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Rizwan Zeb
Ali Khan Ghumro


Employing the qualitative and historical analysis method, this paper overviews the Chinese nuclear doctrine and how it has evolved over the years with particular focus on the Chinese policy of ‘no-first use of nuclear weapons’ and its future. This paper argues that to understand the role assigned to the nuclear weapons in the Chinese defense policy, one must comprehend Chinese strategic thinking and where does nuclear weapons lie in this thinking. The paper further argues that for a better understanding of Chinese strategic thinking, it is imperative to be cognizant of the strategic language and vocabulary used by the Chinese strategic thinkers. The paper also analyses the command and control set up for the Chinese nuclear weapons and the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capability. The argument put forth is that the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capabilities is mostly exaggerated as it has security implications for American interests regionally and globally. The paper also argues that despite new emerging threats in the technological domain, China would continue pursuing the policy of no first use in the foreseeable future.

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