

A FRESH LOOK AT THE RADCLIFFE AWARD

By
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The Radcliffe Award resulted in many difficulties for Pakistan. The allocation of the district of Gurdaspur to India caused the greatest resentment among Pakistanis. There was also some conflict over Ferozpur. The delay in publication of the Award, even when it was ready, and the revision of the Award by Radcliffe, led most Pakistanis to believe that it had been changed to make it more favourable to India. In the light of some new documents this paper will try to answer when, where and why Radcliffe revised his award; and that the threat of violence by the Sikhs in the Punjab was the factor which led to most of the revisions so far as the Punjab's boundaries were concerned.

While Mountbatten was working on his partition plan, the Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab were demanding that the province should be divided. The 3rd June Plan included the proposal for the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. Under the plan the non-Muslim majority districts of these Muslim-majority provinces were to be taken away and to be included in Hindustan. It was provided in the plan that two Commissions to demarcate the boundary lines should be set up by the Viceroy. It was also suggested that until the reports of the Boundary Commissions had been put into effect, the provisional boundaries, indicated in the appendix would be used.¹ The appendix gave a list of the Muslim-majority districts of Bengal and the Punjab according to the 1941 census. The list was as follows:

BENGAL

Chittagong Division: Chittagong, Noakhali, Tippera.
Dacca Division: Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur, Memensingh.
Presidency Division: Jessore, Murshidabad, Nadia.
Rajshahi Division: Bogra, Dinajpur, Malda, Pubna, Rangpur.

THE PUNJAB

Lahore Division: Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Sialkot.

Rawalpindi Division, Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi, Shalpur.

Multan Division: Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan, Muzaffargarh.²

Under the 3rd June Plan, the Boundary Commissions were instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Bengal and the Punjab on 'the basis of ascertaining contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. They were also instructed to take into account 'other factors'.³ These factors were not specified in the plan but a provision was made by the British government to take into account the 'special circumstances of the Sikh community in the Punjab'.⁴

The Sikhs were demanding that the Punjab should be divided. But in no single district of the province did the Sikhs constitute a majority. The community numbered about 4 million out of nearly 28 million population of the province.⁵ Since the Sikhs were in a minority in the province, they demanded that the division of the Punjab should not be made merely on the basis of the population but that the boundaries of the two Punjabs should be determined by taking into account other factors, such as the 'relative share of the various communities in the national assets and their contributions to the prosperity of the province'.⁶ The Sikhs demanded that the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission, when constituted, should include these factors. The Sikhs were demanding that the three divisions of Ambala, Jullundur and Lahore plus Lyallpur or the Montgomery districts should be awarded to them.⁷ Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, had warned Mountbatten that the Sikhs were determined to fight if their claims were not seriously considered.⁸

Mountbatten was naturally worried about the Sikh intentions.⁹ Lord Listowel (Secretary of State) also considered the Sikhs 'a very dangerous element in the Punjab situation'. Commenting on Mountbatten's draft partition plan and the Sikh demand to include 'other factors in the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission', Listowel expressed the view that if a Boundary Commission with terms of reference such as the Sikhs demanded would help to keep the Sikhs quiet until the transfer of power, he would support the viceroy's proposal that the Sikh claims should be considered by the Commission. However, he pointed out that 'unless the Boundary Commission were

told to give weight to these factors, it could not do more than to make marginal adjustments in the (district) boundaries.¹⁰ But the 3rd June Plan did not include any reference to these 'other factors'. It was decided that the leaders of the three communities should appoint a committee which would draw up the terms of reference.¹¹ The Congress party, while trying to draft 'fuller terms of reference ... found that in doing so the result achieved was not very satisfactory. When they tried to make a list of 'other factors', it was either too short or too long. It was decided to leave the matter to the Boundary Commission itself.¹² These terms were later accepted by the League also.¹³

Towards the end of June, two Boundary Commissions, one for Bengal and the other for the Punjab, were constituted. Each Commission was composed of four High Court Judges, two Muslims and two non-Muslims. It was also agreed that Congress would include a Sikh in the two persons nominated by them for the Punjab Boundary Commission.¹⁴ The members of the Punjab Boundary Commission were Justice Din Mohammad and Justice Mohammad Munir on behalf of the Muslims¹⁵ and Teja Singh and Mehr Chand Mahajan on behalf of the non-Muslims. The members of the Bengal Boundary Commission were Abu Saleh Mohammad Akram and S.A. Rehman on behalf of the Muslims, and C.C. Biswas and B.K. Mukerji on behalf of the non-Muslims. It was decided that Bengal Commission would also deal with Assam.¹⁶ When the question of the Chairmanship of the Boundary Commission was raised at the Partition Committee's meeting on 26th June, Mountbatten suggested Sir Cyril Radcliffe's name as the Chairman of both the Boundary Commissions.

'The advantage of such a course', in the Viceroy's view, was that 'Sir Cyril Radcliffe would be enabled to adjust any slight loss one State might have to suffer in one particular area by compensating it in another and generally to see that justice was done uniformly to all claims'.¹⁷ Mountbatten's proposal was accepted by the Partition Council and Radcliffe was appointed as the Chairman of both the Boundary Commissions with a final casting vote.¹⁸ On Lord Ismay's (Chief of Staff to Viceroy) proposal¹⁹ it was thought essential to obtain in advance the agreement of the Indian leaders, who included Sardar Baldev Singh on behalf of the Sikhs, that they would accept the awards whatever these might be.²⁰

Sir Cyril arrived in Delhi on July 8, 1947 and stayed with Mountbatten for 48 hours 'to get into the picture'.²¹ This was his first visit to the sub-continent and he knew very little of India. In his first meeting with the Viceroy, Sir Cyril was informed that he had to complete his award within four or five weeks. Radcliffe pointed out that it was a job which would take years to decide properly but he realised the emergency.²²

Meanwhile the Sikhs in the Punjab were becoming troublesome. Sardar Baldev Singh was reported in the press to have said at a meeting on 8th July, the day when Radcliffe arrived in India, that if the decision of the Boundary Commission went against the Sikhs, they would resist it. Although Baldev Singh denied these reports the Viceroy had little doubt that he was talking along these lines.²³ Jenkins was also of the view that the Sikhs would make trouble if the decision based on the Boundary Commission's report was not to their liking.²⁴ Giani Kartar Singh, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, practically delivered an 'ultimatum to the effect that Sikhs would not accept the notional boundaries and would go to guerrilla warfare after 15 August'. He demanded that 'the Sikhs must have at least one canal system' preferably Montgomery; 'they must also have Nankana Sahib', the birth place of the Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith, located in Sheikhupura. The Sikh leader also demanded that the arrangements of the boundary should be such as to bring three-quarters or at least two-thirds of the Sikh population into Eastern Punjab.²⁵

The Muslim League felt concerned at the Sikh demands and the threat to use violence if they were not met. In a meeting of the Partition Council, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah invited the attention of the Committee to the reports that the Sikh leaders were inciting their followers to offer active resistance to decision which they might regard as unfavourable. He also pointed out that active preparations for resistance were being made and said that Sikhs were carrying on the agitation in order to influence the decisions of the Boundary Commission.²⁶

Radcliffe arrived in Lahore on 14 July. Both the parties submitted their cases to him on 18 July.²⁷ The Sikhs wanted to shift the boundary in the Punjab as far as the river Chanab. The Districts of Gurdaspur, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Montgomery and Lyallpur were claimed for inclusion in East Punjab. On the basis of the 1941 Census, all these districts were Muslim-majority areas. Even in the

district of Guradaspur, where the non-Muslims had a majority in Pathankot Tehsil, the percentage of Muslims was 51.14. In other districts claimed for the Eastern Punjab the total Muslim population was as follows:²⁸

District	Total Population	Muslims
Lahore	1,695,375	1,027,772
Sialkot	1,190,497	739,218
Sheikhupura	852,508	542,344

(In Nankana Sahib Tehsil 74.3 per cent population was Muslim)

Lyalpur	1,396,305	877,518
Montgomery	1,329,103	918,564
Gujranwala	912,234	642,706
Gurdaspur	1,152,511	589,923

All the Sikh claims were essentially based on 'other factors'.²⁹ As far as the claims of the Muslim League were concerned, in the Punjab, the party in addition to the notional award wanted Ferozpur, Ludhiana, Jullundur and Hoshiarpur districts. In some tehsils of these districts Muslims were in majority. The percentage of Muslim population in some of these tehsils was as follows:³⁰

Ferozpur	55.2
Zira	65.2
Nakodar	59.2
Jullundur	51.1
Ajanala	59.4

Meanwhile the communal disorder in the Punjab, which had continued since Mountbatten's arrival in India, gained considerable strength.³¹ Fires, stabbings and bomb explosions became almost daily affairs in the province. A report rendered by the Director of Intelligence, as circulated at a Partition Council meeting, indicated that the Sikhs intended to start trouble on a big scale on or about 7th August if

Nankana Sahib was not included by the award of the Boundary Commission in Eastern Punjab.³² It was also reported that the Sikhs were collecting 'large quantities of arms'³³. Some of the instigators of disturbances arrested by the Punjab Police made statements which implicated Master Tara Singh, one of the most prominent leaders of the Akali Dal, in the manufacture of bombs and the collection of arms through Sikh Army officers. Tara Singh was also reported to be involved in plans to blow up Pakistan Special trains, carrying Muslims from Delhi to Lahore and Karachi. A Sikh plan to assassinate the Quaid during the Independence Day ceremonies at Karachi on 15 August was also discovered.³⁴ In view of this information it seemed necessary to arrest Tara Singh if more trouble was to be avoided, but Jenkins advised Mountbatten against such a step.³⁵ Mountbatten also thought that if arrests were made at that stage, the trouble in the Punjab would spread and the announcement of the Award would render the conditions even worse. He proposed to recommend to the Governor of the Punjab that the arrest should be made at about the time of the announcement of Boundary Commission's Award.³⁶ When the issue of the Punjab was put before Congress and the League, Sardar Patel on behalf of his party indicated that the idea of arresting Tara Singh and some other Sikh extremists was not very appealing.³⁷ Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, on the other hand, did not favour postponement of the arrests. In his opinion it was 'unwise to wait to see the reactions of the Sikhs ... (to the Boundary Commission's) Award'.³⁸ Mountbatten, however, as advised by Jenkins³⁹, left the matter of arrests to be dealt with by the new governments of West and East Punjab.⁴⁰

Jenkins had asked Mountbatten for some advance warning of the nature of the Boundary Commission's Award. It was thought that the Award would affect the distribution of police and troops. The request was made in order to make necessary arrangements for it.⁴¹ On August 8, 1947, Abell (Personal Secretary to Viceroy) dispatched a map, along with a note from Beaumont, Radcliffe's secretary, describing the map, to Abbott, the Secretary to Jenkins.⁴² The map showed 'roughly' the boundary Radcliffe proposed to demarcate in his award. It indicated that the Ferozpur and Zira Tehsils in Ferozpur district would be included in Pakistan.⁴³ According to Abbott's recollections the map also included 'some of cis-Ravi parts of Gurdaspur in Pakistan'.⁴⁴ Some of

other documents available now also support the view that Radcliffe had reached the decision to award the Ferozpur and Zira Tehsils to Pakistan. Justice Mohammad Munir, one of the Muslim members of the Punjab Boundary Commission, recalls that Radcliffe distinctly told him, when he was arguing for Muslim claims about these areas, that the Ferozpur headworks would go to Pakistan and he need not say anything about them.⁴⁵ Justice Din Mohammad, the other Muslim Judge, also reported to the government of Pakistan that Radcliffe had stopped him from arguing 'so obvious a case' as the Tehsils of Zira and Ferozpur.⁴⁶ A.N. Khosla, Chairman Central Waterways, Irrigations and Navigation, had also recorded that Radcliffe's mind was working in the direction of giving Ferozpur and Zira to Pakistan in return for giving Gurdaspur and parts of the Lahore district to East Punjab.⁴⁷

On the strength of the above -quoted documents it is not unreasonable to say that Radcliffe was going to award Ferozpur and Zira Tehsils to Pakistan; at least until 6 August he was thinking on those lines. However, the Award, as announced later, placed these Tehsils, along with the greater part of Gurdaspur, in Hindustan. The questions 'why' and 'when' did Radcliffe change his mind about these Tehsils seem important. The controversial nature of this decision left its marks on Anglo-Muslim relations too. The allocation of these Muslim-majority areas to India was greatly resented by many Pakistanis. It was generally suspected in Pakistan that the Award was changed at the last moment for political reasons as result of improper pressure from Mountbatten. Most of the British historians and administrators, of course, rejected 'the Pakistanis charge'⁴⁸ and stated that the Viceroy had no desire to influence the Boundary Commission's decision in any way. Mountbatten himself recorded: 'I have taken greatest pains not to get mixed up in the deliberations of the (Boundary) Commission in any way ...'⁴⁹

No document is available to show that Mountbatten issued any written instruction to the Boundary Commission or to its Chairman Sir Cyril Radcliffe. But there are some documents which clearly show that Radcliffe altered his Boundary Award after he had discussed it with Mountbatten. According to Radcliffe, he showed the first draft of the proposed award 'to the authorities in Delhi and on further consideration, he made the Award in terms which departed from the first draft'.⁵⁰ The apparent reason for the change was the Sikh problem in the Punjab.

In a 'private meeting', which was held at Ismay's house on or about 9 August, to discuss the date on which the Awards were to be announced, Mountbatten, who was worried about the Sikh intentions to make trouble, told Radcliffe that the Sikh attitude had become rather worse than had been anticipated and that when Radcliffe was 'balancing up' the boundaries of East and West Pakistan the Viceroy hoped that he would 'bear the Sikh problem in mind'. The details of the discussions, as recorded in a letter written to Ismay by Mountbatten at a later stage, show that Mountbatten also remembered saying to Radcliffe that 'any generosity to Pakistan should be given more in Bengal than in the Punjab since there was no Sikh problem in Bengal'.⁵¹ No record of this important conversation was dictated by Viceroy to his staff as Mountbatten usually did after meetings.⁵² It is evident from his letter containing the details of the meeting, that although Mountbatten did not actually advise Radcliffe to assign Ferozpur and Zira to India, at least not on record, he left Radcliffe in no doubt what his personal views were; he wished Radcliffe to be generous to the Sikhs in the Punjab. It seems that Radcliffe gave some weight to the Viceroy's views and decided to award Ferozpur and Zira Tehsils to East Punjab. Both Tehsils had a considerable Sikh-minority.⁵³

Mountbatten's decision to defer the publication of Radcliffe Award until after the transfer of power was also taken on account of the Sikh problem in the Punjab. On 22 July, in a letter to Radcliffe, Mountbatten had requested him to have the Award ready by 10 August⁵⁴ because he intended to publish the Awards by 12 August. Later Mountbatten changed his mind. When on 9 August it was stated in a staff meeting that Sir Cyril would be ready that evening to announce the Award, and that its publication would result in severe disturbances, Mountbatten felt an early announcement 'less desirable'. He thought 'the earlier it (the Award) was published, the more the British would have to bear the responsibility for the disturbances...'.⁵⁵ Consequently, although Radcliffe submitted the Award to Mountbatten 'on or about 12 August',⁵⁶ the Awards were not released until 16th August.

Under the Punjab Boundary Commission Award, the Muslim-majority Tehsils of Gurdaspur, Batala, Pathankot, Ferozpur, Zira, Ajnala, Nakodar and Jullundur were assigned to India. Under the Bengal Boundary Commission's Award, Calcutta was assigned to India, un-

doubtedly because the majority of the population was Hindu. The term 'other factors' had obviously not worked in favour of the Muslim League which claimed Calcutta because of economic considerations.⁵⁷ The other main features of the Bengal Award were that the whole of the Muslim-majority district of Murshidabad and the greater part of the Muslim-majority district of Nadia were given to India. Parts of Jessore district were also transferred from East Bengal to West Bengal. Under the notional award these districts had been in Muslim Bengal. However, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where the population was almost entirely non-Muslim (i.e. Buddhist), were awarded to Pakistan.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, West Bengal gained substantially over East Bengal under the Award.⁵⁹ The Award of the Bengal Boundary Commission regarding Sylhet resulted in the transfer of the whole of the district, less four thanas, from the province of Assam to East Bengal.⁶⁰

The Awards, as was perhaps not unexpected, satisfied neither party. However, Congress had little cause for complaint. The only complaint against the Award from the Indian side was the allocation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Pakistan.⁶¹ Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah called the Award 'unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse'. In his view it was not a judicial but a political award.⁶² Some other Muslim leaders also condemned the Award. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar called it 'a parting kick by the British'. I. I. Chundrigar even suggested that 'the decision might persuade Pakistan not to remain in the Commonwealth'. While reporting these anti-British feelings to London, the British High Commissioner in India, Sir Terence Shone, observed that the general feeling among the Muslims was that the Award was one-sided and most unfair to Pakistan. In the Punjab, Sikhs and Hindus were also critical of the Award but Shone reported that the Muslim side was more strongly critical than the others of the Awards. He believed that this was particularly due to the decision regarding the Lahore and Gurdaspur districts.⁶³

Radcliffe's decision to bisect the Gurdaspur district and to award its greater part to India caused the greatest resentment among Pakistanis; they thought that if India had not been awarded Gurdaspur, she hardly could have intervened in Kashmir as there was not other land access to the State from India. They implied that but for this decision there would have been no Kashmir problem. However some British

works suggest that 'Kashmir was not in any body's mind'⁶⁴ when the Award was being drawn and that even the Pakistanis themselves had not realized the importance of Gurdaspur to Kashmir until the Indian Forces actually entered Kashmir.⁶⁵ The latter observation is based on the fact that when the Awards were placed before the representatives of India and Pakistan, the Pakistani side did not complain that the allocation of Gurdaspur to India had made it possible for the new India to move directly into Kashmir. It is correct that the subject of Gurdaspur was not raised by the Pakistan side at that meeting but it should not be forgotten that the Muslim leaders had already conveyed to the Viceroy that they attached great importance to Gurdaspur. Before the Awards were formally announced, some details of the decision had leaked out. When Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali received information about the likely decision on Gurdaspur, Liaquat asked Choudhary Mohammad Ali, one of the two secretaries to the Partition Council, on 9 August, to see Ismay⁶⁶ and convey to him from Jinnah that 'if it proved true, that the Gurdaspur district or even a large part of it had been given to East Punjab by the Boundary Commission, this would be regarded as most serious' and that 'it would be considered by the Pakistan government a political and not a judicial decision'.⁶⁷

The suggestion that Kashmir was not in anybody's mind also seems too much to assume. Some documents available now point to the fact that at least the Viceroy and Maharajah of Kashmir realized that if the Boundary Commission provided India with any land communication with the State of Kashmir, the whole nature of the future relations between the State and India would be affected.⁶⁸ Since Radcliffe had destroyed all his papers in connection with the Boundary Commission,⁶⁹ and the large number of the British documents about Kashmir are still not available,⁷⁰ we cannot tell whether this point was ever made to Radcliffe. But it is evident that while discussing the notional award Nehru suggested to Mountbatten that the district should be divided between India and Pakistan.⁷¹ Mountbatten informed his staff on 12 May that the Boundary Commission would be instructed to arrange for the hand over from one side to the other of any area within border district where there was clearly a majority of the opposite community.⁷² It implied that Gurdaspur could be divided and at least the Tehsil of Pathankot, where Muslims were only 38.8 per cent, could be awarded to

India. Although the final instructions to the Boundary Commission did not include the above mentioned point, a lead in that direction was given to the Boundary Commission by the Viceroy when in press conference he said that he would be surprised if Gurdaspur, notionally awarded to Pakistan, remained wholly in Pakistan.⁷³

Mounbatten's reference to Gurdaspur in his press conference and later the knowledge that Radcliffe had first awarded Ferozpur to Pakistan but had changed his decision,⁷⁴ led the Pakistan government to believe that the change was made as a result of some pressure from Mounbatten. The controversy became a source of concern for the British government too, when during a debate on Kashmir at the UNO, the representative of the United Kingdom learned that the government of Pakistan were thinking of introducing at the Security Council the issue of the last-minute alterations in the Radcliffe Award. The British delegation anticipated that Sir Zafrullah Khan would associate Mounbatten's name with what had been done. Zafrullah had told a member of the British delegation that he had evidence of the Punjab Boundary Commission's Award having been tampered with to the great disadvantage of Pakistan, and its publication having been delayed.⁷⁵

A note by Noel-Baker (Secretary of State for Commonwealth), to Attlee (the British P.M.) shows that the CRO (Commonwealth Relations Office) had no 'Precise knowledge of the basis of these allegations against Mounbatten'⁷⁶. But it is evident from the same note that London had some information about the alterations made in the Award 'to assign the East Punjab a salient in the original demarcation of the West Punjab boundary which included Gurdaspur'⁷⁷. The information was based on an interview between Radcliffe and Arthur Henderson, the Minister of State. Radcliffe had told Henderson that he had showed the first draft of the proposed Award 'to the authorities in Delhi'⁷⁸ and on further consideration he had made the Award in terms which departed from the first draft. Henderson did not attempt to elicit from Radcliffe at that time whether the departure from the first draft had been suggested to him from any quarter. While informing Attlee of the details of the interview, Noel-Baker took the view that it did not seem desirable to ask Sir Cyril whether the alteration in the Award was made on Mounbatten's advice. Instead, he proposed that Zafrullah should be discouraged from bringing the matter before the Security Council.⁷⁹

Attlee agreed with this course and suggested that the 'personal message' to Zafrullah should not 'expressly deny' what Zafrullah had said.⁸⁰ Accordingly, in a 'private and confidential' message it was suggested to Zafrullah that it 'would be most unwise and highly improper to introduce the allegations (in the UNO) because we should certainly contest them as improper because they would affect the honour and reputation of the King's representative in India who has no means of defending himself in public'.⁸¹ It appears that this approach to Zafrullah was successful; he decided not to raise the issue.⁸²

But before Zafrullah's decision to drop the matter became known, Mounbatten, who felt concerned over the charges against him, decided to prepare a brief refuting the charges, and sent it to Gopalswami, the Indian representative at the UNO.⁸³ As the charges related to period before the transfer of power, it was felt in Britain that it would be appropriate for the UK representative at the UN, and not for the Indian delegation, to deal with them. Accordingly Mounbatten was requested to inform the Indian delegation of this decision.⁸⁴ Meanwhile Zafrullah's decision not to raise the matter apparently became known to Mounbatten. But he was so satisfied with his 'cast-iron reply' to Pakistan's charges that he said he would 'almost prefer the matter to be ventilated and disposed of once and for all'.⁸⁵ This implied that Mounbatten did not wish the British government to discourage Zafrullah from raising the subject at the UNO. However, the British policy of avoiding any public discussion was not altered. Besides some officials in the CRO believed that Mounbatten's case was actually not so cast-iron as he thought.⁸⁶ The British government considered it wise to let the matter drop.

Mounbatten, who perhaps was not satisfied with this policy, informed London that he had learned that Liaquat Ali Khan intended to publish Abell's letter of 8 August. Mounbatten anticipated that a reply would have to be made. He suggested that the reply should either come from the British government or Radcliffe himself. Mounbatten proposed that a statement should be prepared in advance to be issued immediately in case Liaquat decided to publish the letter.⁸⁷ The British authorities were not certain that the government of Pakistan would in fact take the action which Mounbatten had feared. However, they agreed that a denial should be issued if an allegation were made.⁸⁸ They

decided to prepare an answer to a 'planted' Parliamentary question which could be asked by some member at a convenient moment.⁸⁹ It was decided to consult Radcliffe about the contents.⁹⁰ When a draft was forwarded for his advice, some phrases were amended by Radcliffe. The full version and the amendments (underlined) were as follows:

'Draft Statement to be made by Parliamentary Spokesman.

Sir George Abell's letter of 8th August 1947, which has been made public by the Pakistan authorities, communicated to Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, a provisional (a rough statement of a proposed) boundary between East and West Punjab. The information contained in it was derived from Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman of the Boundary Commission, as a result of a very proper enquiry from Sir Evan Jenkins whether he could have advance information about the boundary so that the best dispositions might be made of military forces and police.

The boundary indicated by the communication of the 8th August differed from that contained in Sir Cyril's final (the Award) of the 13 August (as ultimately made by Sir Cyril in its treatment of and) in respect of small area in the Ferozpur District. I understand from Sir Cyril that he found the treatment of this area a question of considerable difficulty and on this point he reached a final conclusion differing from that which he was disposed to adopt at a slightly earlier stage (the time when Sir George Abell asked him for advance information).

Sir Cyril has informed me that his award of the 13th August was the result of his own unfettered judgement and that at no stage was any attempt (of the kind) made by the Governor General to influence his decision. That this is so I have no doubt at all.⁹¹

Lord Ismay in a letter to Mountbatten expressed the hope that Radcliffe's willingness to say that 'the Boundary Commission's Award represented the result of his own unfettered judgement' would ease Mountbatten's mind.⁹² When the draft statement reached Mountbatten for his comments he suggested that the last sentence should be amended to read as that no attempts were made 'by the Governor-General or any other person' to influence the decision.⁹³ No decision was taken by the CRO in regard to Mountbatten's suggestion. R.H. Carter (Under Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations) expressed the view that before deciding exactly how to word that portion of the

statement, it would be better to see 'what in fact Pakistan's allegation is, if it is ever made'⁹⁴ The real reason for not accepting Mountbatten's proposed amendment however, appears to be that Carter found 'a certain awkwardness in any wording that suggests that Radcliffe was absolutely aloof' because Radcliffe had told him that 'he did quite deliberately seek the views of all sorts of people including British officials and some of these conversations took place at a very late stage'.⁹⁵

As the charges against Mountbatten were not officially brought forward by Liaquat's government, the British denial was not issued. But perhaps it is significant that the criticism of Radcliffe's Award in Pakistani newspapers, and by some individuals, which in fact never stopped, was ignored by the British government. Some years later, while considering the question whether the criticisms of the Award called for any action from Britain, the CRO took the view that any statement from the office would have 'little effect' and would only 'exaggerate the matter'.⁹⁶ Sir Lawrence Grafftey-Smith, the UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, once observed that 'History as written in Pakistan will spot-light the 'when' and 'where' as much as the 'why' of Lord Radcliffe's revision of his Ferozepur Award and will cite Lord Mountbatten's press conference of June 4th, 1947⁹⁷..... as evidence of British prejudice against Pakistan'.⁹⁸ He thought that there was little hope of dispelling local criticism of the Radcliffe Award. The best line for the British, in his view, was to refuse 'to accept any Pakistan's suggestion of influence on the part of Mountbatten'.⁹⁹ The British government, as we have seen, had been following this course for some years.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. For full text of the Statement of 3rd June 1947, see N. Mansergh (ed) *The Transfer of Power, 1942-47*, (hereafter as T. P.) Vol. XI, document No. 45. *The Transfer of Power* is in 12 Volumes; the first four volumes have been edited by Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby, and the remaining by N. Mansergh and Penderal Moon.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*

4. Statement by Arthur Henderson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, (Parl. Debs), 5th Ser, HoC. Volume 440, 14 July 1947, No. 74.
5. Figures quoted in a letter (hereafter as Ltr) from Listowel to Mounbatten, 9 May 1947, T.P., X, 371.
6. Raja Patiala to Miesville, 20 May 1947, T.P., X, 492.
7. These 'unreasonable demands' as Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor Punjab called them, were something akin to the idea of the third Central State, Khalistan. (Jenkins to Mounbatten, 3 May 1947) T.P., X, 298.)
8. However, in order 'not to annoy the British', Giani Kartar Singh a prominent Sikh leader, had told Jenkins that the fight would start after the British departure from India. Note by Jenkins, 10 April 1947, T.P., X, 115.
9. Meeting (hereafter Mtg) between Mounbatten, Jinnah and Liaquat, 4 May 1947, T.P., X, 310.
10. Listowel to Mounbatten, 9 May 1947, T.P., X, 371.
11. Mounbatten's Press Conference, 4 June, 1947, T.P., XI, 59.
12. Ltr., Nehru to Mounbatten, 12 June 1947, T.P., XI, 158.
13. Interview between the Viceroy and Jinnah, 23 June 1947, T.P., XI, 311.
14. Minutes of Viceroy's Mtg., 13 June 1947, T.P., XI, 175.
15. Jinnah to Mounbatten, 24 June 1947, T.P., XI, 317.
16. It was thought that the establishment of separate Commission for Assam would cause delay. (Minutes of Viceroy's Staff Meeting 25 June 1947, T.P., XI, 344.)
17. Partition Council's Meeting 26 June 1947, T.P., XI, 354.
18. It is significant that Radcliffe was entrusted with entire responsibility for drawing the boundaries before both Commissions

started functioning. This indicates that it was thought obvious that Muslim and non-Muslim Judges would not agree on anything.

19. Viceroy's Staff Meeting, Item 3, 10 June 1947, T.P., XI, 126.
20. Viceroy's Personal Report (V.P.R.) No.17, 16 August 1947, T.P., XII, 489.
21. V.P.R. No. 12, 11 July 1947, T.P., XII, 65.
22. Mountbatten's Staff Meeting, 8 July 1947, T.P., XII, 12, also Note by Mountbatten, undated, T.P., XII, 111.
23. V.P.R. No. 12, 11 July 1947, T.P., XII, 65.
24. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 10 July 1947, T.P., XII, 56.
25. Meeting between Jenkins and Kartar Singh, 10 July 1947, Enclosure to 56, T.P., XII.
26. Mtg. of the Partition Council, 10 July 1947, T.P., XII, 52.
27. The Public sittings of the Commissions were held from 21 July to 31 July 1947.
28. All figures quoted above are taken from the report of Justice Munnir, 5 Aug. 1947, Microfilms from National Archives of Pakistan, Partition Proceedings, (produced by Partition Secretariat of Govt. of India between 1947-50), Ch. IV, pp. 238-39, POS 3658, IOR.
29. The Sikh claims would have left West Pakistan almost hopeless economically and utterly hopeless strategically. See for details of this view Spate, 'Partition of India and Prospects of Pakistan', *Geographical Review*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, January 1948, p.10.
30. Figures quoted are taken from the report of Justice Munnir, 5 August 1947, Partition Proceedings, p.243. The Muslim case was described as 'miserable to the point of folly', though it was recognized that 'it would have given a single and workable line. (Spate, *Geographical Review*, p.25.)

31. For details of Communal disorder in Punjab, see letters from Jenkins to Mountbatten, 14 July 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 103 and of 30 July 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 292.
32. Viceroy Conference Paper 140, circulated at Partition Council mtg., 27 July 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 250.
33. The report added that the Muslims were aware of most Sikh preparations and were making counter-preparations themselves, 27 July 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 250.
34. Statement by Captain Savage, a police officer in Punjab C.I.D. Control, who was employed in investigations of disturbance cases. Record of Mtg. between Viceroy, Jinnah and Patel, 5 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 345.
35. Jenkins, while sending the information about Tara Singh's subversive activities expressed the view that although 'the character (Tara Singh) mentioned seems to me to be cracked, the question is whether to put him in the bag now or chance it. Either way is bad; on the whole I would chance it'. Note by Jenkins to Abell, 4 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 334.
36. Abell to Jenkins, 4 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 346.
37. Record of Interview between Viceroy, Jinnah, Liaquat, Patel and Savage, 5 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 345.
38. Note by Abell to Mountbatten, 6 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 361.
39. Jenkins sent the advice after discussing the matter with Trivedi and Mudie, the Governors designated for East and West Punjab respectively. Jenkins expressed the view that 'the arrest of Tara Singh and his friends now or simultaneously with the announcement of the Boundary Commission's Award would not improve and might worsen the situation and would lead to sharp reactions among the Sikhs. He therefore, suggested to leave the matter for the future governments of West and East Punjab. (Jenkins to Mountbatten, 9 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 403).
40. Mountbatten approved Jenkins proposal and telegraphed his

acceptance next day. Footnote 3, *T.P.*, XII, 637.

41. The request was made in late July when Mountbatten was visiting Lahore. It was forwarded to Beaumont, Radcliffe's Secretary, on 21 July 1947. (Note by Abell to Beaumont, 21 July 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 190.)
42. Note by Abell to Abbott, 8 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 377. Mountbatten maintained that Abell sent this letter without his knowledge. (Tel. Mountbatten to Ismay, April 1948, Pol. Dept. Transfer of Power Papers, L/P & J/10/119 f III, (*T.P.*, XII, P.579.) However, it was Mountbatten's intention to send the information. See his letter to Jenkins 6th August 1947, (*T.P.*, XII, 359) in which he wrote 'I have not forgotten your request that you should be given advance warning of the Boundary Commission's Award and I will try to secure this'.
43. Both map and the descriptive note were in the possession of Pakistan government. (*T.P.* XII, 377 footnote). Same claim was made by S. Ghiauddin on behalf of the government of Pakistan in a letter to Sir F. Mudie, 19th November 1968, Mudie Collection, Mss. Eur. F.164/63, IOR.
44. Ltr., Jenkins to Prof. Michael, 27 November 1967, Jenkins Papers, Mss. Eur. D. 807/3, IOR.
45. Masooma Hassan (ed.), *Pakistan in the Changing World*, (Karachi, 1978), p.95.
46. Quoted by Mohammad, Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p.219.
47. Note by Khosla to Nehru, 8 August 1947 *T.P.*, XII, Enclosure 395. It may be remembered that under notional award Ferozpur district was included in Eastern Punjab while the Gurdaspur district was in West Punjab.
48. Moore, *Escape From Empire*, P.327. Hugh Tinker, 'Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab', *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXVI, 4, 1977, pp. 695-704. Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, p.309.

49. V.P.R., No. 17, 10 August 1947, T.P., XII, 459.
50. Radcliffe gave this information to Arthur Henderson. Noel Baker reported this in a note to AUK, 26 February 1948, Serial No. 432, Political Department's Transfer of Power Papers, (1) T & S 10), All Systems Against Mountbatten, L.P. & 1/10/119, 1472.
51. Mountbatten to Ismay, 2 April 1948, Ismay Papers, III, 7/24, Liddle Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.
52. The reason given by Mountbatten, at a later stage, for not keeping a record of that meeting was 'partly because of the immense pressure we were then working under and partly because the conversation was of such a very off-the-record nature'. (Mountbatten to Ismay, 2 April 1948, Ismay Papers III 7/24). However, it is of interest to note that Mountbatten, at the end of his letter containing the details of that meeting, asked Ismay to burn it. But obviously Ismay did not act on the advice and the letter was not destroyed.
53. 'The proportion of the Sikhs in the population of this area was nearly double that of their average percentage of 13.2 in the Punjab'. Mohd. Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p.219. The Muslim population in Ferozepur was 55.2 percent and in Zira 65.2 percent. Justice Munir's report, 5 August 1947, Partition Proceedings, p.243.
54. Mountbatten to Radcliffe, 22 July 1947, T.P. XII, 200.
55. Minutes of Viceroy's Staff Mtg., 9 August 1947, T.P. XII, 389.
56. Memo by Minister of State for C.R., 20 August 1947, L.B. (47), F.G. 3718/3568, Public Record Office, London (PRO).
57. 'Radcliffe hesitated for a long time over Calcutta's fate. There was, he thought, much logic in Jinnah's claim to it. So there might be a unitary flow of Jute from field to mill to port. In the end he felt its Hindu population had to overrule economic consideration'. Collins, I., Lappierre, D., *Freedom at Midnight*,

(Glasgow, 1975), p.212.

58. The reason for the allotment was that 'the district was completely isolated from West Bengal. (Confidential Report for Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (S of S. for CR) on Events in India and Pakistan, 15-20 August 1947, Information Department (subject) Files, L/U/42/12 IOR). According to Mountbatten the whole life of the people of the Hill Tracts depended upon East Bengal. (V.P.R., No. 17, 16 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 489.)
59. Nearly 6,000 square miles of territory with a population of 3.5 million Muslims, that had been provisionally assigned to Pakistan, were served from it and transferred to India'. (*The Emergence of Pakistan*, p.200.)
60. Tel., Mountbatten to S. of S. for India, 14 August 1947. High Commissioner and Consular Archives (India) Correspondence, D.O.133/59, (Boundary Commission's Award), P.R.O.
61. Minutes of Mtg. between Viceroy and the Representatives of India and Pakistan, 16 August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 487.
62. However, as Muslims had agreed to abide by it in advance, Jinnah asked them 'as honourable people' to abide by it. Broadcast from Radio Pakistan, 31 August 1947. S. Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah*, (Karachi, 1981), p.643.
63. Report from United Kingdom High Commissioner (UKHC) (1) to S. of S. for C.R., 19 August 1947, War Staff Files, 'Political Development in India and Pakistan', L/WS/L/1034, IOR. The Radcliffe Award had transferred part of Lahore district from West Punjab to East Punjab. The greater part of Gurdaspur had also been awarded to India.
64. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, p.355.
65. Tinker, *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXVI, 4 pp. 701-2.
66. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, pp. 218-19.

67. V.P.R., No. 17, 16 August 1947, Para 9, *T.P.* XII, 489.
68. During a discussion on the question of accession of the Indian States to either of the two Dominions, Mountbatten observed that Kashmir could join either Dominion provided part of Gurdaspur were put into East Punjab by the Boundary Commission. (Record of Interview between Viceroy and the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharajah of Indore, 4th August 1947, *T.P.*, XII, 335.) The Maharajah of Kashmir mentioned the possibility of holding a referendum in his State to decide whether to join Pakistan or India provided the Boundary Commission awarded him land communication between Kashmir and India. (V.P.R., No. 17, 16 August, *T.P.*, XII, 489).
69. See footnote in *T.P.*, XII, p.579.
70. A large number of files relating to Kashmir, (L/P&J/13/1850-1948, Coll. 49, IOR.) were not available for consultation on 2 April 1984, when I last visited India Office Library, London.
71. Minutes of Viceroy's Mtg. II May 1947, *T.P.*, X, 404. Jenkins the Governor of Punjab, who was also present at the meeting, speaking from his personal knowledge as a former Deputy Commissioner of Gurdaspur stated that it was not possible to divide the district because the population was fairly equally mixed throughout the district. (*T.P.*, X, 404.)
72. Minutes of Viceroy's 31st Mtg., 12 May 1947, *T.P.*, X, 414.
73. Mountbatten's Press Conference, 4 June 1947, S. Hasan (ed.), *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Transfer of Power*, (Karachi, 1966), p.252.
74. Apparently the government of Pakistan's knowledge was based on the map and the descriptive note sent by Abell to Abbott on August 8, 1947. According to Abbott the note included 'some cis-Ravi parts of Gurdaspur in Pakistan'. (Ltr., Jenkins to Michael, 27 November 1967, Jenkins Paper, D.807/3 IOR.) Mudie, the the new Governor of the Punjab, found Abell's note in the papers left by Jenkins and handed it over to the govern-

- ment of Pakistan. The map and note were in possession of Pakistan. (T.P., XII, 377, Footnote.)
75. Mounbatten thought that evidence quoted by Zafrullah was probably the letter from Abell to Abbott of 8 August. Mounbatten to Jenkins, 19 March 1948, L/P & J/10/119.
 76. Noel-Baker to Attlee, 25 February 1948, 3/48, *ibid.*
 77. *Ibid.*
 78. Radcliffe probably meant Mounbatten. No record of this meeting was kept by Mounbatten. But he mentioned this meeting in a letter to Ismay, 2 April 1948, Ismay Papers, III, 7/24.
 79. Note by Noel-Baker to Attlee, 26 February 1948, 4/48, L/P & J/10/119.
 80. *Ibid.*
 81. Tel., Noel-Baker to Zafrullah, 27 February 1948, *ibid.*
 82. Note by Paul Patrick, 2 March 1948, *ibid.*
 83. Tel., UKHC (I), to CRO, 28 February 1948, *ibid.*
 84. Paul Patrick (CRO) to Ismay, 2 March 1948, *ibid.*
 85. Mounbatten to Noel-Baker, 2 March 1948, *ibid.*
 86. Tel. H.A.F. Rumbold (CRO) to B.R. Curzon (member of the British Delegation) 25 March 1948, *ibid.*
 87. Tel., Mounbatten to Ismay, received on 3 April 1948, *ibid.*
 88. Carter to Radcliffe, 7 April 1948, *ibid.*
 89. Hugh Tinker, *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXVI, 4, p.703.
 90. Carter to Radcliffe, 7 April 1948, L/P & J/10/119.
 91. Hugh Tinker, *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXVI, 4, pp.703-4.
 92. Ismay to Mounbatten, 13 April 1948, Ismay Papers, III, 7/28.
 93. UKHC (I) to CRO, 22 April 1948, L/P & J/10/119, IOR.

94. Carter to Shone, UKHC (I), 28 April 1948, *ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*
96. CRO to UKHC (P), 1950, F 4115/14, Foreign Office Papers, F.O. 371/84232, PRO.
97. In which Mounthatten said he would be surprised if the Boundary Commission decided to give whole of the Gurdaspur district to Pakistan.
98. Smith to Liesching, P/66 Sec., 26 January 1951, F.O. 371/92869, PRO (London).
99. *Ibid.*