INDIA’S HEGEMONIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PROGRAM RISKS AND RESULTS FOR SOUTH ASIA

Abstract

This research aims to elucidate the consequences of India's advancing nuclear deterrence program for South Asia's stability, spotlighting its perceived regional hegemonic ambitions. Utilising comprehensive methodologies, including in-depth analysis of missile development timelines, evaluations of nuclear stockpiles, and an understanding of strategic intent, this study contrasts India's proactive nuclear trajectory with Pakistan’s primarily responsive approach. A meticulous examination of the SIPRI data reveals discrepancies, especially when weighed against assertions by renowned scholars like Bharat Karnad. Furthermore, the study deciphers the multifaceted repercussions of the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, highlighting its unintended role in accelerating Pakistan's nuclear aspirations and exacerbating regional disparities. Drawing insights from the stability-instability paradox, which originates in Cold War dynamics, the research unravels the intricate and nuanced nuclear relationship between the two South Asian giants. Findings accentuate the significant perils posed by escalating nuclear prowess in the region. Consequently, this research strongly recommends initiating arms control protocols, bolstering diplomatic engagements, and heightened regional collaboration to defuse potential crises and foster a sustainable peace framework for South Asia.