
PROSPECTS AND REPERCUSSIONS OF TURKIYE'S INCLUSION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

Turkiye's accession to the European Union has been considered one of the most debatable cases of European Union enlargement policies. Several complex external domestic issues have led to the complication of its accession to the European Union. Moreover, it brings forth geographic, cultural, and religious problems in the European continent and its organizational ability limits. Although Türkiye's accession to the European Union appears farther away, it is operationally incorporated into the European Union in various ways: collaboration through business transactions, foreign and security affairs, and energy affairs. Hence, it is significant to evaluate whether Türkiye's candidacy for the European Union is still plausible, seeing several hurdles the member countries create in integration into its formal membership. The present paper assesses the issues faced by Türkiye to get membership in the European Union. Moreover, it provides the prospects of Turkish ties with the European Union. The report delves into the Turkish candidacy for the European Union. It also provides an introduction and the historical background of the relationship between Türkiye and the European Union.

Keywords: Cooperation, Competition, Convergence, European Union, Türkiye

INTRODUCTION

The ties between the European Union bloc and the Republic of Türkiye were created in 1959 and officially shaped in the 1963 Ankara Accord (Karpat, 2022; Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Indeed, Türkiye is the leading partner of the European Union in the Persian Gulf countries and holds membership in the European Union-Türkiye Customs Union. Moreover, the European Union and Türkiye hold a no man's territory stretching Bulgaria and Greece (Katsoulas, 2022; Najslava, 2021).

Since 1987, the Republic of Türkiye has been a candidate to access the European Union bloc of European countries (Cendrowicz, 2009), though, since 2016, the accession discussions between the two have held up. The European Union has blamed and censured Türkiye for the supposed human rights infringements (Kramer, 2022; Toksabay & Gumrukcu, 2017). In 2017, European Union officials stated that Türkiye's planned policies infringed the Copenhagen norms of admissibility for a country to be admitted to a European Union membership (Reiners & Turhan, 2021).

Moreover, the long-term budget proposal of the European Union for the 2021-2027 period did not include Türkiye for enlargement talks, and it included a Western Balkan Strategy for its enlargement (Najslova, 2021). Also, on 26 June 2018, the European Union stated that the Council notes that Türkiye has been moving further away from the European Union. Therefore, Türkiye's accession negotiations have effectively reached a standstill, and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Therefore, no further work toward the modernization of the European Union-Türkiye Customs Union is foreseen.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A systematic review approach was used to conduct this research. This technique establishes the research objectives & comprehensively examines the subject's literature (Komba & Lwoga, 2020). First, the study results are categorized per the subject's topic (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). Second, the study ranks classified data into categories (Pawson et.al., 2005). Third, the study's flow is determined by evaluating classified material and titles (Rahi, 2017). Finally, the integrity guarantee is maintained by comparing the research subjects and their contents (Victor, 2008).

Consequently, this technique was selected, and the associated processes were observed. Reviewing the relevant literature resulted in accumulating data and information coded according to the study goals. First, the coded data were grouped by subject. Then, after classifying and merging the issues, they were ordered by degree of connection.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After the Ottoman Empire's breakdown in WW1, the Turkish radicals headed by Atatürk took the country's power. Atatürk, the President of Türkiye, passed several reforms that included secularization and industrialization. In addition, it aimed at Europeanizing or westernizing Türkiye (Duzgun, 2022; Erdogan, 2022). All over the Second World War, Türkiye remained neutral in War till February 1945, when it allied with the Allies. Besides, in 1947, Türkiye participated in the Marshal Plan and, in 1949, got membership in the Council of Europe, and in 1952, became a member of the US-headed NATO Alliance (Reiners & Turhan, 2021).

Türkiye supported the USA and Western Europe during the Cold War, as stated by the Turkish political analyst Meltem Ahiska who outlined that the Turkish standpoint regarding Europe was that Europe had been an object of desire and a source of frustration for Turkish national identity in a long and strained history (Ahiska, 2003; Najslova, 2021).

Indeed, Türkiye's foreign policies are based on West-based reforms carried out by Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Türkiye (Alaranta, 2022; Danforth, 2022; Oran, 2022). The policies stressed close cooperation with the Western world, particularly with the USA, NATO, and the European nations (Baracani, 2021; Oran, 2022). After the Cold War between the USSR and the USA, Turkish foreign policy followed the diversification of relationships with other countries like

the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Balkan countries (Aras, 2022; Oran, 2022).

In particular, Türkiye has vigorously sought membership in the European Union bloc. Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government has followed Neo-Ottomanism (Bechev, 2022; Cengiz, 2022; Duzgun, 2022; Murinson, 2009; Taspinar, 2008). The doctrine emphasized Turkish ties with the Islamic states, especially the Middle Eastern one (Aras, 2022), as a natural balance and diversified foreign policy (Baracani, 2021; Kubilay, 2013; Oran, 2022).

Turkish Ties with the European Union

Türkiye sought a close relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC). That collaboration was accomplished through the charter of an association agreement popularly recognized as the Ankara Agreement, ratified in 1963. Nevertheless, the significant aspect of that accord was creating a Customs Union that could facilitate Türkiye to deal in commodities and agricultural goods with the European countries without any constraints (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). The key objective of the Ankara Agreement is to realize continuous improvement in living conditions in Türkiye and the European Economic Community through accelerated economic progress and the harmonious expansion of trade and to reduce the disparity between the Turkish economy and the European Economic Community (Ozcelik, 2022).

However, the Council of Europe blamed Türkiye for moving for an autocratic regime. In 2018, the European Union announced to the Council notes that Türkiye has been moving further away from the European Union (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Therefore, Türkiye's accession negotiations have reached a standstill, and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing. Therefore, no further work toward the modernization of the EU-Türkiye Customs Union is foreseen (Bilgin & Bilgin, 2021). Moreover, the European Union stated it was especially concerned about the continuing and deeply worrying backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression (Prakas, 2018; Kramer, 2022; Yilmaz, 2022).

Turkish Strategic Position

The strategic position of Türkiye has made it one of the most vital countries in Europe. Because Türkiye is strategically placed, it is on par with the Soviet Union regarding the importance of the European countries bloc, namely the European Union (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Moreover, its significance dates back to the historical relationship between Europe since the Ottoman Empire (Duzgun, 2022). Consequently, for several centuries, the relationship between Europe with Türkiye has been characterized by cooperation and convergence—for example, in the fields of socioeconomic solid and racial interaction between the Europeans and the Ottoman Empire throughout the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries (Duzgun, 2022).

However, along with the ancient ties, rampant conflict and rivalry existed between the two, particularly during the Ottoman-

Habsburg wars in the eighteenth century (Duzgun, 2022). Nevertheless, a code of honor existed between the conflicting rivals during the wars, which recognized and legitimized sovereignty (Deringil, 2007). Thus, in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was permitted to the Concert of Europe and soon became a part of the developing global laws of that era (Duzgun, 2022; Hale, 2002; Hanioglu, 2010).

That conflicting synthesis of divergence and collaboration existed for Türkiye and Europe all over ancient times. Indeed, Türkiye's relations and the European nations have been problematic, disputed, and twisted for a long time (Arp & Polanco, 2022). However, despite the intensity and length of time, the final period of the ties between the two continues to haunt political scientists. Hence, the present research paper concisely narrates the development of the EU-Türkiye ties and delineates the future era's possible developments. Finally, it concludes by deliberating the connotations of these developments for the USA.

Uncertain Future

The prospects of membership in the European Union were entrenched in the 1963 Association Agreement between the Turkish regime and the European Economic Community. However, the Turkish government sought membership in 1987 in the European Union but was turned down by the European body because it lacked an entire political system (Reiners & Turhan, 2021).

Nevertheless, the admission of Türkiye into the European Union was partially shut. The European Union's opinion regarding its application in 1989 was that it was still eligible to seek European Union membership. In 1996, However, Türkiye's prospects for accessing the European Union were membership enhanced when Türkiye was allowed to attend the European Union customs union, which was the start of advanced contacts and a prelude to full membership of the EU (Najslova, 2021).

However, as the European Union told Türkiye in 1997, it was all eyewash that the country was ineligible for full membership of the EU as it did not meet the EU's standards (Eralp, 2009; Narbonne & Tocci, 2007).

Nevertheless, the defining moment was in December 1999, when the European Union allowed Türkiye to candidacy for the EU. However, it did not open accession talks as was usually carried out for other countries seeking it. Türkiye's objection was to get access to the talks, and it should first meet the Copenhagen political criteria. Besides, Türkiye should resolve the Cyprus issue and have friendly ties with Greece (Comak et.al., 2022; Katsoulas, 2022).

Moreover, the European Union was empowered to monitor Türkiye's domestic performance closely, prepare an accession partnership document, and recommend reforms in various Turkish economic fields (Ozcelik, 2022).

After 2001, there was accelerated growth of reforms carried out in Türkiye (Erdogan, 2022), which many economists considered a silent revolution (Independent Commission on Türkiye, 2004;

(Ozcelik, 2022). The whole reformation process was done to fulfill the reform criteria suggested by the Copenhagen European Council to hold deliberations with Türkiye, which were scheduled in 2004. As a result, the European Council approved the radical reforms and found that Türkiye had successfully met the political criteria of the European Union and that accession talks would start in October 2005 (Kubicek, 2011; Onis, 2010).

Ironically, the accession talks were held at snail speed, and by 2013 the accession process was almost lost. By the middle of 2014, Türkiye faced several objections from the European Union member countries, including France and the Republic of Europe. Since then, Türkiye has been put in the European Union accession process with no concrete development to join the EU. In fact, for many European countries seeking the EU's candidacy, the accession process quickly resulted in full membership. Indeed, many deliberate hurdles and roadblocks were created for Türkiye not to get accession to the European Union.

Paradoxically, Türkiye's case of accessing the European Union is unique for an accession that has lasted more than three decades (Najslova, 2021). Türkiye applied for the European Union in 1987 but needed more time to get the desired membership after several country efforts. Despite Turkish desire for European Union membership in 1987, its application was put into abeyance for more than three decades.

Despite the complexities of extending assistance to the Western Balkans countries to join the European Union (Bechev, 2012), some political analysts doubt these countries would ever be able to get European Union membership (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Nevertheless, Türkiye cannot be considered in deliberations concerning the EU's enlargement to get a membership. According to the program presented by European Union President Jean-Claude in 2014 which stated: under the Presidency of the Commission, ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably, the Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no further enlargement will take place over the next five years (Juncker, 2014). Nevertheless, as regards Türkiye, it did not say anything.

Since 2010, the European Union has been undergoing radical changes to the Eurozone crisis (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Consequently, the crisis sharply affected the EU. The crisis was compounded by the subsequent critical socio-political divisions affecting the European Union and stalling other countries' integration programs (Tezcur, 2022). It might lead to the EU's collapse, or it might eventually exit the predicament to evolve into a more significant Union (Tsoukalis, 2014).

According to the European Central Bank President, who promised to act in whatever it took to protect a single European currency in 2013, the specter of total disintegration had been deferred. Moreover, the outlines of a post-crisis European Union still needed to be explicitly outlined. Instead, what was evident if the European Union could reform its financial system effectively, advance towards a financial union, support its democratic legality, and tackle critical

policies regarding defense, energy, and immigration? Then, it would be a remarkably changed European Union that was known then (Arkilic, 2022; Baracani, 2021; Tocci, 2014).

Remarkably, the radical changes in the European Union over the last several years had an apparent effect on the enlargement policy in the organization (Baracani, 2021). In contrast to the eastern enlargement process in the 2000s, there was a substantial decrease in the European Union enlargement's political priorities (Damen, 2022; Ferreira, 2022). Thus, the Balkan countries and Türkiye could be termed as the victims of the European Union policymakers' negligence (Baracani, 2021). In fact, for Türkiye, the accession process was not taken in hand, and dilly-dallying tactic was applied to forestall it, joining the European Union as a full member.

In Türkiye's case, the enlargement process was conducted slowly, as if the European Union did not prepare to admit it and wanted to forestall its membership. Moreover, Türkiye believed it had the due right to get membership in the European Union when the Eurozone crisis peaked (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Under Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish government was highly skeptical about Türkiye's admittance into the EU's fold by ignoring repeated requests. In his address to his party AKP Congress in 2012, Türkiye's President still needs to include his vision for Türkiye's European Union membership. In Türkiye, the government minister, Egemen Bagis, clearly stated that his country would perhaps never be able to get membership in the European Union because of some European Union members' deep prejudices against his country (Bechev, 2022).

Moreover, an independent Turkish Commission observed that the Turkish people who had an approval of 73% for the admission of the European Union in 2004 dropped dramatically after 2007, hovering between 34 percent and 48 percent over the last seven years (Independent Commission on Türkiye, 2014). That drop was partially due to the rising belief that it faced double standards and prejudices of several countries of Europe having the EU's membership.

FUTURE SCENARIOS

The above-mentioned brief history of the evolution of the Turkish relationship with the European Union casts a deep uncertainty. Hence, a gloomy picture of the ties between the two points out a future of growing competition or cooperation. Also, a longer-term assessment could be profound negativity and a final split in the coming decades.

Competition: A future EU-Türkiye ties scenario could be a rising competition and rivalry between the Turkish and European Union countries. Indeed, the European Union could use dilly-dallying tactics to hinder Türkiye's accession to the European Union through a protracted negotiating process (Najslava, 2021).

However, even the advocates of Türkiye's accession among the European Union members would like to lose trust in the membership process. The supporting European countries would primarily struggle with their low economies (Ozcelik, 2022). Other countries like Britain would be busy with their ties with the European Union and its exit from the organization. The East European members would also try to

work out successfully the foreign policies tackling a resurgent Russia (Alaranta, 2022; Baracani, 2021; Mankoff, 2022).

It was expected that following the European Parliament elections, there could be a challenging growth of democracy, leading to an anti-Turkiye constituency in the EU. With the new European Union leadership in the coming years, the expansion policy of the European Union policy could be critically jeopardized in the Juncker Commission (Damen, 2022; Ferreira, 2022). Though the realization of European Union membership for Turkiye does not require the consensus of the European Union member countries, the decision to overturn Turkiye's membership is even less probable (Reiners & Turhan, 2021).

Nevertheless, considering the above accounts, the resolution to discard the accession course was most likely to be announced by the Turkish government (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Recep Tayyip Erdogan would officially leave the European Union's accession process with his people's support. Considering his firm hold on domestic affairs and the growing rise of his popularity, he would consider the European Union a liability, not a plus point (Bechev, 2022).

Now, the advantage resulting from the European Union accession course would not be viable to the country. Therefore, Turkiye's prospects of joining the European Union have almost been shut forever and have no credibility (Najslova, 2021).

Furthermore, Erdogan's stable and popular government in Turkiye has established itself as an unopposed political entity in Turkiye and has proven to carry out reforms in the country single-handedly (Erdogan, 2022). Therefore, it is likely that the Turkish government would openly declare its non-utility to join the European Union (Bechev, 2022).

Hence, it would no more require any value for the political projects of the countries. Moreover, Turkiye would continue to raise the Kurdish issue in all forums and not take dictations from abroad, especially from the European Union countries (Christofis, 2022). Hence, for Turkiye, the accession process would prove to be a liability and eventually end the European Union countries' hypocrisy against it (Ilbiz & Christian, 2021).

In retrospect, Turkiye would not face an economic crunch. Although Turkiye is deficient in natural resources, it will continue to reach regional and global markets as a trade partner. As well, Turkiye would endeavor to get reformation of its macroeconomic policies (Erdogan, 2022; Oran, 2022). The country might have the European Union as an essential trading partner (Ozcelik, 2022).

However, Turkiye's political leadership would like to scale down economic ties with the European Union, thus freeing itself to follow positive and mutual overseas trade policies. Hence, Turkiye would likely ratify free trade pacts with several countries. Besides, the European Union would no more a privileged economic partner. It would consequently help the export-oriented economy of Turkiye to prosper (Oran, 2022; Ozcelik, 2022).

Nevertheless, the meddling in the economy would rise, economic reforms would be incomplete, and it might force the government to

revert to the economic reforms of the 2000s. Consequently, Türkiye could have a 2-3% growth rate (Erdogan, 2022).

Regarding its security, Türkiye would increasingly act like a lone wolf, i.e., in a unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral way with the European and non-European countries on a transactional basis, depending on the issues being considered (Najslova, 2021). Moreover, Türkiye would increasingly pursue policies regarding the Middle East clearly in its distinctive manner (Oran, 2022). Hence, its policies in various parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, would be assessed by European countries with skepticism and apprehensions due to its independent policies (Aras, 2022).

The unresolved Cyprus issue would continue to linger and deter positive ties between the European Union countries and the NATO alliance, of which Türkiye holds its membership (Comak et.al., 2022). Infrequent dialogues and cooperation with the European Union member countries could take place. However, Türkiye and the European Union closely monitor the actions and no more consider partners of each other (Reiners & Turhan, 2021).

As regards energy, Türkiye would actively participate as a vital associate of the European Union. However, it would not espouse the European Union energy policies, given Türkiye's accession process deferral. Besides, Türkiye would not allow the Energy Community of the European Union and rely on Russian gas for its energy needs (Alaranta, 2022). Moreover, controlling Azerbaijan of Türkiye's gas network would prevent its potential to seek other energy resources (Anas, 2022; Mankoff, 2022).

Furthermore, the Cyprus issue's continuance and the constant deterioration in Israel-Türkiye relationships would cause Gulf liquefied gas trading in Asia's markets instead of becoming beneficial for the European Union countries (Comak et.al., 2022). However, neither Cyprus nor Israel would be happy to export gas to or through Turkish territory (Gurel & Mullen, 2014).

As regards migration and mobility of Turkish territories, it would remain inadequate. Indeed, its economic growth would be together with the rise of immigration from various countries of Africa and Middle Eastern countries (Aras, 2022; Arkilic, 2022; Ozcelik, 2022). As a result, the Turkish people would constantly immigrate to European countries, although at significantly lower levels. However, with the constant chaos in its southern neighborhood, Türkiye's infrequent transit journey into the European Union countries would cause problems in its relationship with them (Arkilic, 2022). Simultaneously, Türkiye's open visa policy for its neighbors would be seen unfavorably in the European Union countries (Baracani, 2021; Oran, 2022).

In December 2013, a two-way deal concluded on a readmission accord, and visa liberalization could fail, as the Turkish regime would have unfriendly relations with the European Union countries. The continually rising political, economic, security, and estranged societal ties would eventually affect Türkiye's cordial ties and the European Union member countries. Besides, it would clarify in the minds of the Turks and the Europeans that Türkiye did not belong to the European

continent. It would also make it difficult for the Turkish communities to move into the European Union countries.

Cooperation: Another set would be the European Union block, and Türkiye would sign a new agenda to cooperate according to their respective complementarities. Accordingly, both sides of the European Union and Türkiye would discard the accession process; however, they would remain friends. Besides, the domestic politics of Türkiye would function independently of the EU (Reiners & Turhan, 2021).

The Turkish government would also be developed into an increasingly presidential or semi-presidential system that would provide autonomy to the Kurdish people (Christofis, 2022). Furthermore, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan would try to resolve the lingering Kurdish issue and offer amnesty to Kurd militants and autonomy (Bechev, 2022). Hence, the European Union would appreciate the Turkish government's steps for the Kurdish peace initiative and censure the Turkish political system's centralization of power (Christofis, 2022; Ilbiz & Christian, 2021).

Besides, Türkiye would stress following multi-vectored policies that would not provide special treatment to the European Union and Türkiye. Following much deliberation, Türkiye would see no place in the tightly woven European Union that would revive after the Eurozone crisis (Oran, 2022).

Moreover, Türkiye would overtly endorse ties with the European Union on a functional basis that would best suit its interests. The erstwhile notion of a privileged partnership, devised by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, would be advocated differently by Türkiye (Najslova, 2021).

However, the European Union would sigh in relief by discarding Türkiye's accession in its fold amicably. Notably, for the opponents of Türkiye's membership in the EU, the amiable desertion of the issue by Türkiye would be considered the best possible option.

Furthermore, there would be a functional collaboration between Türkiye and the European Union bloc on the issues of asylum, immigration, and visa policies (Oran, 2022). Moreover, Türkiye insisted on visa-free entry into European countries after some hectic diplomatic initiatives (Arkilic, 2022; Knaus, 2014).

The strong background of cooperation on readmission to the EU, tight control of its borders, and migration policies would contribute to the European Union countries' successful deal (Baracani, 2021). In addition, the European Union member states would also settle for eliminating Türkiye's visa restrictions, a bone of contention for many years. In particular, given Türkiye's fading prospects of joining the EU, the European Union countries would be expected to allow Turkish people visa-free entry.

The last point could be the longstanding Cyprus Issue, which might continue to linger and would not be resolved (Comak et.al., 2022). Further, Türkiye would try to implement the added procedure to the customs union accord with Cyprus. Unfortunately, that could be insignificant concerning the accession process (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). However, the official stoppage of that situation, the Additional Protocol's execution, could be conducive to Türkiye, Cyprus, and the

European countries and help Türkiye-Cyprus's involvement in the European Union's local market (Comak et.al., 2022).

Convergence: The last scenario relates to the convergence of Türkiye with the European Union because of full membership. That picture predicts the European Union will be free from the current internal crisis and refocus on the expansion process to include Balkans and Türkiye. Accordingly, a post-crisis European Union would show a more cohesive bloc comprising the Eurozone to achieve its economic union (Ozcelik, 2022).

However, a more robust integration in the European Union could affect other concerns, namely security, energy, and migration (Arkilic, 2022). Such domains are vital geographic cores of the European Union and are related to the innermost nucleus of Eurozone countries (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Nevertheless, it would also be extended to other members of the European Union. Moreover, a more robust integration of the European Union, together with a refurbished expansion as a result of distinguished integration, would facilitate new members, for instance, Türkiye, to access the European Union, though not its core centralized features (Tocci & Bechev, 2013).

The attainment and viability of the model mentioned above would depend on the UK's long-term, yet modified, association with the outer circle of the European Union. According to the new power model for the European Union, the expansion generally, and for Turkish accession to the European Union, in particular, would be considerably less contentious. In that case, the Turkish government would decide to stay in the outermost circle, provided it was bracketed with the heavyweights of the EU, namely, the UK, which would help Türkiye, and the opposing inner core members (Taspinar, 2014) would not affect its membership of the European Union.

The rejection of Türkiye's full membership by the European Union—though not belonging to the Eurozone would entice satisfactory advocacy from the European Union with strong democratic roots in the political system (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). That would consist of a powerful and complete solution to the Kurdish issue through the Turkish constitution that stresses equal citizenship and all fellow citizens' rights and freedoms (Ilbiz & Christian, 2021; Kramer, 2022; Yılmaz, 2022). Of course, that change would witness some successes and failures; however, the general tendency would be positive.

As well, the economic growth of Türkiye would go simultaneously with the transition of its political system. The Turkish government, Erdogan, would open up local and international markets (Bechev, 2022). Nevertheless, Türkiye would continue liberalizing regional and global markets and strong economic links with the European Union concerning its interests and quality trade (Ozcelik, 2022).

Remarkably, the past few years witnessed a gradual decrease in the share of the European Union share of Türkiye's exports; that fraction is gaining momentum (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). At the same time, Türkiye's exports to Russia, Iran, Iraq, and China are declining (Alaranta, 2022; Mankoff, 2022). Thus, through close trade relations

with the EU, the country could deal successfully with its economic woes (Ozcelik, 2022).

Moreover, Türkiye would have enhanced saving rates, solutions to trade imbalances, and improved energy diversification and economy from political constraints. Such economic adjustments and reforms would help Türkiye avert the middle-income trap (Erdogan, 2022; Onis & Kutlay, 2013; Ozcelik, 2022).

After having full membership in the EU, Türkiye would solve the longstanding issue of Cyprus (Comak et al., 2022). Moreover, NATO and the European Union would get closer and establish a cordial relationship between the two critical blocs of Europe. Furthermore, after several years of advanced dealignment, Türkiye would support the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) stance, which would significantly improve the foreign policy projections of the EU, especially in the chaotic neighborhood (Damen, 2022; Ferreira, 2022).

Regarding the Cyprus issue and the strengthening of Türkiye-Israel political reconciliation, Cyprus and Israel's natural gas would flow from the Turkish regions into Europe (Comak et.al., 2022). It would considerably help Türkiye and the European Union countries to meet their energy needs. Türkiye would implement European laws to access the Energy Community of the European Union and become an actual energy center for Europe (Koranyi & Sartori, 2013; Winrow, 2014).

On migration and mobility issues, the Turkish territory would become an immigration country from an emigration one. As a result, it would likely espouse more restraint visa policies toward its European neighbors (Arkilic, 2022).

However, it would act like a liberal country in the Council of the European Union. Nevertheless, as a full member of the EU, the country would be supportive and more adept at facing asymmetrical immigration. In addition, however, it would ally with various European countries, for instance, Italy and Greece, to support and share the burden of the issues of asylum and immigration (Arkilic, 2022; Katsoulas, 2022).

Lastly, the majority of people both in Türkiye and the European Union bloc would share a broad identity. True, Türkiye would not be considered wholly belonging to Europe, though its Europeanism could be the '*primus inter pares*' aspect of its individuality. Similarly, the association of most of the people of Europe would continue to hold their national characteristics (Tezcur, 2022). Though, with the triumph over the post-emergency era, the European Union would become more cohesive, operational, and democratic. Besides, the affection for civic principles preserved in the future Union, including Türkiye, would also grow.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect to Türkiye's complex history vis-a-vis Europe, Türkiye's future of gaining full membership in the European Union needs to be more detailed and apparent. Nevertheless, Türkiye and Europe's political characteristics are firmly attached, and when your

identity crisis has lasted for some 200 years, it is no longer a crisis. It is your identity (Deringil, 2007).

However, the future relationships between the EU-Turkiye continue to be highly volatile. Some member countries of the European Union need to see eye-to-eye with the reforms carried out in Turkiye. Moreover, these countries disregard Turkiye as an essential part of the European Community. Although Turkiye and the European Union countries are on the same metaphorical ship, the ship's journey is unidentified.

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