

Law and Order Situation in Sindh and Its Impacts on Politics: 1988-1999: An Assessment

Qurat-ul-Ain Bashir

Abstract

It provides the history of law and order situation in Sindh in the tenures of four consecutive elected civilian governments from 1988-1999. The different approaches vis a vis; political, military and judicial had been put into action by the civilian governments to attend to the issues of lawlessness and appalling law and order situation in Sindh. The effects of policies and operations on Centre-Sindh relations, Centre-military relations and Sindh-military were dreadful. The disagreements among political parties on operations had further deteriorated the situation and stability of the political system.

Introduction

The law and order condition in Sindh was the foremost severe matter before the governments (1988-1999) to manage. The purpose of the study is to scrutinize the law and order situation in Sindh and its impact on politics. The study takes in; details of the Operations Clean-up, their effects on the Centre-Sindh relations, Centre-Sindh relations and the Centre-military relations. The study takes in four civilian governments vis a vis; Benazir Bhutto's first government (December 2, 1988-August 6, 1990), Nawaz Sharif's first government (November 6, 1990-18 July 1993), Benazir's second government (October 19, 1993-November 5, 1996), Nawaz's second government (February 17, 1997-October 12, 1999).

Law and Order Situation in Sindh and Its Impact on Politics: December 2, 1988-August 6, 1990:

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government was inept to normalize the law and order position in Sindh as ethnic violence was amplified and army was in need of massive powers which according to the PPP could bring no good to Sindhis. The PPP was shunned to exercise arm methods like past that latter bedevils Sindh throughout and it experienced anomalous situation.

The Sindh situation brought the government at the verge of fall. The cleavage between the PPP and the MQM was out of place to wane the ethnic violence in Sindh. The immaculate policy was requisite to improve law and order but the ethnic divide profoundly prevailed in the tenure. The PPP and army were at utter variance on the ways to expunge from aggravation factors from Sindh. They had no-confidence over each other which entrenched since the inaugural of Operation Clean-up in the Pucca Qilla at Hyderabad on May 26, 1990. The operation was set off by the provincial government as it had the information that illicit arms and ammunition were dumped there. When police raided the Qilla, the cadres went into their hideouts and a procession of women and children with Holy Quran on their heads came forward. In the course of the operation, army entered into the city without the call of the civil government. The PPP leaders berated the army for buttressing the women and children that refused to comply of curfew. Army slated the PPP for its designs to mete out the *mohjirs*. The divergences between the army and the PPP government happened to be publicly known in the course of Pucca Qilla incident.

Constitutionally, army could only operate in Sindh under the article 147 which stated that the provincial government with the assent of the federal government asked over the army to help out in disposing of the chronic and baleful situation. The other condition in which army could intervene in the province was under the article 245. On the government's behest when army calls under this article it means kind of martial law and High Courts stop to have jurisdiction in that region

until the army would exercise its power. Army had hankered to have powers under the article 245 and Benazir was willing to cooperate under the article 147. The Combined Opposition Parliamentary Party (COP) was tilt at the implementation of article 245 in Sindh. In actual, Karachi had law of jungle. Most of the demises in clashes in Karachi were of *Mohajirs*, Punjabis and Pakhtuns. In the National Assembly a debate came about on the law and order situation in Sindh. The opposition went on the government for its powerlessness to normalize the life in Karachi. The law and order situation in Sindh in general and Karachi in particular was brought before the National Assembly in that all provinces, federal government and the citizens had great concern over the situation in Sindh.

The atmosphere of the National Assembly frequently heated up during the discussions over Sindh situation and walk outs transpired often by the opposition side. The army forced government on to put article 245 into action in Sindh. The federal government was *au fait* with the actuality that the grant of the powers in relation to the article 245 could cause arrest of its provincial ministers by the army as they are accused of being the aides of dacoits.

Law and Order Situation in Sindh and Its Impact on Politics: November 6, 1990-18 July 1993:

Four Sindh governments since Ghaus Ali Shah remained disastrous to end the crisis of disturbed law and order. In Sindh the bombs went off, target killing, abductions, burglaries, robberies, assassinations, terrorism, and arrest of the students were ubiquitous. The students of Sindh Peoples Student Federation were detained. The Sindh government held the PPP responsible for the occurrence of all the misdemeanors and felonies within the Sindh. In Sindh the coalition government of the Islami Jamhori Ittehad (IJI) and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) (Altaf) MQM (A) was installed. The transgression prevailed in Sindh which exhibited that the government in power did not win through to restrain the elements that botched the law and order situation.

The law and order situation in Sindh escalated with time and bedeviled the governments at the Centre and Sindh throughout the IJI rule. In the last quarter of May, 1992 the federal government invoked article 147 of the constitution in Sindh on the call of the government of Sindh. The rate of crimes vis a vis; dacoits, terrorism and abduction for ransom augmented. Nawaz vindicated invoke of said article 147 that as law and order situation did not put on a normal footing in the notified course of six months. Asif Nawaz lucid that army is called on for abet of the civil power at the request of the Sindh government. Asif vividly stated that operation would carry out in consultation with the Sindh administration and in accordance with the constitution. He referred that public would be informed about the operation. The operation was well thought-out and happened under the supervision of Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, Chief Minister Sindh, the Corps Commander and the Inspector General of Sindh Police. The military authority proposed considerable reshuffle in the Sindh administration. The army supposed that principally the police and civil appointments were political and not on merit. Military authority deemed that Sindh administration was either vain or non-cooperative for some were patronages of perpetrators. Military sought after to work with those officials who did not owe a favor to any political party. Army registered its grumble about one of the ethnic groups which duress the army for the release of its colleagues. Afterwards, highest authorities guaranteed to the army for unadulterated non-interference.

The MQM (A), ally of the IJI at the Centre and Sindh was dismayed at the occurrence of operation. The top leadership of the MQM (A) demurred to the official explanation. Nawaz met with Altaf Hussain in London on his way back from New York to take the edge off his resentment. The press did not enlightened a good deal about what transpired in the meeting. The MQM (A) sought to convince that dacoits and abductions were facets of country side and not of urban areas in view of that operation should confine to the rural part. Whereas the Centre had mentioned repetitively that the operation

would equally come to pass in urban and rural areas. The MQM (A) walked out from the Nation Assembly session as a protest against the operation. The government affirmed that operation would be unprejudiced plus free and square. Nawaz and Muzaffar Hussain proclaimed that even handed operation would start up to reinstate law and order. Latter on military guaranteed that actions are taken up critical of terrorist and not in opposition to parties. As well military authorities explicated that every group/party have good and bad people and army attempted to cope with that bad elements devoid of fear and favour towards any. Nawaz expounded that operation is instigated to annihilate criminals and terrorism and it did not aim hostile to any political party. In June 1992, a group of Members of National Assembly (MNAs) and MPAs from interior of Sindh convened in Islamabad to hammer out the modalities of the Operation Clean-up. Nawaz asserted that operation staged with consensus among all the parties and within the IJI itself. He cited about the MQM (A) opinion on the operation after having a meeting with it, "We agreed that the action against criminals was a must for the restoration of law and order. And we hopeful that very soon the province, that had given tremendous sacrifices for the creation of Pakistan, would become a secure and peaceful land." The Sindh was brim with problems. The two bomb explosions and pitiless assassination of nine people at the village of Tando Bhawal were grave tribulations faced up by the army in commence of the operation.

The adamant of MQM (A) that the operation ought to take place in urban areas was rest on the fact that it was established political authority in urban Sindh and it strived to exempt its constituencies from the effects of military operation. In the Operation Clean-up the genuine task was not solely to obliterate illegal activities and terrorism but to dispose of the poignant image of the operation letter on. The operation unquestionably had to affect the vote bank of all the political parties and the MQM (A) did not intend to upset the apple cart for its supporters through the happening of the operation.

The MQM (A) was endeavor to watch its political future and was not concerned about the whole of Sindh as rural area was strong hold of the PPP and the operation in rural area meant trim down of the PPP vote bank. The operation was not caused by the IJI to destroy the PPP and strengthen the MQM (A). The even handed operation was essential for country's unity. In the prevalent circumstance the discrimination was not in national interest.

The situation additionally exacerbated with the demand of APC to dissolve the federal and provincial assemblies for it deemed that in the prevalent political scenario the evenhanded and unbiased operation was uncertain. The APC had credence that operation was detrimental for the repute of the army for the reason that "the government would "mislead the personnel of armed forces." " The APC passed the resolution which elaborated on the nascent law and order situation in Sindh and deemed that it would fraught penal and perilous upshots for whole of the country. The APC deplored the operation that it went off in rural area and not in cities which could render the fell of discrimination among the rural masses. The APC marked that operation against known terrorists did not come about in cities and the persons who were arrested by the law-enforcing agencies released as they belonged to a political party which was in coalition in the Sindh government. The APC cited, in the nonexistence of potent government the army action would be through and through counter-productive. The APC was concerned apropos of the status of human rights in the province in the course of operation. The Centre Action Committee of APC created a committee which worked in intimate association with human rights organizations. The responsibility of the committee was to scrutinize the occurrences in Sindh and to maintain link with media so as to acquaint the people on the subject of operation and to bring any violation of human rights into the notice of media and public. Through resolution it concluded that unless the "bogus" assemblies would not sack the free and square operation is not likelihood. It demanded, " Along with the assault on the hideouts of dacoits and terrorists in the

rural areas, all arms dumps, arsenal bunkers, torture outfits in the cities be unearthed and wiped out.”

Withdrawal of the MQM (A) from Sindh Government:

The Sindh’s state of affairs got political split. The cabinet decided to maintain the support of all the agencies, organizations and all of federal government to the Sindh administration so as to combat the illicit cum anti-state activities and terrorism. The cases vis a vis; abduction, assassination, firing and rioting registered opposed to the top leadership of the MQM (A) including its chief Altaf Hussain, secretary general Imran Farooq, vice-chairman Salim Shahzad, provincial Industries minister and others. The MQM (A) requisitioned its MNAs to quit over the Sindh issue. Islam Nabi, minister of production went to Uzbekistan with Nawaz prior to tendering his resignation to the National Assembly Secretariat. His resignation had rendered the doubts that whether he inscribed the resignation himself or the MQM (A) leadership had put pen to paper his resignation and used his signatures. The said article 64 (1) of the constitution stated, “A member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) may, by writing under his hand addressed to the speaker or, as the case may be, the chairman resign his seats, and thereupon his seat shall become vacant”. It was the speaker who had to determine that either resignation was put into black and white by the MNAs themselves or not. In the past the legislators objected that the party authorities duress them to resign though they did not intend so. The resignations of the other MNAs of the MQM (A) were also in doubt after the episode of Islam Nabi. The MQM (A) had intense feel that the operation intended to wipe out the MQM (A). Benazir reproof the federal and provincial governments concerning its double-crossing since they were not expounding that whether the MQM (A) was its ally in federal and provincial governments or not. On the floor of the House Benazir asserted that state in its place to endow people with shield has been making the ethnic and linguistic split more profound. Over the operation in Sindh

Benazir viewed that her government had issues with Pucca Qilla situation at Hyderabad in 1989 and chronic ethnic tension was prevalent in other parts of Sindh but even though the article 147 did not invoke.

On November 28, 1992, the resignations of nine MPAs of the MQM (A) accepted by the acting speaker of Sindh, Atta Mohammad Marri. In accordance with the Sindh Assembly Secretariat notification, these nine MPAs had resigned in June 1992 but the resignation had accepted in November just about five months subsequent to the arrival of their resignations to the Secretariat. The MQM (A) grumbled over the undue deference in the acceptance of the resignation. It alleged the government that postponement was deliberate so as to get hold of adequate time to induce legislators to withdraw their resignations. The MQM (A), the Jammat-e- Islami (JI) and chief of the National Peoples Party (NPP), Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi too left the coalition which was perceptible prove of crumbling way of the IJI. The might of the alliance was reliant on the unity of all the partners which did not linger.

In Sindh assembly the PPP got highest number of seats nevertheless the IJI contrived to shape its government through coalition. Thus the government in Sindh was not in accordance with the expectation of the people which they ushered through the electoral process.

The human rights violation cropped up to colossal degree in the course of operation. All along the demonstrations women were ruthlessly lathi-charged by the police. Quite a few young men were disappeared and did not come to trace. The military personnel themselves picked up a lot of people from their homes for interrogation and were torture to death. The victims of law and enforcing agencies had been traumatized and had fright on registering their complaints. They were not prepared to have a word to the press about the torment inducted by the military/police upon them. The law and enforcing agencies and all trampled over the Hindu minorities. There were episodes that torture happened at the Hindu community. The Hindus of village were pounded that because they were heathens

thus they took it as a prospect to carry out their religious duty. In rural and urban Sindh plentiful people were missing. The MQM (A) adherents and workers were picked up, arrested and assailed too. The Operation Clean-up bear out that the MQM (A) was successful in Karachi and Hyderabad as a political cum terrorist organization. Pile of buttress for criminals was endemic in the MQM (A). The culture of Kalashnikov and brutality had fostered under the sway and shield of the MQM (A). Its effort the MQM (A) had put up a parallel administration. The operation disposed of the MQM (A)'s thugs who used to get money against the businesses notwithstanding the fact small or enormous. The MQM (A) leaders went under ground or moved out to other countries. The MQM (A) torture cells were found besides the evidence happened that it used to detained people.

The Sindh position rendered eerie atmosphere in Islamabad that proliferated the perils for the IJI. The sense of *déjà vu* which subsisted ahead of the sack of Benazir government manifested. The APC in Islamabad was taking into consideration the proposal of dialogue extended by Nawaz in addition the expected composition of the provisional government was on the top of its agenda. The bureaucracy was of the opinion that the manner in which government was carrying out could not "last beyond June". Nawaz had a status of being the blue-eyed boy of establishment but the cleavages with the establishment corroborated that establishment is the factual hub of power in politics and no government could empower devoid of its green signal. Bureaucracy is inevitable and of moment component of the establishment and its prophecy happened to be true.

Law and Order Situation in Sindh and Its Impact on Politics: October 19, 1993-November 5, 1996:

Law and order of Sindh was without fail, a crisis for all the governments. The ethnic divide got intense that the MQM (A) workers insisted on the separate province. The MQM (A) leadership explicated that it was sentiments of the people which got hold of the wrong end of

the stick by the leaders. The MQM (A) leaders and all cited that the clamour for separate province was constitutional and if *Mohajirs* would be treated like second-grade citizen then no other option would be left except separate province. In Sindh the felonies vis a vis; dacoits, abduction and assassinations were pervasive. The government went for the extension of army stay in Sindh till June 1994 in an attempt to root out the reasons of trouble. Nawaz reckoned Operation Clean-up as a conspiracy hatched by the PPP opposed to the MQM (A) and the army. Nawaz recommended the army to roll back the operation as before long. The dialogues held between leadership of the PPP and the MQM (A) but just by reason of disagreement over two portfolios no reasonable upshot floated up. Nawaz tried his hardest to blight the credibility of the government and to incite the nation against the government.

The incorporation of MQM (A) in Sindh administration was not pondered of note by the Benazir since she was of perception that Nawaz had former tendered provincial authority to the MQM (A) with the optimism that it would get harmony in the province however the effect was contrary. She supposed that each time in the government of the MQM (A) the infiltration of Indian elements and crimes bumped up. She alleged that the MQM (A) had joined the Indian elements against the stability of the province. The absentia of the MQM (A) in the Sindh government meant no representation of the urban Sindh. Sindh had assorted cultures and communities and their unity was a key for good law and order which could only come to pass through their participation in the political system. If the MQM (A) were incorporated in the government then responsibility of the affairs of Sindh would be mutual and two big communities i.e; Sindhis and *Mohajirs* were tolerant towards each other. The panacea of Sindh's tribulations was utmost provincial autonomy. The Operation Clean-up was in effect since June 1992 however operations did not endow Sindh with the normalcy. The MQM (A) dismayed at the operation in Sindh and contemplated it as ordeal. The appalling situation in Sindh

prevailed due to difference of views between the PPP and the MQM (A) over the settlement of Sindh issue. The government was not in the position to break off the operation for sturdy judiciary, police system and civil administration were awfully needed in post-operational Sindh and they were not there. In such circumstances the pull out of the army was detrimental for broken law and order and could render more obstinate elements. In such circumstances a political solution could be the only cure-all of the predicaments. The army operation in Sindh did not lend countenance to democracy and made the political system dubious.

The settlement between the PPP and the MQM (A) was not viable option when army set off the intense dire action against the leadership and workers of the MQM (A) and its leaders were gaoled. The MQM (A) insisted on immediate withdrawal of cases opposed to its leadership which was not conceded by the ruling party. The operation put the existence of the MQM (A) on the line. The PPP ticked off the MQM (A) through denunciation of Altaf Hussain for confrontation and stirring trouble whereas the MQM (A) had reproof the PPP for pushing it up the creek. The government and army did not trust the organization (MQM) (A) an inch given that it had massive automatic weapons with them. The government declined the allegation regarding the registration of fake case against the MQM (A). Benazir avowed that if Altaf sought homecoming then he would have to appear before the court. Benazir ruled out the likelihood that to instigate a dialogue with Altaf Hussain. She insisted on minus Altaf talks. Altaf judgment on the Sindh situation was that if the MQM (A) invariable curbed and wronged then the provincial government could not handle the issues of Karachi and Hyderabad “in the context of unattended ethnic divide and some kind of mayhem would inevitably result.” The environment devoid of confidence of political parties over each other had exacerbated the situation and confirmed that political leadership was not susceptible of getting normalcy back in Sindh.

Latter the operation in Sindh extended till the December of 1994 as chief minister had implicated prospect that by that time the

civil government would be in the position to implement its complete authority for of normalcy as a consequence of the army's efforts. The unsound law and order in Sindh had a repulsive effect on the popularity of Benazir. The premeditated visit of Benazir to the Sindh University campus Jamshoro had put the district and university administration into dire trouble. The news of Benazir visit exasperated the students and they warned that stage protest would be happened if she paid a visit to the campus. It was also reported that teachers' support was with students. The law and order got despicable not only in Sindh but and all in other parts such as in Malakand division where fundamental Islamic movements created disturbance in northern tribal areas.

Ultimately the operation was terminated formally on December 2, 1994 with the anticipation that Sindh administration would attend to the situation in an appropriate manner. The military withdrawal transpired at the time when average rate of assassinations went above the average rate of killing per day in the Second World War. *In toto* 408 persons had been killed since the November 1993 in Karachi division and subsequently the wrapping up of operation proved further detrimental to the security and safety of the public. The government was gone at find out of the political solution but the pace of dialogues between the MQM (A) and the government pertinent to Karachi issue was slow. Leghari himself wanted that Sindh situation should be thrashed out with all the political forces in order that suitable solution could come up. Post to the resumption of talks between the MQM (A) and the PPP just in the course of four days (July 11, 1995-July 14, 1995) following misfortunes happened with the MQM (A) such as such; the MQM (A) leader Saeed was abducted and later on assassinated plus the MQM (A) workers were regularly raided by police, two workers and three adherents of the MQM (A) were killed, the MQM (A) worker Ikram Ahmad Farooqi was apprehended and afterwards killed, the members of All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organisation (APMO) were seized and police and rangers had arrested

18 MQM (A) workers. Several rounds of parleys came to pass between the MQM (A) and the PPP but no effective approach unearthed owing to the fact of stubbornness and lack of trust. The problems of Karachi was thorny and multi dimensional. It had political, economical, social and ethnic issues which were not probable to resolve without the active partake of the MQM (A) in the affairs of the province. It could only be achieved through happening of earlier local bodies' elections but the government was not prepared to bring it. The matters of Karachi needed to run a tight ship but the repugnance between the leadership of both the parties did not let the political solution to arise.

Benazir expounded that the putrid situation in Karachi subsisted since 1985 and it did not get well again on account of the fact that there was no demarcation between terrorism and politics. Benazir referred to the immeasurably killings in Karachi as massively done by the MQM (A). In these circumstances the atmosphere of mutual trust and respect was not viable. The frequent impasses between both the parties latter palpable that government hungered for do away with the Altaf group from the political arena. Benazir did not prudently make do with the Karachi issue as Sindh government was technically present but in fact the political power over the law and order situation in Karachi was in control of federal government.

With the dawn of year 1996 the law and order get further ghastly and rate of killings ascended. In the erstwhile year about 2000 deaths happened in Karachi. The snatching of vehicles and assassination were frequent incidences. The elements of lawlessness proliferated. The federal and Sindh governments did nothing except to lay blame on the MQM (A) for the killings and the MQM (A) all the time asked for the withdrawal of cases against its leadership. The parties were more inclined to cash the situation for their gain. The Karachi issue was in fact utilized by both the parties to score a point against each other. The endeavors of police and rangers to normalize the situation were all of no consequence.

Law and Order Situation in Sindh and Its Impact on Politics: February 17, 1997-October 12, 1999:

The tribulations like sectarianism, terrorism, abysmal law and order got more intense. In Karachi the myriad of heinous crimes and killings as well as terrorism prevailed. In Sindh the working relationship between the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)-PML (N) was not smooth as the MQM had some issues with the PML (N). There were about 400 terrorists and 800 declared offenders who in particular impinged on the law and order of the Punjab and in general of the rest of the country. The government took immense measure but it was indeed difficult to trounce such anti-state elements owing to their vast networking. In the time phase of 100 days of new elected government, 7,132 incidents of crimes transpired in Karachi. The law enforcement agencies remained ineffective to deal with the lawlessness.

The considerable killings not only begot havoc in Karachi but also led to tension in the coalition. The dissensions happened within the coalition partners when five men of MQM were shot dead on June 16, 1997. The MQM closed all its party offices in Karachi and referred that the reopening would come about only when Nawaz himself provide security guarantee. The MQM thrashed out the horrendous law and order situation with Leghari and urged him to discharge his role so as to get the things right. The government set up a judicial commission to probe the extra-judicial killings in order to placate the MQM. Nawaz met with MQM delegation and elucidated that government did not intend to put into effect the governor rule and assured political steps for the Sindh predicaments. The wave of terrorism, sectarian violence and crime thrived in whole of the country. The Supreme Court set off the *suo motu* proceedings to probe into the dreadful law and order situation in Karachi. Nawaz pushed the PML (N) and the MQM for collaboration and coordination with each other to return normalcy in Karachi. The withdrawal of rangers and no-go area issue remained the sticking point between the PML (N) and the MQM.

Human Rights Watchdog, the New York based organization accentuated the human rights violation and extra-judicial killings in Karachi in its annual 1998 report on Pakistan. The report held federal security, the MQM and police responsible for it. It pronounced that more or less 400 people had been killed flanked by January to November of 1997. It stated that in 1997, 200 people died owing to sectarian violence and most of which transpired in the Punjab. In Punjab the sectarian violence got horrendous and perpetuated.

The belligerent attitude of the MQM and the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (Haqiqi) MQM (H) towards each other was the momentous cause for turbulence in Karachi. Both the fractions time and again engaged in fights that came of havoc and deaths. The federal government acceded to countenance outright authority on Sindh government so as to pick up law and order.

Promptly afterwards the nuclear tests a wave of relentless violence and bomb blasts instigated in Karachi. The massive killing of workers of the MQM and the MQM (H) prevailed. Several rounds of negotiations again came to pass between the PML (N) and MQM. The violence and terrorism was worrisome and was as abysmal as it was in 1995. The wave of killing intensified on June 16, 1998 when 14 people had been killed. In June, 1998 total lives of 150 people were taken and 70 injured in politically goaded violence. Merely in the second fortnight of the June 95 citizens were killed. The special task force, a new army in the Karachi police was instituted that had apprehended 1700 offenders in the last two weeks of June owing to which provisionally peace was reinstated.

On July 3, 1998 the government subsequent to consultation with MQM took of moment number of decisions to bring about normalcy back in Karachi. The police and rangers were placed under the joint authority while conducting patrols or executing operation in sensitive parts of the city. The government fashioned two committees to attend to the violence in Karachi. The advisory committee had to set down the comprehensive programme for the restructure of the police

force and administrative committee had to check the law and order circumstances on everyday basis in addition to make certain the fulfillment of the directives of executive committee. The power of the rangers to search and arrest was also restored. Since February to October of year 1998 seven bomb explosions transpired in Karachi. In general the law and order in the country was horrific. From February 1998 to November 1998 3600 deaths transpired in Lahore. On December 27, 1998 the army was and all called for prompt action by the district administration in Bannu to put down the violence which brought on owing to clashes between people and police.

In October 1999 the destructive spiral of sectarian violence and law and order happened. On October 1, 1999, 13 people were killed in Karachi and five in the Punjab. Leaders of quite a few political parties had deprecated sectarian killings and held government responsible. On October 4, 1999 two bomb explosions transpired in Hyderabad.

The operation was frowned on by Atlatf. He averred that the MQM was beset again for of the operation even though Nawaz had articulated under oath that lest he did not able to halt such targets opposed to the MQM then he would resign. Afterward the operation extended to the interior of Sindh. The rally of the PPP and its allies manifested that again the street power could put into effect oppose to the government.

Conclusion:

In Sindh ethno-nationalism was one of the momentous reasons of appalling law and order and collisions between the political parties. The governments did not manage to bring normalcy in Sindh owing to political blackmailing by the coalition partners. Working relationship between Centre and Sindh were badly affected which also bring political instability at the Centre level. The direct involvement of the Centre in the Sindh matters were palpable and against notion of provincial autonomy. The good law and order could transpire by means of understanding rather than military operations. The military

operations were disastrous for its own reputation as time and again few political parties alleged them of being partisan in the course of conduct of operations. The military asked for more powers to attend to the situation in Sindh and whenever the Centre declined its demand the antagonism came to pass between them.

References:

- ◆ In 1988 the Pakistan People's Party PPP had established its government at the Centre with the buttress of the MQM as well as 21 members of tribal areas. On the same day Ishaq Khan appointed as the president. Dawn, Karachi, December 3, 1988. R. A. Singh, *Military Governance in Pakistan* (Delhi: Raj Publications, 2007), 100.
- ◆ In 1990 elections the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) surfaced as only largest party in the National Assembly. It bagged 106 seats in the House of 207. Report on General Elections 1993, vol.1 (Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, n.d), 4.
- ◆ The formula of power sharing was provided by the caretaker government to bring about the formation of federal government for the reason that split mandate engendered indecisive party position in the lower house. The formula suggested the coalition at the Centre which was frowned on by both the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) PML (N). This was the first time ever in the parliamentary history of Pakistan that nomination papers were submitted for the prime minister's elections otherwise in previous the premier was nominated by the president. In 1993 the PPP had set up its government in coalition with the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA), the Jamhoori Wattan Party (JWP), independents and minorities. 1993. The News, Islamabad, October 12, 1993. Dawn, Karachi, October 16, 1993. Dawn, Islamabad, October 14, 1993. S. A. Sayood, "Pakistan Peoples Party", *Pakistan Political Perspective*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, November 1993), 19.
- ◆ The National Assembly elections 1997 had ushered evident majority of the PML (N) due to which it enabled to acquire two-third majority and eventually installed its government.
- ◆ Iqbal Akhund, *Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 282.
- ◆ Kalim Bahadur, *Democracy in Pakistan: Crises and Conflicts* (Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd, 1988), 124-125.

- ♦ Wakil Anjum, *Qaumi Sanayhat per Bannay Walay Commission Terbunal aur Commatian: Haqaiq pa Parda Kion Dal Dati Hain?* (Urdu) (Lahore: Jahangir Book Depot, n.d), 205,
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, May 27, 1990. Sajjad Ali Shah, *Law Courts in a Glass House: An Autobiography* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 182. Ahmad Saleem, *Che August ka Bad: Intikhabi Marko aur Muhalati Sazisho ki Kahani* (Urdu) (Lahore: Nagarshat, 1990)), 16-17.
- ♦ Maleeha Lodhi “Beg-Bhutto: Collision Couse?”, *Newsline*, Karachi, August 1990, 32.
- ♦ Makhdoom Ali Khan, “Indefinite Articles”, *The Herald*, Karachi, August 1990, 35. Muhammad Ali Shaikh, *Benazir Bhutto: A Political Biography*, (Karachi: Orient Book Publishing House, 2000), 183.
- ♦ Shaikh, *A Political Biography*, 183-184.
- ♦ Ahmed Rashid, “The Battle for Islamabad”, *The Herald*, August 1990, 32.
- ♦ Lodhi “Collision Couse?”, 32.
- ♦ A Rashid, “Sleeping Through the Blitz . . .”, *The Herald*, Karachi, August 1990, 33.
- ♦ *The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates: Official Report*, vol. 2, no. 5, March 29, 1989, 380-381.
- ♦ *The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates: Official Report*, vol. 2, no. 6, March 30, 1989, 521.
- ♦ *Ibid.*, 556.
- ♦ Nasir Malick interew by Gen. (retd.) K. M. Arif, *The Herald*, Karachi, August 1990. 37.
- ♦ Rashid, “for Islamabad”, 32.
- ♦ Sultan Ahmad, “Political Solution for Sindh”, *Dawn*, Karachi, June 27, 1991.
- ♦ *The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates: Official Report*, vol. 9, no. 13, October 29, 1991, 1600-1601.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 2, 1992.
- ♦ M.H. Askari, “Pitfalls in Military Operation”, *Dawn*, Karachi, June 3, 1992.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 2, 1992.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 5, 1992.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 2, 1992.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 5, 1992.
- ♦ M.H. Askari, “Pitfalls in Military Operation”, *Dawn*, Karachi, June 3, 1992.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 29, 1992. *Dawn*, Karachi, June 7, 1992.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 2, 1992.
- ♦ *Dawn*, Karachi, June 7, 1992.
- ♦ Shaheen Sehbai, “For Sindh, What is in Store?”, *Dawn*, Karachi, June 19, 1992. There were about eight MNAs vis a vis; Syed Pervez Ali Shah,

Jam Saifullah Dharejo, Abdus Sattar Bachani, Rafiq Mahesar, Syed Khurshid Shah, Shabbir Ahmed Chandio, Kishan Chand Pirwani besides Qaim Ali Shah and Nisar Khuhro of the Sindh Assembly and some others. Two journalists were also present in the course of talk.

- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 2, 1992. Dawn, Karachi, June 7, 1992.
- ♦ Aftab Ahmed, "Army Action in Sindh", Dawn, Karachi, June 25, 1992.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 5, 1992.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 19, 1992.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 30, 1992.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 24, 1992.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 29, 1992.
- ♦ Munir, *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, 225.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 29, 1992.
- ♦ M.H. Askari, "Pitfalls in Military Operation", Dawn, Karachi, June 3, 1992.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, June 29, 1992.
- ♦ M.H. Askari, "Pitfalls in Military Operation", Dawn, Karachi, June 3, 1992.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, November 29, 1992.
- ♦ Nauman Naqvi, and Hasan Mujtaba, "Under the Boot", *Newsline*, Karachi, November 1992, 28-29.
- ♦ Muhammad Hanif, "Newsline, Karachi, November 1992, 25-28.
- ♦ Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, "Power Play in Islamabad", *Newsline*, Karachi, June 1992, 24-25.
- ♦ Hassan Mujtaba and Mohammad Hanif, "Sindh: Divide and Rule?", *Newsline*, March 1994, Karachi, 37.
- ♦ Aftab Ahmad interview by Sheik by O.T. Siddiqui, *Newsline*, March 1994, Karachi, 38
- ♦ Mujtaba and Muhammad, "Divide and Rule?", 39.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, March 12, 1994.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, March 28, 1994.
- ♦ Farhatullah Baber, "Where Benazir is going Wrong", Dawn, Karachi, March 31, 1994.
- ♦ Benazir Bhutto interview by Okaz, Dawn, Karachi, July 10, 1994.
- ♦ Mohammad Waseem, "Turmoil in Sindh", Dawn, Karachi, May 9, 1994.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, May 15, 1994.
- ♦ Mohammad Waseem, "Turmoil in Sindh", Dawn, Karachi, May 9, 1994.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, July 10, 1994.
- ♦ Benazir Bhutto Interview by Okaz, Dawn, Karachi, July 10, 1994.
- ♦ Dawn, Karachi, May 27, 1994.

- ◆ M. B. Naqvi, “The Sindh Situation: What Altaf Thinks”, Dawn, Karachi, May 6, 1994.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, July 10, 1994.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, 11 July 1994.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, November 6, 1994. Dawn, Karachi, November 13, 1994.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, November 13, 1994.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, December 1, 1994.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, December 23, 1994.
- ◆ M. H. Askari, “Promises and Realities” Dawn, Karachi, December 21, 1994.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, March 29, 1995.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, July 16, 1995.
- ◆ Benazir Bhutto Interview by Kamran Thapar, Dawn, Karachi, August 27, 1995.
- ◆ Dawn, Karachi, January 3, 1996.
- ◆ M. H. Askari, “Karachi and its travails”, Dawn, Karachi, January 3, 1996.
- ◆ Dawn, May 8, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, May 10, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Nisar Khuhro interview in The Herald, July, 1997, Karachi, 34-35
- ◆ Dawn, June 18, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, June 26, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, June 28, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, July 4, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, July 7, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, July 9, 1997, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, January 11, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, January 6, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, April 1, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Idrees Bkhtiar, “City of Death”, The Herald, July, 1998, Karachi, 51.
- ◆ Dawn, June 29, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, July 2, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, July 4, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, October 28, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, December 4, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, December 28, 1998, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, October 2, 1999, Karachi.
- ◆ Dawn, October 5, 1999, Karachi.
- ◆ Altaf Hussain interview by Idrees Bakhtiar, The Herald, November-December, 1998, Karachi, 34.
- ◆ Dawn, December 31, 1998, Karachi.