

## INDO-PAK CRISIS IN WAKE OF TERRORIST ATTACK ON INDIAN PARLIAMENT

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### ABSTRACT

*The wave of terrorism has been a major threat to the world, especially to India and Pakistan. These two states have been suffering acts of terrorism for a very long time. India and Pakistan's support for the militancy has become a major strengthening point for the terrorists. The terrorist groups have taken a complete benefit of the situation, exploited the two states, and brought them into a confrontation against each other at many times. The main objective of this current research is to know the variables, which avoided predictable war between India and Pakistan during 2001-02 crises. This study employed a qualitative methodology to know the outcomes through secondary data analysis. This article answers two questions, which posed in the study. First, were terrorists successful in leading India and Pakistan towards war in 2001-02 crises? Second, did nuclear deterrence succeed to avert a crisis between the two countries? This article found that terrorists were so strong that they led two nuclear-weapon states towards a major crisis in 2001-02, which could result in a predictable dispute between the two states. Secondly, this article gives another finding that the nuclear preemption unsuccessful to avert a crisis between India and Pakistan during the 2001-02 crisis. The crises between these two South Asian nuclear states can only be resolved via diplomatic channel.*

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**Keywords:** Nuclear Deterrence, India, Pakistan, War, Crisis, Peace, Diplomacy

### INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks on the US mainland targeting World Trade Centers and the Pentagon changed the world scenario. This attack claimed about three thousand lives and cost heavy destruction. The United States announced a war on terror and started targeting terrorists wherever they are. It became successful to get the international community's support in the pursuance of its task to wipe out terrorists.

India suffered two major terrorist attacks at the end of 2001 after 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The legislative assembly of Kashmir was the first target of the terrorists, which claimed 35 lives in October 2001. Indian Parliament was the second terrorist target claiming more than ten lives in December. India did not respond harshly after the first attack but it showed extreme anger after the second terrorist attack. India mobilized its armed forces on the border and decided to attack on the terrorist hideouts in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. However, Pakistan had decided to retaliate in similar vain. In result, Pakistani forces were ready to face all type of challenges and response with complete force at bordering areas. The situation was worsening day by day. Due to tension between two atomic countries both reached a notch of war.

The diplomacy and diplomatic strategies have contributed a lot to avert conventional war between Asian powerful neighboring countries. External forces and communities such as the United States persuaded neighboring countries that war was not the solution of long standing disputes and it would not support any country in war therefore, better to avoid war. Pakistan under the international community's pressure banned two militant's groups and arrested hundreds of militants. The steps were taken by Pakistan finally averted the war type situation between two Asian countries.

#### **WHAT LED PAKISTAN ON THE WAY OF NUCLEARIZATION?**

The history of bloody partition and its war with India on Kashmir in 1948 made its belief firm that India is not going to be its friend and a major threat lies to it from the Indian side. This belief further strengthened when it fought another war with India on Kashmir in 1965. Indians intervened in East Pakistan and initiated the war against Pakistan. This war resulted in the dismemberment of East Pakistan and surrender of more than ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers before the Indian army. Pakistan's humiliation in the war put a severe impact on its people and especially it is military; was the moment when Pakistan seriously started considering nuclear (Khan and Brom, 2009).

Pakistan's position of getting nuclear weapons further strengthened after the Indian nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program faced some difficulties during the end of 1970s due to the US sanctions but later on when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan invited the United States to help it get Soviets

out of Afghanistan. The US agreed to Pakistan's point and here the new era of the cold war between the US and Soviet Union started. Pakistan got the benefit of this United States and Soviet Union rivalry and availed billions of dollars and modern weaponry from the United States. In the meantime, Pakistan also got an opportunity to continue its nuclear weapons program on a very fast track. In addition, it was because of this opportunity that Pakistan became successful to get nuclear weapons capability in the 1980s. Though it tested nuclear weapons in 1998, it had been able to manufacture nuclear weapons in the 1980s (Cheema, Interview, 2015).

Pakistan's motivation for nuclear weapons based on the element of insecurity it faced from the Indian side. The findings further added that Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India and Indian nuclear test in 1974 had contributed to Pakistan's way to nuclearization. According, to T. Fatemi (Personal Communication, October 30, 2015) Pakistan did not think of going after nuclear weapon program until the late 1960. It was dismemberment of Pakistan into two parts, and Indian nuclear test of 1974, which led it seriously to think about its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan just followed Indian path and it was the reason that when Indians tested nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan responded them by testing its nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's motivation for getting nuclear weapons was because of the extreme sense of insecurity compounded by two events including the trauma of Pakistan's defeat and dismemberment into two parts, which severely affected psychologically Pakistanis in general, and its army in particular as that was the very traumatic experience and Indian nuclear test of 1974. According to Kidwai (Personal Communication November 19, 2015) if Pakistan had nuclear weapons before India's nuclear test, India would have never dared to show such aggression against Pakistan. He added, later Indians called it as "Indian revenge for a thousand years' subjugation of India by Muslims", Indian celebrated the victory by giving "jingoistic and rhetoric statements.

Following the findings that the element of insecurity led Pakistan on the way of nuclearization and that insecurity was because of the wars Pakistan fought with India on Kashmir dispute, Z.Khan (Personal Communication, November 12, 2015) confirmed, that it was the security factor, which led Pakistan on the path of nuclearization, and that, based on two developments. First, it was the 1971 war and

dismemberment of East Pakistan. Second, it was the Indian nuclear test in 1974. Furthermore, Durrani (Personal Communication, November 3, 2015) endorsed Pakistan's right for nuclearization said that Pakistan's conventional military defeat in 1971 war and non-conventional threat emerging from the Indian side in the shape of 1974 nuclear test led Pakistan to tackle both Indian conventional and non-conventional threats with its nuclear weapons. He further added that Pakistan had a psychological impact of 1971 defeats and Indian nuclear test of 1974 and wanted to release that psychological pressure by working fast on its nuclear weapons program.

Endorsing Pakistan's position on nuclearization Solingen (1994:310) argues that in the anarchic structure of the society, states try hard to maximize their power to match other states and that is the reason that this security thrust of states leads them to attain nuclear weapons. Defending Pakistan's position to get nuclear weapons Gilpin, (1984:20) argues that the political conflicts between different states have been a major cause for states to opt for nuclear weapons. Gilpin further illustrated this point and explained, "The Soviet Union and the United States got nuclear weapons because of one another, China because of the two superpowers, India because of China, Pakistan because of India and Israel because of Arab states" (Gilpin, 1984:20).

The findings that the element of insecurity led Pakistan on the way of nuclearization have been further justified by Kidawi (Personal Communication, November 19, 2015). He believes that Pakistan firmly believed that in the presence of Pakistan's very strong inventory of nuclear weapons, the adversary, which is India as our (Pakistan's) nuclear program, is India centric; the Indians will not want to engage in any kind of serious conflict with Pakistan.

Sultan (Personal Communication, November 5, 2015) defended Pakistan's nuclear option and considered it as a source of providing security against India. He further added that Pakistan had a non-declaratory nuclear weapons capability by 1982 but it surfaced on the scenario in 1986-87 when Indian based on "Offensive Military Doctrine" initiated Brass-tacks military exercises, while, Pakistan countered it through "Defensive Offensive Military Doctrine". In the meantime, Dr. Qadeer Khan admitted that Pakistan had the nuclear weapons capability and said it could be used against India if India launches a conventional war against it.

Abbas (Personal Communication, November 2, 2015) also agreed that his conventional threat to Pakistan emerges from India. He believes that when India conducted a nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan became firm to continue its nuclear weapons program because it knew that its nuclear weapons could cause deterrence against Indian conventional as well as a nuclear threat. Hussain (Personal Communication, November 3, 2015) also endorsed that a sense of insecurity has its roots in 1971 defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan into two parts and Indian nuclear test of 1974 made Pakistan think of going nuclear. While Hoodbhoy looked Pakistan's nuclearization with the other way, "It was basically with the idea of revenge that Pakistan started its quest for nuclear weapons. After 1971, the loss of East Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto put the acquisition of nuclear weapons as one of his main priorities" (P. Hoodbhoy, Personal Communication, November 6, 2015).

Furthermore, P.Cheema (personal communication, November 13, 2015) argued that Pakistan faced with a security dilemma always had tried to search for the options, which could make it, secure against Indian conventional military threat. He also said that it was the reason that Pakistan joined alliances during its initial years because it could not match Indians conventional military strength and, saw an opportunity in alliances to secure itself from India. Further added, over the years Indian powerful economy helped it to purchase more conventional weapons in comparison to Pakistan and this increased gap resulted in Pakistan's increased dependency on nuclear weapons for its security. According to Abbasi (personal communication, November 12, 2015) Pakistan's policy motivation for nuclear weapons lied in Indian perceived threat to its security and it was seen visible by looking at the history of three wars between the two states in 1948, 1965 and 1971.

Pakistan's path for nuclearization was with the motive of seeking strategic parity with India. Pakistan's conventional military inferiority against India led it on the path of nuclearization. Pakistan is indulged into sub-conventional warfare against India under the garb of its nuclear weapons, which stops India from going after Pakistan. While the justifying Pakistan's path to nuclearization, Marwah (Personal Communication, January 25, 2015) said that Pakistan's motivation behind its nuclear program was to get "strategic parity with India and to achieve a leadership role among the Islamic comity of nations".

Marwah further argued that as Pakistan has lost all conventional wars against India in 1948, 1965 and 1971, it made it feel inferior to India in conventional military capabilities and led it on the way nuclearization.

Marwah further defended the impact of nuclear deterrence, “One might aver that both nations held back from a full-scale war in 1999 due to both having acquired/declared their nuclear weapons status”. This meant that nuclear weapons provided security to Pakistan against India Das (Personal Communication, February 9, 2015) also supported Pakistan’s nuclearization based on insecurity it felt from the Indian side and, it was Indo-Pak war in 1971 and dismemberment of East Pakistan, which created Indian fear “what can be described as an existential paranoia vis-à-vis India”. He added, “The tilting of the military balance favorably towards India over the last 2-3 decades had driven Pakistan to acquire deterrence capabilities against significantly larger Indian forces”. Das further added that the role of nuclear deterrence is Pakistan’s strategic policy is to stop Indians from going after Pakistan, and to avoid an “existential crisis”, and provide it with a “strategic umbrella” under which it could continue its sub-conventional policies without bringing Indian punishment.

Nye (Personal Communication, February 9, 2016) said that Indian nuclear test and Indo-Pak conventional military competition motivated Pakistan to go for the search of nuclear weapons. Nye further added, “Pakistan relies on nuclear deterrence to balance Indian conventional superiority”. According to Sahgal (2010), the conventional military asymmetry was forcing Pakistan to bring further changes into its nuclear weapons doctrine and to opt for tactical nuclear weapons to counter India’s Cold Start Doctrine, which meant to stop India from opting the space of limited conventional war.

To sum up, Pakistan motivation for nuclear weapons was because of its insecurity against India. This had its roots three wars fought between India and Pakistan in their three decades after independence. The two major events Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in 1971 war in which East Pakistan was dismembered with Indian intervention and second Indian nuclear test in 1974 led Pakistan to follow the path of nuclearization.

### **THE US WAR ON TERROR**

The whole world was shocked when the terrorists targeted the United States on September 11, 2001. The United States suffered

heavy losses in the result of these terrorist attacks. The terrorists targeted the USA's major buildings causing the death toll to almost 3000 lives and heavy economic losses in the result of the WTCs collapse. The United States announced war on terror to pursue terrorists and punish them wherever they are (Tellis, A.J, 2004).

The USA initiated a campaign to communicate and motivate World communities to favor and to support its war on terror. It became successful in international support on the war on terror. It demanded from Afghan government help and handover Osama Bin laden and other terrorists belonging to Al-Qaeda involved in a terrorist attack on the US mainland. Taliban government in Afghanistan refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and other terrorists to the United States. The crises did not reached to solutions because of Taliban response in negation to surrender Osama Bin Laden and other terrorists to the US. The United States finally decided to target Afghanistan to put an end to the terrorist network working over there. It attacked Afghanistan and put an end to the Taliban regime, and started its fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Tellis, A.J.).

#### **INDO-PAK CRISIS 2001-02)**

Wieninger (2004) states that both South Asian countries have tussled limited scale war at Kargil in 1999 and have been indulge into many crises after getting nuclear capability. Further, expert insisted that weapons are not to maintain peace in the region hence the assumption of the nuclear deterrence theory will not support here to deter tension and war between two powerful Asian countries.

India and Pakistan faced their fourth crisis in 2001-02 after getting the nuclear capabilities and the second one after testing nuclear weapons in May 1998. Carruth (2002) states that India and Pakistan's rivalry since their independence has dominated South Asian affairs and it has become more severe one after their nuclear capabilities. The crisis between the two states occurred when India suffered two terrorist attacks on its mainland in October and December in 2001. India did not respond in a harsh way when the legislative assembly of India was targeted on October 1, 2001 by terrorists killing about 35 people. India alleged that Pakistan based terrorist group was involved in that terrorist attack. India alleged Pakistan of its involvement in the attack. Pakistan refused to have its hand in the terrorist attack and condemned the terrorist attack (Cheema, Interview, 2015).



India suffered the second terrorist attack on its parliament on 13 December 2001. Terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament and killed more than 10 people in the attack but the terrorist failed to get its results as Indian forces responded very efficiently. The second terrorist attack on Indian Parliament angered India. It alleged Pakistan of its hand in the terrorist attack as Pakistan based terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammad was involved in terrorist attacks on the Indian mainland. It brought its forces on the border and decided to take benefit of the situation at the international level and target the terrorist hideouts in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The situation worsened and the relations between the two states reached the lowest point when India moved its half a million soldiers to the border and Pakistan responded by bringing its 0.3 million troops to the border. This was the strongest military buildup on the two sides after the 1971 war fought between the two countries (Cheema, Interview, 2015).

The war between the two nuclear-weapon states seemed to be a real possibility. The terrorists have once again become successful to take these two nuclear powers on the edge of war. The nuclear deterrence was not so successful in averting war between the two states. The two states remained in continuous rivalry with each other for coming many months. The eye to eye was going on between two militaries on the border.

Cheema (2004) states while examining the psychological oppressor assault on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 and its fallout, he expresses that following the fear monger assault on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, the objection in India for correctional or pre-emptive military activity against Pakistan raised to exceptional levels through a large portion of 2002. India prepared its military, cut off most channels of correspondence to Pakistan, and kept up an angry position, making respective relations droop to their least levels since the 1999 Kargil strife. Pakistan had to react with its very own counter preparation.

The activated military of both the nations situated on alert, prepared for war, for a long time. It was an amazingly perilous circumstance. Wild acts by fear mongers could have activated new flare-ups whenever, with military reactions ejecting into a full-scale war, making way for potential atomic heightening. It was a troublesome time for harmony and solidness in the South Asian area where India and Pakistan went nearest to war. The international



community became alert on the worsening situation between the two nuclear powers. The United States played a very important role to convince both sides not to go for a war. It also became successful to convince Pakistan to take action against the militant groups using Pakistan's territory against other states.

Pakistan under the US pressure took action against militants working in the country. Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf came on the media and announced to hold action against the militants. He announced a ban on two militant groups but refused to hand over 20 people wanted by India. Afterwards, about two thousand militants were arrested in the country. About 300 militant offices were closed. According to some experts, most of the militants became successful to get out of prison (Kapur, 2009).

The role of the international community played a very important role to avert the crisis between the nuclear-weapon states. The forces of the two countries remained on the border for many months but the things were not so severe one in the coming days. The diplomacy was the most successful one in averting war between the two countries.

### **CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

Hoodbhoy and Mian (2002) express that the connection between India and Pakistan has weakened after their atomic tests in 1998 and the two states have seen one emergency after another. They contend that the 2001-02 emergencies were serious in its power, as Indians appeared to be decidedly ready to hit aggressor-focusing Pakistan. At the point when Pakistan thought about the changing circumstance and saw Indian danger set itself up for a war. The two states appeared to be nearly war. They centre on the U.S. job to determine the issues among India and Pakistan as it has done before. They express that if the two states will not leave their juvenile mentality, South Asia would have a dim future. They at long last state, they dread that may be another part may sometime be written in the reading material managing the hypothesis of atomic prevention. They (Hoodbhoy and Mian, 2002) express that time is short and the United States' job is the key one in keeping up harmony in South Asia.

According to Yost (2005), nuclear deterrence is not any way an assurance of war resistance nor will it ensure that war will not happen. This only gives the probability of changing war-torn situation because both countries may feel that countries can have many nuclear assets

and may outnumber in the weapon, therefore, an opposite country at some level feel hesitate to reach aggressively. Hence, this situation is uncertain when non-stat actors involved in this scenario.

The Indo-Pak dispute is serious in response to the wake of a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. India seemed to be well prepared to launch strikes to target terrorist hideouts in Pakistan. The situation at the international level was also in its favor. Two powerful militaries were in the eye-to-eye condition on the border.

Following the Past practices, world diplomats performed their due role and contributed to minimizing the war-like situation between the two countries. Among others, the US contributed its good gesture and played responsibly in this dispute. The US convinced Pakistan authorities to punitive actions militant groups at various parts where they perform their activities. Pakistan's action against the militants paved the way for normalization of the relations between the two states.

However, in the tension between Indian and Pakistan, nuclear deterrence has not extraordinarily backed to diffuse the problem. If it effectively done its part, then the situation might be different in the region.

Terrorism and terrorist activities, have switched the situation between two countries at the verge of war therefore, it must be tackled sensitively. Those terrorists who changed the situation into war have affected socially and economically to the involved countries. Thus, both south Asian countries must handle terrorism effectively and should crush them at their hideouts. This discussion has come up with the point the international diplomacy played a decisive and healthy role in building peace and changing war type situation in 2001-2002.

## **CONCLUSION**

The terrorist was the key pillars who created tension between Indian and Pakistan. This happened after the terrorists attack the Indian Parliament. In response to this, Indian forces plan to retaliate and planned to attach on Pakistan. Since Pakistan comes to know that Indian forces planned to attach Pakistan, they issued directives to be ready for any situation to respond. This was time both countries were at the boundaries to attach the opponents. This military mobilization and threat of war in 2002 have affected the region severely and race for the weapons started in south Asian region countries especially

India and Pakistan. Both countries were threading to attack with nuclear weapons was a big challenge for the policymakers and public in general that if it happened then it would give great loss to the countries (Pervez Hoodbhoy and Zia Mian, 2002). The nuclear deterrence was not so effective in reducing the tension between two powers and averting the chances of war. Though there was no difference of opinion that the nuclear deterrence had some psychological impact but it was not successful to avert war between India and Pakistan during 2001-02 crises. The diplomacy became the most successful variable to reduce the tension between these two nuclear states as the United States played a very vital role in averting war between India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan need to have a basis for permanent peace. They should take confidence-building measures to have an end to trust deficit. They should focus on cooperation than confrontation with each other. They need to resolve their issues through negotiations. Both states should focus on trade, people-to-people contact and cultural ties other than depending on nuclear deterrence for peace. If the diplomacy can play a major role in averting war between the two countries then how useful, it would be if these two states o such as trade, people-to-people contact and cultural cooperation.

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#### INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY RESEARCHER(S)

Name	Organization/Status	Type of Interview	Date	Place
Amb ® Syed Tariq Fatimi	Special Assistant to Pakistan's PM on Foreign Affairs	Face to face	30.10.2015	Islamabad
Athar Abbas	Major General ® Pakistan Army	Face to face	02.11.2015	Islamabad
Asad Durrani	Lieutenant General ® Pakistan Army	Face to face	03.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr.Nazeer Hussain	Associate Professor, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad	Face to face	03.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr Maria Sultan	President South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)	Face to face	05.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr.Zafar Khan	Assistant Professor National Defense University, Islamabad	Face to face	06.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr.Zulfiqar	Professor, National Defense University, Islamabad	Face to face	06.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr.Pervez Hoodboy	Professor Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad	Face to face	06.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr.Nasrullah Mirza	Professor Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad	Face to face	09.11.2015	Islamabad
Akram Zaki	Ambassador ®	Face to face	11.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr.Rizwana Abbasi	Assistant Professor National Defense University, Islamabad	Face to face	12.11.2015	Islamabad
Prof.Dr.Zafar Iqbal Cheema	President Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad	Face to face	13.11.2015	Islamabad

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Dr.Pervez Iqbal Cheema	Professor and Dean National Defense University, Islamabad	Face to face	13.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr.Zafar Nawaz Jaspal	Director School of IR and Associate Professor Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad	Face to face	13.11.2015	Islamabad
Zamir Akram	Ambassador ®	Face to face	14.11.2015	Islamabad
Khalid Ahmed Kidwai	Lieutenant General ® Pakistan Army	Face to face	19.11.2015	Islamabad
Dr Onkar Marwah	Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India	Email interview	25.10.2016	India
Dr.Joseph Nye	Professor Harvard University	Email interview	30.01.2016	United States
Pushan Das	Research Assistant, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, India	Email interview	09.02.2016	India

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