CHALLENGES TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA
INSIGHTS AND RESOLUTIONS POST-PULWAMA ATTACK
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47781/asia-pacific.vol42.Iss42.7375Keywords:
South Asian Security Environment, Challenges to Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Escalation, Security DilemmaAbstract
Nuclear deterrence has been a cornerstone for strategic stability in South Asia especially between Pakistan and India, but there are some political and strategic factors which grave challenges to nuclear deterrence in South Asia and the incident of Pulwama further intensified the situation. The study aims to identify and analyse various challenges posed to nuclear deterrence in South Asia especially after the crisis of Pulwama attack. Discussing challenges, the study finds that Indian hegemony ambitions and imbalanced power in the region, interventions of global powers, existence of non-state actors, lack of crisis management and absence of formal mechanism for dialogue and reconciliation are the biggest challenges posed to nuclear deterrence in the region. The study further aims to highlight and recommend steps to address challenges to nuclear deterrence. Firstly, a robust, reliable and urgent crisis management mechanism and effective communication channels should be established between both countries. Secondly, both states should initiate confidence building measures (CBM), and thirdly, both nations need to clarify and harmonise their nuclear doctrines, most importantly, there should be a mechanism to monitor and control arms race and maintain balance of power.
References
Batool, S. S. (2024). Identity politics in crisis management: A case study of India and Pakistan. Pakistan Horizon, 77(1), 75-88.
Bluth, C. (2010). India and Pakistan: a case of asymmetric nuclear deterrence. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 22(3), 387-406.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research in psychology, 3(2), 77-101.
Cirincione, J. (2013). The Most Dangerous Country on Earth. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 14(2), 91-100.
Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (3rd ed.). Sage Publications.
Ganguly, S., & Kapur, S. P. (2010). India, Pakistan, and the bomb: Debating nuclear stability in South Asia. Columbia University Press.
Hussain, R. (2020). Deterrence and nuclear use: Doctrines in South Asia. In The India-Pakistan nuclear relationship (pp. 151-184). Routledge India.
Hyder, A. T. O. (2013). Strategic restraint in South Asia. CISS Insight Journal, 1(2), 9-15.
Jaspal, Z. N. (2009). Paradox of deterrence: India-Pakistan strategic relations. Strategic Studies, 29(4), 49-71.
Jervis, R. (1989). War and misperception. In R. Gilpin (Ed.), The origin and prevention of major wars (p. 102). Cambridge University Press.
Kanwal, M. (2022). Nuclear weapons: A source of peace and stability between India and Pakistan. SSRN. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4105194 (Accessed: April 4, 2023).
Karim, U. (2019). India and Pakistan: A case study in crisis management. In Globalisation in retreat: Risks and opportunities (p. 294).
Khan, K. (2013). Deterrence stability, security doctrines and escalation control in South Asia. Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 62, 66.
Khan, R., Mustafa, G., & Liaqat, B. B. (2022). Nuclear deterrence and South Asia: Theory and its prerequisites. Annals of Human and Social Sciences, 3(2), 284-291.
Khan, Z. (2013). South Asian nuclear equation. Strategic Studies, 33(2), 1-18.
Khan, Z. (2014). Pakistan's nuclear policy: A minimum credible deterrence. Routledge.
Kliman, D., Rehman, I., Lee, K., & Fitt, J. (2019). Imbalance of power. Center for a New American Security.
Krepon, M. (2013). Pakistan's nuclear strategy and deterrence stability. In Deterrence stability and escalation control in South Asia (pp. 65-92).
Luk, U. H. (2016). Strategic ambiguities in Indian nuclear doctrine: Implications for Pakistan's security. Policy Perspectives: The Journal of the Institute of Policy Studies, 13(1), 5-23.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1983). Conventional deterrence. Cornell University Press.
Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in the modern era: Regional powers and international conflict. Princeton University Press.
Rais, R. B. (2020). Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Posture. In The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship (pp. 51-82). Routledge India.
Rana, A. (2018). Challenges to strategic stability in South Asia. Strategic Studies, 38(2), 1-20.
Roberts, B. (2021). Orienting the 2021 nuclear posture review. The Washington Quarterly, 44(2), 123-142.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2019). SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, disarmament and international security. Oxford University Press. Retrieved accessed: April 30, 2024, from https://www.sipri.org
Suto, T. (2004). Prospect of arms control and CTBT in South Asia. Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 209-210.
Tandon, A., & Slobodchikoff, M. O. (2019). Building trust: Cooperation between rivals India and Pakistan. The Round Table, 108(2), 189-201.
Zeenat, R. (2011). India-Pakistan: Deterrence to compellence. Eurasia Review: News & Analysis. Retrieved from http://www.eurasiareview.com/10032011-india-pakistan-deterrence-to-compellence/ (Accessed on June 4, 2024).
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
