Mr. Jinnah's Leadership and the Evolution of the Pakistan

IDEA: THE CASE OF THE SIND PROVINCIAL MUSLIM LEAGUE CONFERENCE, 1938

BY

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India in 1937 witnessed two events which marked a significant turning point in the political fortunes of the Muslim League movement. These two events were, first, the general elections held in early 1937 and, second, the League's annual session at Lucknow in October. In the election the Muslim League, on the whole, fared rather poorly. Discouraged but not defeated by its weak electoral showing, the League experienced a resurgence of will and purpose at the Lucknow session.[2] The revitalization of the League was reflected in key changes in both the League's goal and its composition. The League at Lucknow finally took the step of declaring its goal to be the achievement of full independence in India.[3] The Lucknow session was also the first time Muslims from the middle and lower classes were openly welcomed to an annual session and they came in large numbers.[4] Thus guided by a new goal and strengthened by a more democratic constitution, the League in late 1937 and early 1938 launched a campaign to extend its organization throughout the length and breadth of India.

Efforts to organize the League began in the province of Sind in the month of May, 1938, partly as a result of the enthusiasm generated at the All-India Level.[5] But impetus for organizing the

League in Sind also came from certain prevailing political circumstances in Sind. Since 1937 Sind had had two ministries both headed by Muslims but, because of division among Muslim Assemblymen, both had depended for their survival on Hindu support. Most of the Sindhi Muslim leadership became embittered by this experience for two reasons. The first reason was that both these governments isolated them from the political power they felt they had rightfully earned in the difficult but successful struggle to achieve Sind's separation from Bombay. The second reason was neither government had taken any steps to ameliorate the plight of the largely Muslim peasantry. But in issuing an appeal to Sindhi Muslims to join the League, the League leadership chose to ignore the disunity in their own ranks and focussed instead on Hindu exploitation as the reason why Muslims in Sind were powerless and why no legislation had been passed to benefit the rural masses:

> The Muslims of Sind are aware of the reasons why we have come to feel the necessity of organizing Muslim League movement (sic) in this province. The necessity is being increasingly felt after the recent political development which are an outcome of the determination on the part of the Hindus, more particularisely those who are sailing under the Congress colours, to rule the Muslim majority in the province by a more process of exploitation.6

If the League could be firmly implanted in Sind, they reasoned, the ministry would be forced to honor Muslim needs and interests and if that failed, the League could serve to unite the Muslim Assembly men and remove the ministry from power.7

So with the aims of increasing the League's following in Sind and restoring political power to the hands of the Sindhi Muslims, the League leadership decided to convene a conference in Karachi to which would be invited the top names in the All-India Muslim League leadership, including its president, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.8 The conference was also intended to serve as a natural climax to the organizing efforts that had been going on since May and as an incentive for the ongoing task of further organization.9

Sir Abdullah Haroon, a wealthy Memon busine sman from Karachi, took the initiative in making preparations for the conference. He began by organizing a Reception Committee of which he was made chairman. 10 Through his financial connections he was able to find men of means to give contributions to help defray conference expenses and as a member of both the Central Legislative Assembly and the recently formed Working Committee of the All – India Muslim League, Haroon was able personally to invite many of the leading lights of Muslim India to attend the Karachi conference. Once the leaders had been invited and the details agreed upon, the conference was scheduled for early October.

The conference which was to last four days opened in Karachi on October 8 amidst "scenes of great enthusiasm". 12 Jinnah, the star attraction of the conference had arrived in Karachi by special train the previous day, accompanied by Sir Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur, a scion of the former ruling family of Sind, the Talpurs. 13 The League president was greeted at the Karachi railway station by Abdullah Haroon, the Reception Committee chairman, in a manner "befitting a King." 14 Mr. Jinnah was driven through the streets from the station in an open conveyance in a three mile long procession behind a contingent of volunteer National Guards to the accompaniment of bands playing rousing welcome music. 15

Other distinguished leaders of Muslim India who attended the conference included Sir Fazlul Haq, Premier of Bengal, Sir Sikandar Hayat, Premier of the Punjab and the venerable old Khilafat leader, Maulana Shaukat Ali. The Raja of Mahmudabad, an important financial backer of the League, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, one of the League's chief organizers, Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim and Moulana Hamid Badayuni also graced the conference with their presence 16

The conference began on a high note and the excitement did not suqside for the sessions's full duration. The meetings which began at eight O clock in the evening often continued until two o' clock in the morning and in the estimation of the League's General Secretary, A. M. Rashidi, over 20,000 delegatess attended the confer-

ence. 17 Rashidi has also stated that this conference "for its grandeur, majesty and attendance was never equalled in the history of the Muslim League movement. 18

One of the first tasks Jinnah set for himself upon arriving in karachi was to try and bring about unity in the ranks of the Sindhi Muslim leadership. Hotim Alavi who attended Jinnah's "unity" meetings with the Sindhi leadership has given a graphic account 19 of Jinnah's technique in getting people to forget their differences and forge a common position. Alavi's anecdote is recounted herr because it provides some insight into Jinnah's exceptional qua ties of leadership.

Alavi states that when Jinnah came to Sind for the conference he found bickering and schisms among the Muslims mostly on personal grounds. He called them in one by one and heard their stories down to the last detail. He let them speak their full until they had no more to say. He then asked them, "Do you have anything more to say?" "No, nothing, that is all, no more, "was invariably their reply. And then he gathered them all together and spoke to them. He said he realized that they expected him to arbitrate in each and every one of the cases, to give to one and take from another, to support one and abandon another. He reminded them of their great aim of unity and asked them how they could make any progress if they were all quarreling one with another. He used the metaphor of dirt in a water pitcher. "If you throw dirt into a pitcher and then drink the water, it will be distasteful and upset you. But if you let the dust settle, then the water will be clear and you may drink from the pitcher with no ill effects." So he exhorted them to settle their differences by forgetting them, by putting their disagreements behind them and instead turning and working for the great aim of strength and unity. He said he could arbitrate; it may satisfy their heads but not their hearts. This appeal was effective for Jinnah was able to get the Muslims leaders to agree on a common position in regard to the Sind ministry during the conference's deliberations. 20

The sessions of the conference followed a distinct pattern. Their opening was marked by a series of speeches made by the

various leaders. Following the speeches, resolutions were read before the gathering which were either passed or rejected according to the opinion of those present.

At the opening session, the honor of presenting the welcome Address went to Sir Abdullah Haroon in his capacity as Chairman of the conference's Reception committee. Seizing the opportunity, Haroon delivered a forceful, forthright speech which amounted to, in part, a challenge to subsequent speakers and in part, a prelude to the most important resolution the conference was to pass. Haroon began his speech by referring to the important issue of the search for a Hindu-Muslim political settlement. Not only was this matter the most significant, he addressed in his speech; 21 it was the question of over-riding imporance at the conference.

At the outset of his speech, Haroon reviewed the efforts over the past fifteen years on the part of outstanding Indian Muslim leaders to reach a settlement with the Hindu community but he observed the goal was as far off as ever. He laid the blame for this state of affairs at the feet of the Hindus citing their failure to "recognize the deep-rooted suspicion of the minorities that their interests were not safe in the hands of the Hindu majority." 22 He declared that unless adequate safeguards and protection for minorities were forthcoming, there may be no alternative for Indian Muslims but for them "to seek their salvation in their own way in an independent federation of Muslim states." 23 He drew a parallel with recent happenings in Czechoslovakia and warned that the same might happen in India if the majority community persisted in its present course. In recounting the recent repressive policies of the congress governments toward Muslims, Haroon was compelled to reiterate the possibility that India might become divided into federations. "We have nearly arrived at the parting of the ways," he said, "and until and unless this problem is solved to the satisfaction of all, it will be impossible to save India from being divided into Hindu-India and Muslim-India both placed under separate federations." 24

Haroon's sharp attack on Congress, his harsh words of warning and his bold reference to federation all indicate that a

section of the Muslim leadership was moving toward a more radical and militant position in their thinking on the communal problem. In effect, the real purpose of Haroon's speech was to ask of the Muslim community and its leadership a series of questions: was the old policy of seeking safeguards and pursuing accommodating with the Hindus now bankrupt? Did not Muslims and the League need to establish for themselves a new policy and a new goal? Should not Indian Muslim break away on their own and pursue their own political fortunes and destiny? As the conference progressed, it would become patently clear what Haroon's position on these questions was, though it was not equally certain his position would be adopted by the rest of the leadership.

The thrust of Haroon remarks was not lost on those attending the conference, least of all Mr. Jinnah whose Presidential speech immediately followed Haroon's welcome Address. In his speech, Jinnah largely ignored the challenges implicit in Haroon's speech and instead voiced once again the milder, more moderate themes that had become his frequent refrain since Lucknow: the imperative of Muslim unity and the base of Congress opposition 25 In fact, the major portion of Jinnah's speech was devoted to the latter theme; he denounced Congress for its "arrogance, opportunism and oppression."26He charged the Congress press with falsely propagating the image of a reactionary League and defended the League as a national and progressive body and "the only authoratative organization of the Muslmans of India." 27

Haroon in his speech hah intimated that since Congress had come to power in six of India's province, relations between the Hindu and Muslim communities had become even further excacerbated as a result of the anti-Muslim policies of Congress. This theme was echoed by Jiunah in his address: "the greatest misfortune of India is thet the High Command of the Congress has adopted a most brutal, oppressive and inimical attitude towards the All-India Muslim League since they secured the majority in the six provinces." 28

It was also while on the subject of Congress policy in his speech that Jinnah, at two different places, used language and made references that recalled the emergent radical position of Haroon. At one point he spoke of some in Congress trying to create "a serious situation which will break India vertically and horizontally" and at another he warned Congress to "mark, learn and inwardly digest" the recent lesson of Sudetan Germans in Czechoslovakia, 29 Both of these references in Context were vague and ambiguous and neither mentioned the prospect of separate federations in India, but they are nevertheless significant in what ther say about the trend in Jinnah's thinking at this stage, and beyond that what clues they furnish to Jinnah's leadership.

Jinnah likely included these references in his speech in order to assess the Muslim public's reaction to his feigning a radical posture as President of the League and leader of the Muslim community so he could form a notion of how Muslims generally felt about adoPting an extremist cou se. They suggest also that Jinnah had come to agree that Haroon's questions needed to be asked now though for him, at least, he was not yet prepared to respond affirmatively. In addition to what these references say about Jinnah's thinking, they confirm certain aspects of his leadership: a cautious approach to problematic issues, an openness to consider different policy options and a reliance on Muslim public opinion to determine the proper course for the League to follow. After Jinnah finished speaking, he gave Fazlul Haq and Sikandar Hayat opportunities to speak. Following them, other leaders spoke, including those from Sind. All reiterated the themes first dsicussed by Haroon and Jinnah and none furnished any new perspective or introduced any new themes.

A casual listener or participant at the conference would likely have been struck by the similarities in the speeches of Haroon and Jinnah, particularly the harsh attacks on Congress, but a keen observer would have discerned the seeds of conflict and tension in their two addresses. That tension and conflict was to become even more apparent at a later stage in the conference during the deliverations over Resolution No. 5, 30 the [most significant resolution passed at the conference.

Resolution No. 5 was a lengthy resolution which summarized past efforts to reach a communal settlement between the two major communities, discussed the present situation and recommended a future [course of action. The resolution began by launching an attack on Congress particularly in regard to its policy and conduct in the provinces where it had formed the government which were also the provinces where Muslims happened to be in a minority:

> "Whereas it (Congress) has deliberately established purely Hindu rule in certain provinces by forming ministries either without Muslim ministers or with Muslim ministers having no following among the Muslim members, in direct and flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Government of India Act' 1935 and the Instrument of Instructions. "whereas the ministries so formed have established a sort of rule which has for its aim the intimidation and demoralization of Muslims, the extermination of the healthy and nation-building influences of Muslim Culture, the suppression of Muslim religious customs and their religious obligations and elimination of their political rights as a separate community." 32

The next paragraph of he resolution further denounced Congress but this time in the context of the Muslim majority provinces.

> "Whereas it (Congress) has in open defiance of the democratic principles persistently endeavoured to render the power of the Muslim majorities ineffective and unimportant in the North Western Frontier province, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind by trying to bring into power or by supporting coalition ministries not enjoying the confidence of the majority of Muslims and the Muslim masses of those provinces." 33

The juxtaposition of these paragraphs had a symbolic significance beyond its simple literal reality. The arrangement of these paragraphs one after another reflected the adoption of a common polsition by the Muslim leadership in the two main blocs of

Muslims in India, the Muslim minority provinces and the Muslim majority provinces. It is noteworthy as well as ironic that the basis for unity between the two leadership groups was not any shared sense of experience or even interests (in fact they differed considerably between both blocs) but rather their mutual opposition to a common foe, Congress. This achievement in resolution form of a common outlook by the leadership of the Muslim minority and the Muslim majority provinces was a unprecendented event since the League's reorganization in 1937 and it marked an important stage in the League's evolution toward its ultimate goal and purpose for the Muslim community in India. 34

This emergency of solidarity between the leadership of the two Muslim blocs represented an important development at the conference but its significance was obscured by the resolution's subsequent deliberations and debate. At the end of the resolution's the authors included a section which called for the League's departure in a new direction, toward a new goal. The shift in League policy signaled by this latter portion of the resolution made this section the most important part of the resolution but it also sparked considerable controversy. This section, as initially drafted, read:

> "The Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into federations, namely, the federation of Muslim States and the federation of non-Muslim States.
>
> "This conference therefore recommends to the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslim-majority - provinces Muslim Indian States and areas inhabitated by a majoritys of Muslims may attain full independence in the from of a federation of their own with permission to admit any other Muslim State beyond

the Indian frontiers to join the Federation and with such safeguards for non-Mulim minorities as may be conceded to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim Federatson of India." 35

Some in the League leadership, however, found this section to be an exreme and untimely statement of the League's position and at the subjects committee stage of the conference they had this latter portion of the resolution altered to read as follows:

> "This conference considers it absolutely essential, in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political Self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to the All India Muslim League to review and revise the entire conception of what should be the suitable constiution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status to them." 36

This section of the resolution, however, still retained its historical importance despite its modification to a more moderate form. The conference's adopion of this resolution, particularly the latter section, signified the first time the Muslim League had defined political India as two separate nations, on Hindu and one Muslim, and at the same time advanced the claim of political self-determination as a legitimate means for the achievement of separate nationhood. This resolution marked a new departure in League thinking which prepared the way for the establishment two years later of the League's ultimate goal of Pakistan. It was in this respect, as a forerunner of the historic Lahore resolution of March, 1940, that Resolution No. 5 of the Karachi conference achieved its true historical distinction.

This resolution's aspect of historical significance-its calling for the League to undertake a new direction in outlook and purpose-prompted the controversy which took place amongst the League leadership and which forced the modification of the initial version

to a more moderate and acceptable form. This dispute was settled quickly but had it not been, it might easily have created a major issue with possible negative repercussions for the League. 37 But despite the rapid dissolution of the controversy, its occurrence at the conference was an important development which warrants closer scrutiny. This conflict will now be discussed in more detail not just as a way of gaining some sense of the ideological ferment taking place within the League leadership at this time, but more importantly, because this controversy provides further insights into the thought and leadership of Mr. Jinnah's at this crucial stage in the League's development.

Before Mr. Jinnah's role in this disagreement is discussed, some explanation should be given of the origins of this resolution in order to furnish some perspective and understanding of the part Mr. Jinnah played later when the conflict arose. The initial draft of this resolution which contained the radical portion was authored by Sir Abdullah Haroon and his secretary Pir Ali Mohammad Rashidi in close collaboration with Sheik Abdul Majid Sindhi. 38 Haroon and Majid in consultation with other Muslim leaders, had drafted the first section of this resolution in a concious effort to demonstrate Muslim solidarity between the two Muslim bloc. 39 So deep was their sense of anger and frustration with Congress' treatment of Muslim in both blocs that they abandoned hope of ever reaching a settlement with the the Congress in the future. In this way, their profound hatred of Congress produced in them a new awareness that Muslims by themselves must discover their own political destiny. These two impulses combined to find natural expression in the radical version of the resolution's later portion. Thus the Sindhi leaders' empathy with Muslim leaders from elsewhere in India both in their opposition to Congress and in their desire for a new League goal provides an explanation for their adoption of a radical posture in Resolution No. 5.

A second reason why the Sindhi leaders, Haroon, Rashidi and Majid advocated a militant approach in the resolution's latter section, is found in their aspirations for recognition and respect and even a position of leadership within the larger Indian Muslim

community. The political outlook of the Sindhi Muslim leadership at this time was still dominated by the movement concluded two years earlier to separate Sind province from Bombay. The Sindhi Muslims' efforts to secure Sind's separation had been bitterly opposed by an influential section of Sindhi Hindus so when the campaign ended in success for the Muslim side, Sindhi Muslim were immensely proud and elated with their victory. The Muslim leadership in Sind later began to feel that their success in their difficult struggle had earned for them a place of leadership among Indian Muslims, a position in 1938 they had yet to occupy. Thus they saw in Resolution No. 5 an opportunity to achieve the leadership they felt they deserved. By drafting a radically worded resolution, they would attract attention at the conference and if they were able to secure its passage, they would be elevated to the leadership they desired. This idea is implicit in Rashidi's summation of the conference proceedings in his report when he says:

> "I have no doubt that it (Resolution No. 5) will serve as a prelude to the Muslims declaring finally to go in for a separate federation of their own and will thus get Sind a very conspicuous place in the history of new India ... Sind has on many occasions in the past given the lead to the whole of India and I will be pardoned if I say that even on this occasion, and in the matter of the Muslim League movement she has given a lead to the rest of India." 4

Thus, a combination of factors: anger with Congress, impatience for a new League goal and ambition for Sindhi leadership had compelled the Sindhi leaders, with the support of other provincial Muslim leaders, to give Resolution No.5 its radical stamp.

Standing in opposition to the militant position espoused by the provincial League leadership and a major force in its alteration to a more moderate form was Mr. Jinnah. The League president certainly preferred the final form of the resolution to the initial version, but it is virtually certain that he would have been most pleased if such a controversial resolution declaring what the League's ultimate future goal should be had never been tabled at the conference at all. In order to understand why Mr Jinnah felt

this way, it is necessary to consider his view of what the proper task of the League was at this stage in its development.

Jinnah's view, informed by a strong sense of the past, focused not on ideological goals perse, but rather on the more preliminary steps of building a strong, tightly knit and disciplined party organization which could command the broad support of Muslims throughout India. 41 Jinnah thought it was premature at this juncture to talk in terms of long-range goals when the Muslim community, though politically conscious, had yet to become politically organized. It was pointless, in other words, to pursue a goal without any means of support or organization. In Jinnah's view, therefore, the first step was for the League to organize itself within the Muslim community; then once the Muslims became an organized and disciplined force under the League banner, the search for the League's ultimate ideological goal could begin. Thus, in proceeding from a position of strength and preparedness, the League's prospects in securing its ultimate goal would be greatly enhanced 42

It was in this frame of mind that Jinnah went to Sind in early October 1938 to preside over the Sind Muslim League conference. He wanted to see the League firmly established in the province and beyond that, if possible, to help form a League ministry in Sind. In purfuit of these aims, Jinnah realized one of his first tasks upon arriving in karachi was to forge unity between the feuding and divided Sindhi Muslim leadership. 43 The success of his initial efforts reassured Jinnah and in his Presidential speech he made a special point of singling out the Sindhis and praising them. "Not long ago," he said, "the Muslimans in Sind were divided and torn into groups, but today I am happy to find that there is a wonderful Public spirit, solidarity and unity demonstrated (by them) ..."44 In keeping with his aim of organizing the League, he proceeded to congratulate the Sindhi Leaguers for having established the "District Muslim League in almost all your Districts and having organized the Muslimans of Sind in the manner in which you have done in such a short time." 45

Jinnah addressed these laudatory remarks to the Sindhis not simply because he was encouraged by their show of unity and

their support for the League, but also because his political foresight told him that the All-India Muslim League would need the strong support of the provincial League organizations in its struggle with the Congress and the British government. This aim of solidarity between the Sind Muslim League and its parent body was one of two goals Jinnah outlined for Sindhi Leaguers in his Presidential address; the other was for the Sind League to assume the reins of government and provide for the progress and welfare of the people of Sind. 46 Thus, Jinnah felt that these immediate goals of strengthening the League in Sind by forming a ministry and by lending support to the All-India League should be foremost in the minds of the Sindhi Leaguers. Hence, he was disappointed when the Leaguers in Sind indicated by their strong advocacy of Resolution No. 5 that their first priority was to formulate the League's ultimate goal. He feared they would shirk the League's badly needed organizational work in their impatience to find a goal.

This view of Mr. Jinnah's, that Resolution No. 5 was an inopportune measure which might detract from the League's immediate organizational needs, was only one reason why he opposed the resolution, at least in the early stages of deliberation. There is evidence to suggest that Jinnah thought the resolution was too hasty from another standpoint, made clear in a remark he made at the conference. "The Government, "he said, "is still in the hands of the British. Let us not forget it. You must see ahead and work for the ideal that you think will arise 25 years hence."47 Jinnah was also opposed to the resolution because he still had hope a settlement might be reached between the Hindu and Muslim communities yet Resolution No. 5 sought to discard this approach and set the League upon a new course. 48

Mr.Jinnah remained, on personal grounds, opposed to the resolution throughout the conference. According to one of the conference participants, Jinnah even refrained from participating in the debate after the resolution was tabled.49 According to another delegate, Abdullah Haroon and Sheik Abdul Majid continued to prevail upon Jinnah at informal moments during the conference and on the third day, Jinnah finally agreed to let the resolution

pass.50 Apparently the three were finally able to reach a compromise which, in part, resolved the controversy which had arisen earlier. Haroon and Majid agreed to replace the radical version of the resolution with the more moderate rendition and Jinnah agreed not to obstruct the resolution's passage at either the subject committee stage or when the resolution was brought before the whole conference. 51

Jinnah's shift in position on Resolution No. 5 from one of outright opposition to tacit support was one of the most significant developments of the conference. It had positive implications for the success of the conference as well as for the League's image in the eyes of Congress and the British government. But beyond these considerations and for the purposes of this paper, Jinnah's change in outlook is of primary importance in providing a deeper understanding of his thought and leadership in this phase of the League's evolution toward the goal of Pakistan.

What factors compelled Jinnah to alter his position on Resolution No. 5 and what light do they shed on his thought and leadership? First of all, Jinnah's keen sense of the dominant political trends and forces at work in India informed his leadership with qualities of flexibility and adaptiveness which, in the case of this resolution, prompted him to re-evaluate his initial position. He began to wonder if there was not some truth to the insistent view of Haroon and the others; perhaps they were indeed speaking for a wider spectrum of Muslim opinion than just their own small coterie of leaders. So he decided to let Resolution No 5 pass with the idea it would serve as a trial balloon and would indicate the depth of support within the Muslim community for the ideological notions implicit in the resolution. 52

Jinnah's concern for the voice of public opinion suggests a second element that helped to shape his leadership: his commitment to democratic principles. Jinnah perceived his leadership as one based solidly and securely on the needs, desires and will of the Muslim community. Thus, if Resolution No. 5 could provide a fuller sense of what the real interests and aspirations of Muslim

were, it woule help him to be a stronger and more effective leader. Speaking to a group of Aligarh students in late 1940, Jinnah in eloquently defining his own leadership, revealed its democratic inspiration

> "When I addressed you last, the Lahore Resolution, popularly known as Pakistan, had not been passed but I noted that you were anxious for the declaration of the ideal embodied in the Lahore Resolution. In other parts of India I had noticed the same thing. What I have done is to declare boldly what was striving the heart of Muslim India (sic). 53

Conclusion:

Scrutiny and evaluation of the proceedings of the Sind provincial Muslim League Conference of 1938 have made it possible to perceive certain of the important attributes of Mr. Jinnah's leadership that led, in part, to his elevation to the prominent position of Quaid-i-Azam. This task of discernment has been facilitated by the particular significance of this Karachi confernce and its place in the larger context of the All - India Muslim League's evolution toward its ultimate ideological goal of Pakistan. With the passage of Resolution No. 5, the Karachi conference became identified with the larger process of ideological ferment and change that attended the Muslim League in this period of its national resurgence and revitalization. The Resolution's inherent impetus toward a new League goal came not, however, from the highest reaches of the League leadership, but rather from the lower ranks of the provincial League leadership. Mr. Jinnah initially stood opposed to the resolution deeming it premature and possibly detrimental to the League's organizational work but as the conference progressed, he shifted his stance and adopted a position of tacit approval. The factors that compelled him to alter his position were elements that informed his leadership: a sense of the past, attentiveness to present realities, keen political foresight and a strong committent to democratic priociples. These attributes of Mr. Jinnah's leadership subsequently kept him closely attuned to the wishes and needs of the Muslim community, strengthened his hand in negotiations with the Congress and the British government and sustained him in his task of guiding the Muslim League toward the successful conclusion of its struggle to win Pakistan.

FOOTNOTES

Listed below are abbreviations found in the footnotes of this paper

FR- Fortnightly Reports on the Political Situation in Sind, London.

PMS- papers of M. H. Saiyid, Karachi

QAPC- Quaid-I-Azam paper Cell, Islamabad

D.G.- *Daily Gazette*, National Archives, Karachi

MLA- Muslim League Archives, Karachi

PMA- Papers of Mazhar Alavi, Karachi

1. The results showed the League winning only 109 of the 482 seats reserved for Muslims. For an official account, see *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India 1937*, (Delhi: Goverment of India Press, 1937)

2. For an account of the speeches and resolutions of the session see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents*, 2 vols., (Karachi: National Publishing House 1970), II, 264-281.

3. Resolution No. 2 stated "The object of the All-India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of full independence in the form of federation of free democratic States in which the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the Constitution." Ibid., P. 274,

4. See Raja of Mahmudabad, "Some Memories." in *The Partition of India, Policies and perspectives, 1935 – 1947*, ed, C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), PP. 386-387.

5. The Sind Provincial Muslim League had been started as early as February, but in testimony given before the Weston Committee, May is the date given when, "the regular establishment of the Muslim League in Sind began." FR for second half of February 1938, Kirpalani to Thorne, March 7, 1938. Also Causes of Sukkur Distu-

rbances: Important Findings of the Court of Inquiry into Sukkur Riots of November, 1939, Presided over by Mr. Justice Weston, (Karachi: Sind Provincial Muslim League, 1940), P. 27.

6. From an appeal to Sind Muslims, issued form the Sind Provincial Muslim League Office on September 2, 1938 Found in Alhaj Mian Ahmad Shafi, *Haji Sir Abdoola Haroon: A Biography* (Lahore: Pakistan Herald press, n.d.), PP. 128–130.

7. Sindhi League leader, Sir Abdullah Haroon wrote to the All-India League leaders, the Raja of Mahmudabad and Nawab Ismail Khan about their upcoming visit to Sind, saying" "I hope your visit will be so successful that we will have to call Mr. Jinnah in a (sic) very near future and inaugurate (sic) the first Sind Muslim Ministry." This indicates Haroon was thinking along the lines of replacing the Sind Ministry. PMS, Letter of Haroon to Raja of Mahmudabad and Nawab Ismail Khan, August 23, 1938.

8. Haroon wrote Jinnah in early August about the possibility of his coming to preside at the conference QAPC, File 1098, p 57 Letter from Abdullah Haroon to Mohammad Ali Jinnah August2, 1938.

9. During the summer a number of Muslim League meetings and conferences were held in taluka and district headquarters throughout Sind. Places where these meetings were held included Nawabshah, Sukkur, Larkana, Dadu, Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas Tatta, Jacobabad, Mehar and Shikarpur The most important conference was a province-wide meeting held in mid-July in Sultankot in Sukkur District, organized by an energetic Aligharian from Sultankot, Agha Ghulam Nabi Pathan and presided over by the Makhdum of Multan, Murid Hussain Qureshi. Interview with Hafiz Khair Mohammad Ohidi, Sukkur. December 19, 1975.

10. Shafi, p. 128.

11. Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi was the other member from Sind, there were twenty-two in all. For a complete list of the working Committee, see Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore: Longmans, Green and Co., 1961), p. 192j

12. FR for first half October, 1938. Bhat to Thorne October 18, 1938.

13. *D. G.*, October 8, 1931, p. 1.

14. MLA, Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference, 1938, Vol. 242, Pir Ali Mohammad Rashidi, Report of the General Secretary of the First Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference, 1938, p. 9. (Hereafter Rashidi's Report.)

15. *D. G.*, October 8, 1928 p. 1. Even the anti-League newspaper the *Sind Observer* described the reception as one "a prince might well envy," quoted in G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for a New Sind*, Karachi Sind Observer Press, 1949), p. 24.

16. Nripendra Nath Mitra, *The India Annual Register*, 1938 (Calcutta: The Annual Register Office, 1939), p. 352.

17. Rashidi, Report p. 22. The Daily Gazette's estimate of those in attendance was more conservative, 10,000. *D. G.* October 19, 1938.

18. Interview with Pir Ali Mohammad Rashidi, Islamabad, June, 3, 1975.

19. Interview with Hatim Alavi, Karachi, October 7, 1974. Alavi's account is of a gathering which preceded the October 9 meeting at which an agreement was reached between Jinnah and the Sindhi Muslim leaders. For the terms of the agreement see, Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah, 2 Vols. (Lahore: Shaik Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), I. 60-62.

20. See FN 1, p. 6. The details of this agreement and its subsequent fate are eschewed here as they are deemed to be outside the scope of this paper.

21. There were, of course, other issues raised in Haroon's speeches and resolutions at the conference, but they will not be dealt with as they do not pertain to the central focus of this paper.

22. *D. G.*, October 9, 1938, p. 6.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. FR for first half of October, 1938. Bhat to Thorne, October 18, 1938.

26. *D. G.* October 9, 1938, p. 3., Mitra, pp. 353-354.

27. Ibid., Jinnah praised the Sindhi Muslims for the unity they had shown at the conference but warned they had a grave task ahead "to guard yourselves in the All-India Muslim struggle against the various forces which are out to destroy and divide Muslamans by means of corruption and dishonest propaganda and to stand solid behind the All-India Muslim League."

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Rashidi in his report numbers this resolution, entitled *Communal Settlement*, as No. 5. There is some discrepancy as to how many resolutions were passed at the conference and what their sequence was. For instance, the Sind League Secretary, M.A. Khalique, sent a list of the resolutions of the conference to Liaquat Ali Khan at the latter's request in March 1939 and he included only twelve compared to Rashidi's twenty-one. Furthermore, he listed Rashidi's No. 5 as his No. 1, MLA, Sind Provincial League Conference, 1928, Vol. 242, Letter from M.A. Khalique to Liaquat Ali Khan March 4, 1939, p. 10. Another source listed the total number of resolutions as seventeen. *D.G.* October 11, 1939, p. 2, Ibid., October 12, 1939, p. 2, Ibid., October 13, 1939, p. 2. I accept Rashidi account as authentic as his report was official and it was published soon after the conference by the Sind League. This Resolution was also cited as No. 5 at th next session of the League in Patna when Sheikh Abdul Majid introduced it as part of another resolution. MLA, Annual Session at Patna, 1938, Vol. 190, Resolutions introduced by Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi.

31. The Resolutions passed at the conference were evenly divided between All-India issues (ten resolutions) and local Sindhi issues (11 resolutions dealt with such issues as Palestine and India's Frontier policy, and the Sindhi resolutions with such matters as the

Governors controversial actions and the anti-Muslim policies of the Allah Baksh government. These resolutions are not discussed because they are deemed to be outside the scope of this paper.

32. In addition to Rashidi's Report at the Muslim League Archives in Karachi, the full text of this resolution can be found in Jamal-ud-Din Ahmad, *Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement* (Lahore: Publishers United, 1970), pp. 255-258

33. Ibid

34. The unified outlook of the leadership from both blocs was further demonstrated in the passage of the resolution itself. There were three from the Muslim majority bloc who were instrumental in its passage: Sheikh Abdul Majid, the resolution's mover, K. B. Gurmani from the Punjab who seconded it and Abdullah Haroon who supported it. Two from Muslim minority provinces were also listed as supporters: Sayed Abdul Rauf Shah from the Central Provinces and Moulana Abdul Hamid Badauni from the United Provinces. Rashidi Report p. 14.

35. This is the text reported in the *Statesman*, October 11, 1938, quoted in S.R. Mehrotra, "The Congress and the Partition of India," Philips and Wainwright, p. 206. A slight but not substantially different version appeared in *The Star of India*, October 11, 1938. See S. H. Zaidi, "Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-1947," also in Philips and Wainwright, p. 261.

36. Ibid., This became the final and official form of this section of the resolution. This is the form which appears in Rashidi's official report as well as in Ahmad, PP. 255-258.

37. There is evidence that the Hindu press, particularly in the Punjab, seized on this resolution and claimed it revealed the League's desire for Pakistan. Abdullah Haroon made this point in an interview with Pir Ali Mohammad Rashidi published in the latter's newspaper, *Moslem Voice*, on April 30, 1945, quoted in Shafi, P. 135. Haroon in the interview mentioned he was pleased with this development because the Hindus would popularize the idea of Pakistan on behalf of the Muslim who could not accomplish task on their

own because of the lack of Muslim newspapers. Thus, Haroon chose to see the matter in a positive light rather than considering the negative effects that might have resulted from the League's adoption of an extremist position at this stage in the All-India negotiations for a communal settlement.

38. Shafi, p. 132, 155, also Philips and ainwright, p. 261. The assertion by one scholar that this resolutoin was "almost surely the brainchild of Mr. Jinnah" is untrue if it is meant by this Jinnah thought of this resolution and drafted it. It is likely, however, that he played at least an indirect part in shaping the final form of the resolution which was accepted a at the conference. The author gives no evidence to support or explain this assertion. See Mary Louise Becker, "All-India Muslim League, 1906-1947," (Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University, 1957), p. 307.

39. See p. 10 above.

40. Rashidi Report, p. 9. Other evidence supporting this interpretation is Haroon's emphasis on Sind's importance to the rest of India in his Welcome Address in which he stresses Sind,s historical importance as symbolized by Moen-jo-daro and its present day significance and potential by the growing seaport of Karachi. *D. G.*, October 9, 1938, p. 6.

41. See extracts from Jinnah's speeches contained in J. Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of M. Jinnah*, Vol. I., p. 30, Ibid. p. 45., quoted in Khalid din Sayeed, *Pakistan the Formative Phase*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 293.

42. M. H. Saiyid, *Mohammed Ali Jinnah, A Political Study*, (Karachi Elite Publishers, 1970), p. 185.

43. See p. 7 above.

44. *D.G.* October 9, 1938, p. 3.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Philips and Wainwright, p. 207.

48. Jinnah was still hopeful a year later when in a speech to the Old Boys of Osmania University on September 28, 1939 he proclaimed, "I still remain a nationalist. I have always believed in a Hindu-Muslim pact." It should be noted too, however, that the context in which he said these words suggests his hope in such a pact was rapidly fading and might not continue much longer. Ahmed, *Speeches and ritings of Mr. Jinnah* Vol. I, p. 87. M. H. Saiyid also quotes this passage as evidence that Jinnah still believed in a Hindu Muslim settlement. Saiyid, p. 216.

49. Interview with Yusuf Haroon, New York City, May 26, 1976.

50. Interview with Pir Hissamuddin Rashidi, Karachi, September 30, 1975.

51. It is doubtful jinnah would have been inclined to let the resolution pass if the Karachi conference had been an annual session of the League. Yusuf Haroon claims that Jinnah himself drew attention to this point and said that because the Karachi conference was only a regional conference, in order for its resolutions to have the force of All-India League policy, they would have to be passed at the annual session of the League, interview, May 26 1976. Sheikh Abdul Majid did introduce Resolution No. 5 at the next annual sessions in Patna but it was not passed and in its place was passed a resolution reverting to the former League position of seeking a suitable constitution that safeguarded Muslim interests. MLA, Annual Sessions at Patna, part III, Vol. 190 Resoltions introduced by Sheikh Abdul Majid., Pirzada, Vol. II, pp. 311-324

52. Interview with Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, Karchi, January 23, 1976. Alavi takes this point a step further and says that Jinnah agreed to the resolution's passage in order to let the resolution be be a warning to the Congress and the British government that unless an equitable settlementwas reached between the two majority communities, the outcome would be a solution such as Pakistan. Interview with Hatim Alavi, Karachi, October 7, 1974.

53. PMA, *Revelations*, Vol. I (unpublished manuscript), p. 23.