before going to India for any talks. (48)

Anyhow, Bhutto had to go to India for the solution of several problems which had arosed due to the break up of Pakistan. In their first summit meeting after the 1971 War, Bhutto and Indra Gandhi met at Simla from June 28 till July 3, 1972 and their deliberations resulted in the Simla Accord which was signed on July 2, 1972. (49)

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal decided to exploit the Simla Accord against Bhutto as the later used the Taskent Declaration for dethroning Ayub Khan. It declared that the Simla Accord was meant to pave way for a confederation with India and it had been signed in accordance with the decisions taken in Moscow. (50) When, Bhutto tried to defend the Simla Ac-

cord in the National Assembly, Asghar Khan declared in his speech delivered in the National Assembly on the Accord as a "pack of lies". (51) The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's leaders also advocated that the linguistic riots, which erupted in Sindh in mid-1972, (52) were a government technique adopted to divert the public attention from the disadvantages of the Simla Accord. (53)

Besides the Simla Accord, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal got another issue to put the Bhutto government in a fix. In December 1972, a fierce debate was started in the country on the pros and cons of recognizing Bangladesh. The right-wing parties and individuals joined their hand together against the recognition of Bangladesh. The PPP government which was mentally prepared to face the hard realities, launched a campaign through the official media to mobilise the public opinion that Bangladesh should be recognised soon. This party attitude gave birth to anti-recognition rallies in Punjab, mostly led by students, causing violent clashes among the public and the police. (54)

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal initially, took a contrary stand to its later policies towards the issue of the recognition of Bangladesh. Asghar Khan, probably, was the first Pakistani politician who, after a month of East Pakistan debacle, publically suggested that Pakistan should recognise Bangladesh without further delay. (55) He argued that by this step Pakistan could conquer the hearts and minds of the people of East Pakistan and pave the way for normalization of friendly and brotherly relations between the people of Pakistan and Bangladesh. (56) However, he was wise enough to make it clear that it was his 'personal opinion' and the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal would consider the question some time later. (57)

This point of view gave birth to a strong criticism within and outside the party. The PPP availed the opportunity and its spokesmen while criticising Asghar Khan for demanding to recognize the "so-called" Bangladesh said, that nobody had a right to call for recognition of that wing as an "independent state" which was a part of Pakistan and at present was under illegal Indian occupation. (58) This stand also caused a row within the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and there

seemed to be a strong rift emerging within the party folds. (59) Sensing the public trend, Asghar Khan changed his position and started opposing the Bangladesh's recognition with his full might.

He opposed Bhutto's decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth which he took due to Britain's decision to admit Bangladesh into the organization. He argued that cutting off the ties with Commonwealth and other countries on Bangladesh issue must be settled by the National Assembly and not by a single person. (60) Soon after when the movement for anti-recognition of Bangladesh gained momentum, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal joined with other right wing parties and declined to accept Bangladesh at any cost. (61) Asghar Khan and other party leaders addressed several rallies held to oppose the recognition of Bangladesh and demanded that the repatriation of POWs and Bahari should be done without accepting the independent status of Bangladesh. (62)

To discuss the Bangladesh issue, a special meeting of the National Working Committee (NWC) of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal was held on March 19-20, 1973 and after the end of its two-day session, through a resolution, the NWC opposed the recognition of Bangladesh as a separate entity. (63) The committee held the view that the recognition would not be in the interest of Pakistan and opinioned that what had happened so far and what was in the offing was an international conspiracy hatched by global interests and by their unscrupulous agents in Pakistan. (64) It felt that the return of Pakistani POWs had been deliberately linked with the recognition of Bangladesh and called upon the government to desist from using the POWs issue as a weapon of political exploitation and urged to resolve it by moving through international agencies. (65) This policy was followed by the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal strictly till the official recognition of Bangladesh by the Government of Pakistan in February 1974.

On the completion of one year rule of the PPP government, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal decided to observe a 'Black Day' on December 20, 1972 and arranged processions in several cities resulting in severe clashes between the PPP workers and the

supporters of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal. (66) This move, on one hand exhibited the growing strength and popularity of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal in the country and on the other hand widened the gulf between the ruling party and the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal which greatly increased in the coming months.

This tension was intensified by Asghar Khan's emotional announcement that the way of democratic change had been blocked in the country and no alternative was left for the opposition except to have recourse to violent methods to bring about a change. (67) He said that the fate of this country would ultimately be determined by bullets. (68) According to Bhutto of trying to fulfil the mission of the Indian Premier Indra Gandhi, he declared that Bhutto was a mentally sick person and was himself a goonda and coward. (69)

This outrage of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and its chairman towards Bhutto gave birth to a strong reaction from the ruling party. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Federal Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, said that the language used by Asghar Khan clearly indicated that it had come from sick mind. (70) He said that it also showed that he was a frustrated person and a lunatic and expressed the view that an advocate could plead in the court that he should be examined for insanity. (71)

The Punjab Chief Minister, Malik Meraj Khalid said that if any one hurled abuse at the President, he would only invite the warmth of the people on himself. (72) He further said that while the government had its own machinery to take action against Asghar Khan, but he was referring the matter to the court of the people to give their verdict against him. (73) Iftikhar Ahmed Tari, Punjab Minister for Communication announced that several protest processions against Asghar Khan's remarks would be taken out by the PPP throughout the country. (74)

The massive rallies arranged by the PPP against Asghar Khan simply boosted his image as a major opposition leader and several anti-Bhutto elements started pouring in his party. On the other hand the incidents of disturbances by the PPP workers in the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal meetings gained momentum and all the official machinery was mobilized to curtail the

Tehrik's activities throughout the country. (75)

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal was not the only target of the Bhutto regime during that period, as in February 1973, the NAP-JUI government in Baluchistan was dismissed by the PPP government on the pretext of several issues, including the discovery of an arms cache in the Iraqi Embassy at Islamabad. (76) While the Central Government replaced the Governor and dismissed the Government of Baluchistan, the Government of NWFP resigned on its own, in protest. (77) By this action, Bhutto only wanted to extend his power base to these two provinces. But, later events proved that it was a wrong decision, and after remaining quite for sometime at this political coup, the Balauchi people restored to armed resistance to protect their political rights; mainly led by Marri and Bughti tribes, who were the largest among the 18 major tribal groups of Baluchistan. (78)

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal took a strong stand against these political manipulations and called for a political solution to the situation in Baluchistan and said that the military intervention would make matter more worse. (79) It feared that if Bhutto did not desist from his policy of brinkmanship, Baluchistan would turn into a Vietnam. (80) Asghar Khan, along with his selected partymen went on a tour of Baluchistan in May 1973 and after his return, he pointed out that the terrain of Baluchistan was so difficult that the Army would get sucked in it and the strategically important area of the Punjab would be adversely affected. (81) He opined that the Baluchistan crisis was purely artificial, and the steps taken by the PPP government were wrong and deliberately mischievous from the very beginning. (82)

The Provincial Working Committee of the Baluchistan Tehrik-i-Istiqlal held the view that the new provincial government in Baluchistan, installed by Bhutto regime was unconstitutional because it was in minority in the provincial legislature. (83) It demanded that the army should be called back and the provincial administration should be handed over to the NAP-JUI group which still commanded majority in the province. (84) Unfortunately, the Baluchistan crisis

could not be solved till the end of Bhutto era and resulted in damage of lot of lives and property in the province.

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal which had refrained from dwelling on the delicate foreign policy subject since long, broke the long self-imposed silence by giving a new approach towards the foreign relations. It called for signing a defence pact with China because, according to Tehrik-i-Istiqlal resources, neither Washington nor any other capital, except Peking was in a position to provide effective military security to Pakistan.

(85) It severely criticised the government for following a foreign policy aimed more at befooling the people at home rather than winning friends abroad. (86) In a study report presented to the NWC of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, it was observed that under the prevalent condition only China could assist Pakistan in the events of hostilities and a defence pact with China would, therefore be of great value to Pakistan and would give it the security that it needed. (87) The report further argued that it would also be the natural culmination of a long period of friendly and close association in the international and defence fields between the two countries. (88) The report also observed that Pakistan's strategic location lured both America and the Soviet Union to secure their strong hold here to apply influence over China and it was in Chinese interests to deny this area to both the World powers. (89)

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal also favoured the idea of a Commonwealth of the Muslim countries (90) and stressed to maintain close ties with Turkey and Iran who were although not producing defence hardware, but could "do shipping for Pakistan during wars". (91) The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal was especially critical of US policies in the sub-continent which always chose to shut off the supply of arms during the wars of 1965 and 1971. In early 1973, when President Bhutto visited USA, the United State restored the military aid to Pakistan; Asghar Khan alleged that US-aid worth 14 million dollars had been used by the PPP government to suppress the opposition and, he criticised USA for patronising dictators in Asia, while at their home they preached democracy. (92) The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal also manifested great interest in Arab-Israel war of

1973 and while congratulating the Arab for their bold initiative, it stressed upon the government to give effective military assistance to the Arab. (93)

Alongwith expressing its policies on the external affairs, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal continued to oppose the Bhutto regime within the country. It observed "Condemnation Day" on November 23, 1973 against the several political murders, and arrests and imposing complete blackout on the news about the meetings and activities of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal in the national press and electronic media. (94)

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal marked the end of the first phase of the Bhutto era, through a message released on the birth anniversary of the Quaid-e-Azam which was being celebrated on December 25, 1973 by calling the nation to rise to rebuild the Pakistan of Quaid-e-Azam that had been reduced to a state of economic and political deprivation by power-hungry cliques and re-affirmed its resolve to continue its right against reactionary forces that had lined up behind the Bhutto government. (95)

A cursory glance at the activities of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal during the years 1971-73, discussed in the foregoing paras, would reveal that after the separation of East Pakistan, it tried its best to strive hard for the preservation of unity and integrity of the remaining Pakistan. It struggled for the lifting of Martial Law and emergency and restoration of the democracy in the country. It also continued demanding the early convening of the National and Provincial Assemblies and advocated for framing a democratic, federal and Islamic constitution. Besides making these demands, it held innumerable public meetings, brought out processions and held party conventions to accelerate the political activities in the country. Due to its strong opposition of the ruling party, it continued to be the main target of the repression of the government circles and its leaders and workers were often beaten, arrested and involved in false cases, besides several events of disruptions in their public meetings by the PPP workers. But inspite of all these hardships, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal continued its struggle for the restoration of the democratic traditions and became the main representative of the healthy opposition in

the country.

During all these years, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal remained a 'personality dominated party' and Asghar Khan acted as its boss and sole spokesman. He not only explained and defended its policies and programmes to the public, but also gave voice to the aims and ideals for which the party stood. Infact, his strong personality and qualities of leadership were the main sources of inspiration for his partymen. Anyhow, the presence of forceful personality of Asghar Khan did not hamper the smooth functioning of the various party organs and they always remained free to exercise their specified power. Moreover, self-criticism and deliberations among the party leaders and workers were always encouraged, a tendency being lacked by most of the political parties of that era.

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3. *Daily New Times*, (Rawalpindi) December 23, 1971.
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7. *Daily Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), January 11, 1972.
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9. *New Times*, January 21, 1972.
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12. *Daily Jang* (Karachi), January 27, 1972.
13. *Daily Jasarat* (Karachi), January 31, 1972.
14. *New Times*, February 3, 1972, Throughout his period of ruling over Pakistan, Bhutto's opponents blamed him for the break-up of Pakistan, including the generals who surrendered to the Indian Forces at Dhaka on December 16, 1971. For details, see Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, *Ahwal-e-Waqie*, (Urdu) Lahore, 1979, pp.1-19.
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20. For details see, Muhammed Asghar Khan, *General in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982*, New Delhi, 1983, pp.32-53. Also see *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), February 21, 23 & 28, 1972.
21. *Daily Javdan* (Rawalpindi), February 27, 1972.
22. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1972.
23. For further details, see *New Times*, March 7, 1972.
24. *Ibid.*
25. In the land reforms, announced by Bhutto on March 1, 1972, the ceiling on individual holdings was reduced from 500 irrigated or 1000 unirrigated acres to 150 irrigated or 300 unirrigated acres. For further details, see Shoukat Ali, *Pakistan Kay Masial Aur Zari Islahat* (Urdu), Lahore, 1973, pp.27-31.
26. *Jang* (Rawalpindi), March 3, 1972. As a matter of fact, absentee landlordism was the basic cause of existence of semi-feudal culture in Pakistani politics and created unbelievable hardships for the cultivators reducing them to the level of serfs, having no social, political or economic rights. For further details, see Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, ed., *Land Reforms in Pakistan: A Historical Perspective*, Islamabad, 1987, pp.2-71.
27. *Javdan*, March 3, 1972. Throughout the period of captivity of Pakistani POWs, India continued to ignore all international commitments about them. For details, see Nasim Hasan Shah, *Geneva Conventions and the Pakistani Prisoners of War*, Lahore, 1973, pp.1-3.
28. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), March 7, 1972.
29. *Dawn*, March 14, 1972.
30. *New Times*, March 18, 1972.
31. *Daily Morning News* (Karachi), April 12, 1972. In fact, Bhutto was able to present the draft manifesto of the Interim Constitution so early because of the fact that his party had carried a lot of home work on the future constitution of the country. For example, J.A.Rahim, a member of Principles Committee of the PPP, had presented the outline of the future constitution as early in 1969 on behalf of his party. For

details, see J.A.Rahim, *Outline of A Federal Constitution for Pakistan*, Lahore, 1969, pp.25-94.

32. *Daily Tameer*, (Rawalpindi), April 18, 1972.

33. *Dawn*, April 19, 1972.

34. *Dawn*, April 22, 23 & 25, 1972.

35. Marghub Siddique, *Principles of Federal Constitution: A Discussion of Pakistan's Problems*, Lahore, 1971, p.6.

36. *Dawn*, April 24, 1972.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *New Times*, April 24, 1972.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. For details, see Bhutto's speech made in the UN Security Council, New York, on September 22, 1969. Quoted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Re-shaping Foreign Policy*, Rawalpindi, n.d., pp.221-22.

43. *New Times*, May 13, 1972.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.* However it was ridiculous to believe that Mujib government at that time was in any position to put pressure on Indra Gandhi who handed over power to it. In fact, as a prominent Bengali scholar Mutiur Rahman observed, Mujib's role at that time was simply to ". . . guild the slavery which his party had induced the Bengali Muslims to accept and to perpetuate the hatred which war created". Mutiur Rahman, *Bangladesh Today: An Indictment and a lament*, Karachi, 1978, p.104.

46. *Dawn*, May 22, 1972.

47. *Ibid.* Although Bhutto's role in the break-up of Pakistan is still debatable, but it was naive on part of Asghar Khan, to think that Soviet Union wanted to retain Pakistan a united country. In fact the said resolution was nothing short of an eye-wash. The Soviet Union was not only the first among the major powers to condemn Pakistan's army action in East Pakistan but in fact, India dared to intervene in East Pakistan after the signing of a twenty-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with Soviet Union in August 1971. For a brief survey of the Soviet Union's role in the creation of Ban-

gladesh, see G.W.Choudhry, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Sub-continent*, London, 1975, pp.204-206.

48. *New Times*, June 12, 1972.

49. The Simla Accord resulted in resumption of communications, travel facilities and trade between the two countries and both the countries agreed to withdraw their forces to their own respective sides of the international border. For further details, see S.M.Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Karachi, 1973, pp.409-411.

50. *New Times*, July 15, 1972.

51. *Ibid.*, July 19, 1972.

52. The linguistic riots were erupted in Sindh after the passage of a bill by the Sindh Assembly on July 7, 1972, approving Sindhi as the only official language of the province. For further details about this issue see, Javed Ahmed Siddique, ed., *Muhajir Qomiet* (Urdu), Karachi, 1990, p.13.

53. For details, see *Weekly Outlook*, (Karachi), August 5, 1972 and *Weekly Ishtarak*, (Lahore), August 2, 1972.

54. Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan*, New Delhi, 1978, pp.26-27.

55. *New Times*, January 12, 1972.

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), January 14, 1972.

59. *Daily Mashriq* (Lahore), February 2, 1972.

60. *Daily Wafaq* (Lahore), February 3, 1972. It was a condition of the creation of Pakistan that she should start her career as an independent sovereign state by being a member of the Commonwealth. For details, see K.Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the Commonwealth*, Karachi, 1950, pp.5-12.

61. *Mashriq* (Lahore), January 3, 1973.

62. *Ibid.*, March 7, 1973. In fact all the right-wing parties were demanding that the problem of repatriation of POWs and recognition of Bangladesh should be dealt separately as they were two different issues. For details, see Khurshid Ahmed, *Pakistan, Bangladesh Aur Junahi Asia Ki Sivasat* (Urdu), Karachi, 1973, pp.170-171.

63. *New Times*, March 21, 1973.

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Daily Nawa-i-Waqat* (Lahore), December 21, 22, 1972 and *New Times*, December 21, 1972.

67. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), April 28, 1973.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Daily Musawat* (Lahore), April 28, 1973.

70. *Dawn*, April 29, 1973.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), April 29, 1973.

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*

75. For details of such events, see *Weekly Chattan* (Lahore), May 6, 1973, pp.4-7 and *Weekly Lail-o-Nahar*, (Lahore), May 17, 1973, pp.19-27.

76. Azizud Din Ahmed, *Kai Hum Ikthey Rah Skthy Hain?* (Urdu), Lahore, 1988, pp.52-54.

77. *Ibid.*

78. Yu.V.Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1973, p.14.

79. *Dawn*, May 24, 1973.

80. *Ibid.*

81. *Pakistan Times*, Rawalpindi, May 29, 1973.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Dawn*, June 2, 1973.

84. *Ibid.*

85. *New Times*, May 26, 1973.

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.* It was doubtful that whether Chinese themselves would be willing to enter into such an alliance with Pakistan. But in Pakistan's last two wars with India especially during the 1965 war, they were most eager to help Pakistan. For details see Muhammad Asghar Khan, *The First Round: India Pakistan War 1965*, Lahore, 1978, pp. 110-115.

89. *New Times*, May 2, 1973. In fact during the entire Cold War Era, China tried its best to have a greater influence over whole of Asia and showed special interest promoting her image in the sub-continent. For details, see Niloufer Waj-

id Ali, *Communist China and South & South-East Asia*, Lahore, 1975, pp.230-240.

90. The idea of a Commonwealth of the Muslim states or an organization of Muslim countries having closet links among themselves always remained a cherished dream of the Muslim intellectuals of the Indo-Pak sub-continent. For a study of this idea, see Ch. Nazir Ahmed Khan, *Commonwealth of Muslim States: A Plan for Pan-Islamism*, Lahore, 1972, pp.97-122.

91. *New Times*, July 12, 1973.

92. *Ibid.*, September 24, 1973: America's role in patronizing dictatorship in Asia for its global interests was best manifested in Indo-China region, during the early seventees. For details, see Desmond Crowley, *The Background to Current Affairs*, London, 1972, pp.153-158 and p.160.

93. *Jang*, (Rawalpindi), November 5, 1973.

94. *New Times*, November 20, 1973.

95. *Dawn*, December 25, 1973.