THE UNITED STATES MILITARY POSTURE IN ASIA-PACIFIC AND ENHANCED SECURITY DILEMMA

Authors

  • Muhammad Naveed Qaisar Quaid-I-Azam University Islamabad
  • Aroona Khan Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47781/asia-pacific.vol42.Iss42.7401

Keywords:

Asia-Pacific, AirSea Battle, US military posture, Nuclear non-proliferation, Security dilemma

Abstract

This paper argues that United States is adhering to an offensive military posture of ‘AirSea Battle’ (ASB) concept in the backdrop of military, political, and economic rise of China. It aims to strengthen extended deterrence and deter China to initiate limited conflict. However, this paper posits that such military posture is resulting into an intense security dilemma and triggering an arms race between the United States and China. Such outcome may not be compatible with existing grand strategy of the United States, which emphasise economic interdependence and nuclear non-proliferation. This paper recommends that the United State needs to change its existing military posture and reassure China that the United State would not threaten its vital interests.

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Published

2024-12-31